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Abstract
This thesis studies inflation dynamics, investigating both reasons why
prices change, and why they sometimes do not. It investigates four areas
that are of interest to monetary policy makers, but where our knowledge
is incomplete.
The first area investigated is the causes of price stickiness at the firm
level. Insight is given by a large survey of price-setting behaviour of
New Zealand firms. There is a large degree of heterogeneity in price-
setting practices between, and within, sectors. Explicit contracts, implicit
contracts and strategic complementarity are the most widely recognised
causes of price rigidity. Menu costs and sticky information are not widely
recognised.
The second area investigated is how exporters price, and in particular
the decisions over currency of invoice and whether to differentiate prices
across markets. In sharp contrast to commonly held views, we find that
primary sector firms do differentiate prices across markets. Indeed, these
firms are more likely to do so in New Zealand than firms in other sectors.
Larger, and more productive firms, are more likely to differentiate prices.
This thesis then studies the influence that global inflation factors have
on domestic inflation. A CPI database for 223 countries and territories
extends the previous research, which focuses on high income countries.
Global factors explain a large share of the variance of national inflation
rates in advanced countries, but not for less developed countries. More
generally, global factors have greater influence in countries with higher
GDP per capita, financial development and central bank transparency.
Global factors explain a large share of the variance of food and energy
prices but a much smaller share of the variance of other sub-components.
Finally, this thesis carries out the first systematic analysis of the im-
pact on inflation of disasters caused by natural hazards. There is a large
degree of heterogeneity, with disasters having little significant effect in
advanced countries, but having effects that can persist for years in devel-
oping economies. There are also differences between types of disasters
and sub-indices of inflation. Storms have a short-run impact on food price
inflation that lasts for the first two quarters, before being reversed in the
subsequent two. Earthquakes reduce CPI inflation excluding food, hous-
ing and energy.
To my amazing wife, Anthea, for allowing me to have the many evenings
and weekends required to carry out this part-time PhD without unneces-
sary interruptions.
To my daughter, Julia, for providing necessary interruptions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Inflation dynamics – when, why and by how much prices change – is a
key concern of monetary policy makers, especially given the widespread
adoption of inflation targeting. In the quarter of a century since it was first
introduced by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1989, all the major cen-
tral banks have adopted some form of inflation target. Yet the transmission
of monetary policy to inflation is subject to “long, variable and uncertain”
lags (Friedman, 1961), requiring monetary policy makers to pay close at-
tention to the drivers of inflation and to understand the inflation process.
The literature on inflation, and monetary policy more generally, is vast.
Rather than attempt to review such a large literature, this thesis instead
focuses on four areas that are of interest to monetary policy makers, but
where our knowledge is incomplete. The aim of the analysis here is to
reduce these gaps in our knowledge through answering four questions:
Why are prices sticky? How do exporters set their prices? What is the role of global
inflation factors in driving domestic inflation? What is the impact of disasters on
inflation? These questions are answered in turn in the following chapters
of this thesis.
The first question relates to what causes firms to change prices, and
why they choose at times to not change. The aggregation of individual
firm decisions across the economy results in the measured inflation rate.
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The existence of rigidities – price stickiness – at the level of the firm has
an important bearing on the ability of monetary policy to affect output.
While many theories abound on the causes of price stickiness, differen-
tiating between the competing theories is more problematic. Analysing
the responses to the first price-setting survey carried out in New Zealand
provides insight to the underlying causes of price stickiness.
How exchange rate movements pass into prices has bearing on mone-
tary policy transmission. It is a widely attested phenomenon that move-
ments in the domestic prices of internationally traded goods are much
smaller than the corresponding move in the exchange rate, particularly
in more developed economies. There are a number of potential causes of
this exchange rate ‘disconnect’, with the focus here on how exporters set
prices.
The influence of global factors on domestic inflation extends beyond
movements in exchange rates. Recent research has found that movements
in global inflation factors can account for a large share of the variance of
national inflation rates. Yet the literature to date has for the most part fo-
cused on a small group of high income countries. A CPI database of 223
countries and territories, collected from national and international sources,
allows this question to be investigated at a truly global level.
The final question studied in this thesis is how disasters caused by nat-
ural hazards – such as earthquakes, storms and floods – affect inflation.
Of the four gaps in our knowledge studied here, the effect of disasters
is probably the most significant. Despite the frequency of these events
throughout the world, and the potential for massive economic disruption,
very little is known about the impact on prices. The analysis here is the
first systematic attempt to quantify the impact of disasters on inflation.
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1.1 Why are prices sticky?
Modern macroeconomic models, such as the Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models commonly used by central banks, are ‘micro-
founded’, which is to say derived from the optimising behaviour of indi-
vidual agents in the economy. Such models are typically unable in pure
form to match the persistence witnessed in real world data. As a result,
the models used by central banks incorporate a number of rigidities to
increase the persistence of variables, notably inflation (for example, see
Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007; Kamber et al., 2015).
These rigidities are often implemented in an ad hoc fashion, and the
purpose of chapter 2 is to investigate the types of nominal rigidities that
delay firms from changing price. The responses to a 2010 purpose-built
survey on price-setting by New Zealand firms provide the basis for this
analysis. Using surveys to understand firms pricing behaviour is not new
– Hall and Hitch (1939) developed the now-familiar kinked demand curve
from the responses to their survey. The use of surveys was reinvigorated
by Blinder et al. (1998) and there have been recent country surveys for
the euro area (Fabiani et al., 2006) and the United Kingdom (Greenslade
and Parker, 2012). The survey used here is the first such survey for New
Zealand.
The advantage of behavioural surveys is that they allow the differen-
tiation between competing theories that are unobservable in the micro
price data. For example, it is not possible to tell using price quote data
whether prices remain unchanged because of explicit, formal contracts, or
because of firms’ perception of the level of competition. Similarly, by ask-
ing firms separately about the timing of price reviews (when firms assess
available information to decide on what the optimal price is) and actual
price changes it is possible to differentiate between theories that rely on
rigidities at different points in the pricing process.
The responses to the survey point to a wide heterogeneity in pricing
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behaviour by New Zealand firms. There is a notable divergence between
sectors, but also within sectors, with many sectors having both firms that
reset prices on a daily basis and those that reset prices less frequently than
annually. The median number of times a New Zealand firms reviews its
prices is twice per year, but the median number of changes is one.
In terms of the underlying causes of price stickiness, the rigidity that
firms were most likely to cite as being ‘very important’ for not changing
prices is explicit contracts. Implicit contracts, where the firm wishes to
maintain an ongoing relationship and does not wish to antagonise its cus-
tomers, was the second most recognised reason. Firms selling to house-
holds and individuals were less likely overall to cite these reasons, sug-
gesting that price stickiness is more a function of producer rather than
retail, prices. There is little support in the responses for two popular theo-
retical justifications for stickiness – menu costs and sticky information.
1.2 How do exporters set their prices?
It is a well documented fact that domestic prices of internationally traded
goods move by less than the exchange rate. This incomplete pass-through,
frequently termed ’exchange rate disconnect’ is the subject of a large liter-
ature. There are a number of reasons why the dynamics of traded goods
price inflation and the exchange rate may differ. In chapter 3 we consider
two of these channels: local currency pricing, where exporters choose to
price in currencies other than their own, and pricing to market where firms
choose to vary mark-ups and the price of their product, expressed in com-
mon currency terms, differs between countries.
The responses of a survey of 1281 New Zealand exporters are used to
study the factors that contribute to the decisions of exporters to invoice in
foreign currency and to price to market. There are a number of advantages
to using surveys relative to the unit record customs data more commonly
used in the literature. First, the survey explicitly asks firms whether the
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price (in domestic currency terms) is the same across all markets. Customs
data do not, of themselves, include information on the domestic market,
so is unable to identify cases where the export price (even if common to
all foreign destinations) is different from the domestic price.
Second, the survey used here covers the service sector. Customs data
require the physical movement of goods across borders, so is silent on the
pricing behaviour of service sector firms, who account for a significant
share of advanced countries exports. Third, the survey directly asks firms
the reasons for choosing to differentiate prices between markets. It also
provides other information on the exporters to permit a more thorough
understanding of the firm characteristics that contribute to the decisions
on invoice currency and whether to price to market.
The responses point a large majority of primary sector firms pricing to
market. Indeed, even accounting for other firm characteristics, primary
sector firms are more likely to price to market than firms in other sectors.
This finding is in stark contrast to the assumption in the literature that
the price for such products is determined by the balance of international
demand and supply and is consequently the same across countries.
In terms of firm characteristics, larger and more productive firms are
more likely to price to market. Primary sector firms aside, there is no dif-
ference across sectors of firms’ decision to price to market once other firm
characteristics are accounted for. Conversely, the sector that a firm oper-
ates in has a large bearing on the decision on currency of invoice.
1.3 What is the role of global inflation factors in
driving domestic inflation?
The past decade has witnessed large movements in international commod-
ity prices, which have affected domestic consumer prices, particularly the
prices for food and energy. Recent research has highlighted the role of
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global factors in determining domestic inflation, with the share of infla-
tion variance explained by global factors estimated as high as 70 percent
(Ciccarelli and Mojon, 2010).
The literature on the subject has to date mostly focused on a small
group of advanced economies. To consider ‘global’ inflation in a truly
global context, chapter 4 details the collection of a database of quarterly
consumer price indices for headline (all items), food, housing, energy and
the remainder of the index. The database covers 223 countries and ter-
ritories over the period 1980 to 2012. While headline figures are readily
available from international sources such as the IMF’s International Finan-
cial Statistics, the majority of sub-indices had to be obtained from national
sources. Every feasible effort has been made to make the sub-indices com-
parable between countries by adhering as closely as possible to interna-
tionally recognised classifications.
This database is used to construct a number of measures of global infla-
tion. These measures do explain a large share of the variance of national
inflation rates in advanced economies, confirming the previous findings
in the literature. However, as the level of development decreases, so does
the share of national inflation explained by global inflation. Very little of
the variance of low income countries is explained by the global measure.
Analysis by sub-index suggests global measures mostly account for
movements in food and energy prices, which are also the most volatile
sub-indices. In terms of explaining differences across countries, greater
GDP per capita, higher financial development and higher central bank
transparency are all associated with a greater influence of global factors.
These findings confirm the existence of global factors influencing domes-
tic inflation rates, but also suggest the observed large share in advanced
economies is also a function of the success of monetary policy in reducing
domestically generated variation.
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1.4 What is the impact of disasters on inflation?
The final question investigated in this thesis is the impact of large shocks
on inflation. The DSGE models used by central banks are linearised around
steady state and are therefore ill suited for considering the impact of a
large shock that moves the economy far from steady state. Yet these large
shocks can have massive implications for welfare. Barro (2009) estimates
the welfare cost of these rare, but extreme, events at 20 percent of output,
far beyond the 1.5 percent estimated welfare cost of normal business cycle
fluctuations.
Chapter 5 studies the impact on inflation dynamics of one class of large
shocks – large disasters caused by natural hazards, such as earthquakes,
storms and floods. In the context of complex economic interrelationships,
studying these shocks is appealing since the underlying hazard is unre-
lated to the economy. Much progress has been made in recent years in un-
derstanding the impact of such disasters on output (e.g. Noy, 2009; Loayza
et al., 2012; Fomby et al., 2013), yet little is known about the impact on
inflation. Indeed, Cavallo and Noy (2011) in their recent survey of the lit-
erature on disasters point to the effect on prices as being one of the main
remaining gaps in our knowledge of disasters. The analysis in chapter 5
is the first systematic study undertaken of the impact of disasters on infla-
tion.
The analysis combines two large databases. The first is the database on
consumer prices, whose collection is set out in chapter 4. This database
is the only one with widespread coverage of CPI sub-indices. Differing
types of disasters may have distinct effects on individual sub-indices. The
second database is the EM-DAT database collected by the Centre for Re-
search on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the University of Louvain. It
contains information on a wide range of disasters, including number of
people killed, number of people affected and (less frequently) damage
caused. This database is widely used in the literature and is the only one
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with widespread coverage that is publicly available at this time.
The analysis confirms a wide heterogeneity in the impact of disasters.
The impact of disasters in advanced countries is for the most part insignif-
icant, whereas in developing countries the impact is significant and can
last for several years following the disaster. There is also heterogeneity in
the impact by type of disaster and by CPI sub-index. For example, storms
have a short-run impact on food price inflation that lasts for six months
before being reversed in the subsequent six-month period. Earthquakes
reduce CPI inflation excluding food, housing and energy.
Chapter 2
Why are prices sticky?
2.1 Introduction
Price-setting behaviour of firms determines inflation dynamics and is of
crucial importance for monetary policy. Nominal rigidities in prices affect
monetary policy’s ability to influence real activity.1 For example, suppose
the money supply doubles. The efficient response is for all prices in the
economy to double, and real quantities to remain unaffected. But if prices
do not immediately adjust to the doubling of the money supply, then falls
in nominal interest rates translate into falls in real interest rates, stimulat-
ing the economy and increasing output until prices adjust.
Great progress in our understanding of the firm-level drivers of price
rigidity has been made in recent years, principally using the price quotes
used in the construction of consumer and producer price indices.2 These
studies provide useful information on the timing and size of price changes,
which allows indirect empirical estimation of the relevance of competing
theories.
1Recent work by Bhattarai et al. (2014) finds that the source of the shock and the re-
sponse of monetary policy can affect the impact of price flexibility on output.
2See Klenow and Malin (2010) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) for excellent sum-
maries of the micro price data literature.
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This chapter takes an alternative identification approach by analysing
the responses to a survey that directly asks firms about their pricing be-
haviour. The advantage of behavioural surveys is that they allow the dif-
ferentiation between competing theories that are unobservable in the mi-
cro price data. For example, it is not possible to tell using price quote data
whether prices remain unchanged because of explicit, formal contracts,
or the effects of firms’ perception of the level of competition. Similarly,
by asking firms separately about the timing of price reviews (when firms
assess available information to determine what the optimal price is) and
actual price changes it is possible to differentiate between theories that rely
on rigidities at different points in the pricing process.
The use of surveys to answer questions about pricing behaviour was
reinvigorated by Blinder (1991) and Blinder et al. (1998), who survey US
firms on their price-setting behaviour and the sources of price stickiness.
There have been several follow-up surveys in other countries, including
surveys for Sweden (Apel et al., 2005), Canada (Amirault et al., 2006), the
euro area (Fabiani et al., 2006), Australia (Park et al., 2010) and the United
Kingdom (Greenslade and Parker, 2012).
The New Zealand survey is the largest country survey carried out to
date, with a markedly superior response rate (see table 2.10 in the ap-
pendix). It has more than twice the respondents of the next largest survey,
and over 25 times the number of respondents in Blinder (1991). It is also
the first such survey that covers all non-government sectors in the econ-
omy. The survey was carried out in 2010 under the auspices of Statistics
New Zealand’s annual Business Operations Survey.
The survey contained a number of questions around pricing behaviour.
Put simply, a firm’s optimal price will change when supply and / or de-
mand conditions in a firm’s market change. Not changing price when the
optimal price changes means that there is some form of rigidity prevent-
ing prices from changing. This article focuses on the questions relating to
how frequently firms review and change prices, and the factors that pre-
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vent more frequent changes – i.e. the causes of price rigidity. The theories
of price rigidity of particular focus are:
Explicit contracts : where the firm agrees with its customers to fix the
price of its good or service for a period of time. Contributions to
this theory include Fischer (1977) and Barro (1977).
Implicit contracts : where firms are reluctant to increase prices since this
might encourage customers to search for a new supplier (see Okun,
1981). This theory also considers concepts of ‘fairness’ – that
customers accept price increases caused by increases in costs, but
are ‘angered’ by price increases following higher demand (e.g.
Rotemberg, 2005).
Strategic complementarity : where the optimal price for a firm is a
function of its competitors’ prices. Ball and Romer (1990) show that
strategic complementarity can increase nominal rigidity and Gertler
and Leahy (2008) show that when strategic complementarity is
strong enough price stickiness in a state-dependent model can
match that of a time-dependent model. Indirect attempts to
estimate the extent of strategic complementarity (e.g. Kryvtsov and
Midrigan, 2013; Bils et al., 2012) find little or no evidence of its
presence.
Menu costs : are costs involved in actually changing price (e.g.
Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977; Akerlof and Yellen, 1985; Mankiw,
1985). In the presence of such costs prices, firms will typically only
change once the optimal price diverges sufficiently from the current
price, resulting in sticky prices.
Sticky information : There are a number of theories that point to the
review stage as the source of price stickiness. These theories posit
that the costs of gathering and processing the information required
to assess the optimal price prevent the regular updating of prices.
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Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose a model of sticky information. In
this model, firms receive infrequent updates to the information
required to assess optimal prices. In the absence of new
information, firms continue along their previous pricing schedule –
a case of ‘sticky price plans’ rather than sticky prices. It follows that
firms with sticky information would change more frequently than
review prices since planned changes would take place even in the
absence of new information.
Multi-product firms : recent research highlights that the price-setting
practices of multi-product firms diverge from those firms selling
just one product, resetting prices more frequently, and carrying out
a greater proportion of smaller price changes (Bhattarai and
Schoenle, 2014). Midrigan (2011) models multi-product firms
assuming economies of scope in price-setting – once a firm changes
one price it is able to reset its price for its other products without
further costs. Alvarez and Lippi (2014) demonstrate analytically
that such behaviour in multi-product firms increases the size and
duration of output effects from a monetary shock.
Studies of price-setting behaviour in New Zealand have to date been
rare. Buckle and Carlson (2000) use qualitative survey responses to Quar-
terly Survey of Business Opinion (QSBO). They find that large firms (as
measured by number of employees) change prices more frequently than
smaller firms, which they attribute to lump sum menu costs that are pro-
portionately larger for smaller firms. Coleman and Silverstone (2007) also
use data from the QSBO, finding considerable heterogeneity in price-setting
behaviour.
The survey analysed here is the first purpose-designed behavioural
survey carried out in New Zealand, and is superior to the QSBO for the
purposes of understanding firms’ price-setting behaviour in a number of
dimensions. First, the questions are specifically designed to elicit the un-
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derlying causes of price stickiness, including understanding the differing
influences on the review and change stages of the price-setting process.
Second, there are a markedly higher number of respondents. Finally, the
firms are carefully stratified and sampled across all private sector indus-
tries to accurately represent the make-up of firms in the New Zealand
economy.
The responses to the survey point to large heterogeneity in price-setting
behaviour both within and between sectors. Most sectors had some firms
that did not change price over the previous year, as well as some firms
that change price on a daily frequency. The median number of price re-
views is twice over the previous year, but the median annual number of
price changes is one. There is also marked heterogeneity in price-setting
behaviour by firm size, with larger firms resetting prices more frequently.
This is in line with the previous research on New Zealand and with the
findings of Goldberg and Hellerstein (2009). Multi-product firms reset
prices more frequently, even taking into account other firm characteris-
tics. Price stickiness is more prevalent in firm-to-firm transactions, with
those firms selling to households and individuals changing prices more
frequently.
Explicit and implicit contracts are the most cited reasons for firms to
leave prices unchanged. This is an important finding since such contracts
are not reported in the micro price data, and evidence in the literature on
their existence is sparse. Strategic complementarity, where a firm’s opti-
mal price depends on its competitors’ prices, is also commonly cited as
being very important in preventing price increases. Physical (menu) costs
involved in changing prices are rarely viewed as being important. There
is little support for the costs of gathering information having an impact on
the frequency of reviews.
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2.2 Survey design and characteristics of respon-
dents
2.2.1 Survey design
The data used here originate from the 2010 Business Operations Survey
carried out by Statistics New Zealand in August 2010.3 The module on
price and wage setting was funded by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand,
the University of Tasmania and Victoria University of Wellington. The
author provided advice on questions to the Reserve Bank, who set the
preliminary questions. These preliminary questions were then trialled by
Statistics New Zealand to test for comprehension. The survey was admin-
istered by Statistics New Zealand, with access to the individual repsonses
provided under the Statistics Act 1975.
The target population was businesses on Statistics New Zealand’s Busi-
ness Frame with an annual GST turnover greater than NZD 30,000 and
at least 6 employees. Firms operating in public administration and safety
were excluded, as were local government enterprises, the central bank and
non-profit institutions in the service of households. The final estimated
population size of firms was 35,307 enterprises. The sample design was a
two-level stratification, firstly by Australia and New Zealand Standard In-
dustrial Classification 2006 (ANZSIC06) industrial sector, and then by firm
size within each sector, as determined by number of employees. The four
employment size groups were small (6-19 employees), medium 1 (20-29
employees), medium 2 (30-49 employees) and large (50+ employees). The
reporting stratification for publication is slightly different from that used
in the sample stratification, with the firm employment sizes used here be-
3See http://www.statistics.govt.nz/browse for stats/businesses/business growth
and innovation/business-op-survey-2010-tables.aspx for a full description of the
survey. A full copy of the survey questionnaire is available at http://www2.stats.
govt.nz/domino/external/quest/sddquest.nsf/12df43879eb9b25e4c256809001ee0fe/
6233ea80fe191165cc25777d007a8490/$FILE/BOS%202010 Sample.pdf
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ing: small (6-19 employees), medium (20-100 employees) and large (100+
employees).
The survey was sent to a random sample of firms within this sampling
frame. Firms were asked to report on the most recently completed fi-
nancial year prior to the sampling date. The survey had 5369 replies, a
response rate of 81.8 percent and comprising approximately one firm in
seven of the total population of firms.
One problem associated with surveys is the bias associated with self-
selection of responses. The mitigating factor for this survey is that firms
are legally obliged to respond to survey requests from Statistics New Zealand,
which reduces the incidence of self-reporting bias. The response rate for
this survey is far superior to the response rates of other surveys in the
literature, which are typically below 50 percent (see table 2.10 in the ap-
pendix).
To reduce the impact of any sample composition bias, the results pre-
sented here have been re-weighted to represent the population of firms,
using weights provided by Statistics New Zealand. These weights are cal-
culated within each industry and firm size stratum such that multiplying
each firm in the sample by its weight will deliver the number of firms
in the total population in each stratum. The mean weight of firms is 6.6,
with around 80 percent of firms having a weight less than 10. That the
vast majority of individual firm weights are close to the overall sample to
population ratio suggests that the sample stratification was successful in
delivering a representative sample.
It should be noted that these weights deliver aggregate and sectoral
statistics that are firm-count weighted, so emphasise the behaviour of the
more numerous smaller firms. Firms with more employees in general have
a greater share of sector value added than those with fewer, so a sector
aggregate based on output (perhaps of more interest to macroeconomic
policymakers) could potentially differ from the results shown here. To
account for this potential difference, the aggregate results for each ques-
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tion are also presented using employment weights, calculated by dividing
the aggregate employment in each stratum derived from Statistics New
Zealand’s 2010 Business Demography Survey by the number of firms in
that stratum.4 Data for output by employment size and by industry are
unfortunately not available.
2.2.2 Relevance of survey questions for price-setting be-
haviour of respondents
Economic theory on pricing concentrates on profit-maximising firms that
are able to determine their own price. Previous surveys (e.g. Blinder et al.,
1998; Amirault et al., 2006; Greenslade and Parker, 2012) consequently ex-
cluded firms in certain sectors from their sample, notably in primary in-
dustries and in the health and education sectors. Prices in primary indus-
tries5 were assumed by these authors to be set by the balance of supply
and demand in international markets and firms consequently assumed to
be price-takers. Similarly, firms operating in the health and education sec-
tors often have some form of regulatory control over pricing.
The New Zealand survey includes these sectors in its sampling frame,
but asks firms who reviews and sets the prices. For the primary sectors,
the assumption made by previous papers has some validity – less than
half of the firms in the primary sectors set their own prices. Three quarters
of firms surveyed in the health and education sectors set their own prices,
although the survey excludes local government enterprises, such as public
hospitals, which account for a large share of activity in those sectors. The
4Pre-school and school education and hospitals were excluded on the assumption that
the majority of employment within these industries would primarily be in the state sector.
5Respondents have been grouped into broad sectors to aid presentation of results.
These broad sectors are primary (agriculture, fishing, forestry and extraction), indus-
try (manufacturing, electricity, gas and other fuels), distribution (wholesale and retail),
government services (health and education) and private services (all remaining service
sectors)
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share of businesses that set their own prices within the other sectors is
much higher – reaching 95 percent for industry and construction. In the
following analysis, the data presented relate only to those firms that are
responsible for setting their own prices.
2.2.3 Customer groups
The survey indicated that a large proportion of transactions takes place
between firms. 57 percent of respondents identified other businesses as the
main customers for their product or service. Of those business customers,
firms outside of the business group are the largest customer type, followed
by retailers and wholesalers. Households are the next largest customer
group, with 45 percent of respondents.
Firms in the industry sector are much less likely to sell to individuals or
households, with 87 percent of these firms selling primarily to businesses.
A fifth of firms in the government services sector sold their product or
service primarily to the government. In terms of firm size, smaller firms
are more likely to sell direct to households, whereas a higher proportion
of larger firms sold to retailers and other businesses.
There is a large degree of continuing customer relationships, with three
quarters of firms having at least half of their customers return for repeat
business. This high degree of repeat customers is consistent with the cus-
tomer markets theory of pricing, (see e.g. Bils, 1989). Firms whose main
customers are households are less likely to have repeat customers – only
62 percent of these firms had more than half their customers returning,
compared with 87 percent of firms with other main customer types.
2.3 Frequency of price reviews and changes
The literature on price setting makes the distinction between two stages of
the process for setting prices. In the first stage, the firm gathers informa-
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tion as to what the optimal price (or potentially the optimal pricing strat-
egy) may be. In the second stage, the firm decides on whether it should
change its current price to, or at least towards, this optimal price. The ad-
vantage of a behavioural survey over price-quote data is that it permits
understanding of these two stages separately.
2.3.1 Are prices time or state dependent?
There are some costs associated with reviewing and changing prices, which
are discussed in greater detail below. As a result of these costs, most
firms do not continuously adjust prices.6 The literature differentiates be-
tween two forms of price setting: time-dependent and state-dependent pric-
ing. Time-dependent pricing is where price resets happen as a function
of time. In some models the time between price reset is fixed, e.g. Tay-
lor (1980), in others the opportunity to reset prices is random, (e.g. Calvo,
1983). In state-dependent models, the price is changed in reaction to shocks.
Such models typically assume a cost of changing prices, (e.g. Sheshinski
and Weiss, 1977; Dotsey et al., 1999). The consequence of these costs is
that firms do not change prices until a shock occurs that is large enough to
create sufficient divergence between the current and optimal price for it to
be worthwhile to change price.
The survey asked firms whether they reviewed prices at regular inter-
vals, in response to specific events, or a combination of the two strategies.
A quarter of firms review prices at regular intervals only, 15 percent did
so in response to events, and the majority (61 percent) use the combined
strategy. These response rates are similar across sectors and firm sizes.
This suggests that using time-dependent pricing in a model of the econ-
omy is appropriate in ‘normal’ times, but there is a risk that price-setting
behaviour could deviate markedly from model predictions in the presence
6As shown below, 5 percent of firms review their prices daily, which could be viewed
as effectively continuous.
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of large shocks.
2.3.2 What factors influence prices?
Firms were asked which factors were important for price setting, indicat-
ing whether these factors were always important, or whether there is an
asymmetry between increases and falls in these factors. Figure 2.1 sets
out the average response, with a larger bar indicating a greater propor-
tion of firms citing this factor as being important for price changes. ‘Other
costs’ (e.g. purchases of goods form suppliers, rent) are viewed as the
most important factor affecting prices, followed by labour costs, competi-
tors’ prices and demand. Productivity, finance costs and the number of
competitors are seen as important factors by just over half of firms. How-
ever, the majority of firms did not view inventories as an important factor
affecting prices.
There are some notable asymmetries, with costs in particular being
more important for price rises than price falls. The number of firms cit-
ing costs as being important for price increases is noticeably larger than
the proportion of firms citing these reasons as being important for only
price falls. This asymmetry of responses for the importance of costs is in
keeping with the findings of Coleman and Silverstone (2007).
Conversely, the number of firms citing demand as being important for
only price increases is approximately the same as those who said it only
affected price decreases. The response that demand is important for both
price increases and decreases is much bigger than either of the previous
one-sided responses, implying a symmetric response. Given this symmet-
ric response to changes in demand, there may not be much difference in
price-setting behaviour through the cycle. These results for the importance
of demand contrast with the findings of Coleman and Silverstone (2007),
who find that demand changes are far more important for price decreases
than increases.
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Figure 2.1: Factors that affect price changes (percent of firms citing factor
as important for price changes)
To some extent, asymmetry in response to costs may reflect the evo-
lution of such costs. Nominal wages rarely fall, so respondents may not
have experience of price setting following lower labour costs. Further,
while labour costs may be important for the price level of a firm, it does
not necessarily translate into more frequent price resets. Only 7 percent of
firms in the sample reset wages more frequently than once per year, with
30 percent doing so less frequently than annually (Armstrong and Parker,
2016).
The survey took place in August 2010, immediately following the global
financial crisis. Financing costs for banks had increased, and were passed
on to some customers, although these increases were offset to an extent
by the low Official Cash Rate of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Half
of firms had no change to their interest rates or fees, whereas 31 percent
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faced an increase, and 18 percent had a decrease. Unlike labour costs (with
downward nominal wage rigidity), the asymmetry in response to finance
costs cannot be attributed to one-sided evolution of the relevant cost. That
said, firms that had experienced increased interest rates or fees over the
previous year were more likely to indicate that finance costs were impor-
tant for price increases than firms that had experienced constant or falling
interest rates. This evidence is in line with the role played by financial
frictions in pricing behaviour found by Gilchrist et al. (2015).
Other costs include raw materials and other intermediate inputs. Sec-
tors where a high percentage of firms reported ‘other costs’ as not affecting
price changes tended to be those with a low share of intermediates in gross
output. Similar to finance costs, the costs of inputs can fluctuate both pos-
itively and negatively. There appears to be little relationship between the
reported asymmetry of pricing responses by firms and the fluctuations in
input prices for their industry over the previous five years.
2.3.3 How frequent are price reviews?
Firms that claimed some form of time dependence in their price review-
ing process were asked to give the frequency at which prices are reviewed.
The responses display considerable heterogeneity; 10 percent of firms re-
view prices at least weekly, whereas a third of firms review prices either
yearly or less frequently (table 2.1). There are also large divergences in the
responses by firm size and sector. Larger firms are likelier to review prices
at more frequent intervals than small firms. Firms in the distribution sec-
tor review prices more frequently – a quarter of these firms review prices
at least weekly, compared with 6 percent of private services firms and 9
percent of firms in industry.
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Table 2.1: Frequency of price reviews (percent of firms)
Less Specific
Half- than events
Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly yearly Annually annual only
Firm size
Small 5 6 13 14 14 28 5 16
Medium 5 4 14 15 14 31 4 13
Large 9 10 13 14 11 31 2 10
Sector
Primary 5 12 6 16 8 28 5 22
Industry 5 4 12 17 15 27 6 14
Distribution 12 14 18 15 13 12 2 15
Private serv. 3 3 10 15 14 36 5 14
Gov’t serv. 0 0 2 6 12 61 9 10
Overall
Pop. wgt. 5 5 13 14 14 29 5 15
Emp. wgt. 6 8 13 13 12 32 4 12
The effect of these factors on the frequency of price review can be esti-
mated using an ordered probit model. Firms are aggregated into three cat-
egories, based on the frequency of review: frequent (daily, weekly, monthly),
medium (quarterly and half yearly) and slow (annual or less frequent).
Table 2.2 shows the estimated average marginal effects for this model.
A model with seven categories (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, half-
yearly, annually, less frequent than annual) yields qualitatively similar re-
sults.
Taking into account other characteristics of the firms, large firms are
more likely to review more frequently than small firms. A large firm is
4 percent more likely than a small firm to review prices at frequent inter-
vals. This finding is in keeping with the cross-sectional results, but the
estimated magnitude is somewhat small, suggesting that large firms have
other characteristics beyond size that contribute to more frequent reviews.
The sector that the firm operates in appears to have the greatest bear-
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Table 2.2: Average marginal effects on frequency of review
Evaluated at: Frequent Medium Slow
Firm size
Small reference reference reference
Medium 0.004 0.001 −0.005
Large 0.042∗∗ 0.009∗∗ −0.051∗∗
Sector
Primary reference reference reference
Industry 0.029 0.006 −0.035
Construction 0.158∗∗ 0.006 −0.164∗∗
Distribution 0.237∗∗ −0.011 −0.225∗∗
Private services −0.061∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.084∗∗
Gov’t services −0.195∗∗ −0.159∗∗ 0.354∗∗
Main customer
Firms within group reference reference reference
Households 0.071∗∗ 0.017∗∗ −0.088∗∗
Retailers 0.006 0.001 −0.008
Firms outside group 0.015 0.004 −0.019
Government 0.006 0.001 −0.007
Perceived performance
Lower profitability −0.015 −0.004 0.018
Higher profitability −0.008 −0.002 0.010
Lower productivity −0.002 −0.001 −0.003
Higher productivity 0.042∗∗ 0.010∗∗ −0.052∗∗
Perceived competition 0.041∗∗ 0.010∗∗ −0.051∗∗
Multiple products 0.056∗∗ 0.014∗∗ −0.069∗∗
Notes: *Significant at 5 percent and ** at 1 percent. Frequent review firms
are those that review at daily, weekly or monthly frequency, ‘medium’ firms
are those that review at half-yearly or quarterly frequency. ‘slow’ firms
review prices annually or less frequently.
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ing on frequency of price reviews. Firms in distribution and construction
review prices more frequently, even accounting for customer type and per-
ceived competition (see below). Conversely, firms in the service sectors
review prices less frequently. This may be due to the relatively higher
share of labour costs for these firms. Armstrong and Parker (2016) find
that wages are reviewed infrequently in New Zealand, with only 7 percent
of firms changing wages more frequently than annually, and 30 percent of
firms doing so less frequently than annually. Firms whose main customers
are households are more likely to review at high frequencies, but other
types of customers do not appear to affect the frequency of review.
Firms were asked how they perceived their profitability and productiv-
ity relative to other firms in their sector.7 Perceived profitability appears
to have no effect on the frequency of price reviews. However, firms that
believe they are more productive than their competitors are more likely
to review prices at more frequent intervals than firms who believe their
productivity to be in line with the sector average. The responses to the
profitability and productivity questions are closely aligned, so consider-
ing profitability by itself is significant. Firms selling more than one prod-
uct review prices more frequently for their main product or service than
firms selling just one product (see section 2.4.5 below for a more detailed
discussion of multi-product firms).
The wide heterogeneity of price reviews between industries is displayed
in figure 2.2, which shows the cumulative share by frequency of reviews
for each of the 36 industries. Furthermore, there is wide heterogeneity
within industries, with most industries containing firms that review prices
daily and those that do so less frequently than annually.
7Fabling et al. (2012) find that these perceptions of relative productivity align with
actual relative productivity.
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative distribution of firms, by frequency of price review
2.3.4 How frequent are price changes?
Firms were asked how many times they changed prices in the most re-
cent financial year. The picture is one of notable price rigidity. Around a
quarter of firms had not changed prices, and a further 36 percent changed
prices only once (table 2.3). Only 12 percent of firms changed prices more
than six times over the previous year, with a further 12 percent changing it
between three and six times. Larger firms change prices more frequently
than smaller firms, resulting in an employment-weighted overall result
slightly more flexible than a firm-count weighted one.
Split by sector, prices are notably stickier among service-sector firms.
Only 8 percent of firms in government services, and 34 percent of firms in
private services change prices more than once. This contrasts with the dis-
tribution sector, where 60 percent of firms change prices more than once.
An ordered probit was carried out to investigate the factors that influ-
26 CHAPTER 2. WHY ARE PRICES STICKY?
Table 2.3: Frequency of price changes, last financial year (percent of firms)
6 26 182 More
times times times than
or or or 182
Zero Once Twice less less less times
Firm size
Small 26 36 16 12 5 3 2
Medium 21 37 17 13 7 4 2
Large 15 36 12 15 8 7 6
Sector
Primary 26 31 15 11 8 6 2
Industry 21 40 18 11 5 2 3
Distribution 16 24 18 19 10 8 4
Private services 27 39 17 10 4 2 1
Government services 29 63 6 2 0 0 0
Overall
Firm pop. weighted 24 36 16 12 6 4 2
Employment weighted 20 37 14 14 7 5 4
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ence the number of price changes over the previous year. Firms were split
into three categories: sticky (two price changes or less), medium (3 - 26
price changes) and flexible (more than 26 price changes).8 The results for
price changes are unsurprisingly similar to those for price reviews, given
the likely endogeneity of the decision to review prices (table 2.4).
There is a clear difference in results by firm size, with large firms the
most likely to appear in the flexible category, followed by medium-sized
firms, and then small firms. Firms in construction are 9 percent less likely
to be in the sticky category, relative to primary sector firms and distri-
bution firms are 17 percent less likely. Firms in private services are 11
percent more likely than primary firms to be in the sticky category, and
government services firms are fully 31 percent more likely. These esti-
mated marginal effects are large, and suggest that the sector that the firm
operates in plays a very important role in deciding the frequency of price
changes. To an extent, sector should be expected to have an impact. To
the extent that a firm’s optimal price depends on the prices of competitors
(see section 2.4.2 below), it is unlikely to be optimal for a firm to reset its
price less frequently than annually when the competitors do so daily.
Firms selling to households and those facing higher perceived compe-
tition are more likely to appear in the flexible category. Similarly those
firms who believe they are more productive than their competitors and
those firms selling multiple products made more frequent price changes.
2.3.5 Comparison with surveys of other economies
The large heterogeneity in the frequency of price changes is a feature of
previous price-setting surveys (table 2.5). The median number of price
changes over one year by a New Zealand firm is one, which is similar
to that found in other small open economies. But there appears to be a
greater level of price stickiness, with only 40 percent resetting prices more
8A seven category ordered probit delivers similar qualitative results.
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Table 2.4: Average marginal effects on frequency of price change
Evaluated at: Flexible Medium Sticky
Firm size
Small reference reference reference
Medium 0.032∗∗ 0.031∗∗ −0.063∗∗
Large 0.069∗∗ 0.056∗∗ −0.125∗∗
Sector
Primary reference reference reference
Industry −0.020 −0.016 0.037
Construction 0.054∗ 0.031∗ −0.085∗
Distribution 0.120∗∗ −0.051∗∗ −0.171∗∗
Private services −0.057∗∗ −0.056∗∗ 0.113∗∗
Gov’t services −0.123∗∗ −0.187∗∗ 0.310∗∗
Main customer
Firms within group reference reference reference
Households 0.023∗ 0.020∗ −0.043∗
Retailers 0.007 0.006 −0.012
Firms outside group 0.017 0.015 −0.032
Government −0.007 −0.006 0.014
Perceived performance
Lower profitability 0.001 0.001 −0.002
Higher profitability −0.010 −0.009 0.019
Lower productivity −0.000 −0.000 0.001
Higher productivity 0.025∗∗ 0.021∗∗ −0.047∗∗
Perceived competition 0.027∗∗ 0.023∗∗ −0.050∗∗
Multiple products 0.034∗∗ 0.029∗∗ −0.063∗∗
Notes: *Significant at 5 percent and ** at 1 percent. ‘Sticky’ firms
changed prices two times or less, ‘medium’ changed 3 - 26 times
and flexible changed more than 26 times.
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Table 2.5: International comparison of frequency of price changes per year
(percent of firms)
Price changes New Euro United United
per annum Zealand Australia Canada area Kingdom(a) States
≥ 4 24 33(b) 59 14 30 35
2-3 16 12(b) 8 20 18 16
1 36 40 27 39 39 39
< 1 24 15 8 27 13 10
Median 1 1 4 1 1 1.4
Notes: (a) The responses for the United Kingdom have been adjusted for the actual
number of price changes made by firms that responded ‘irregularly’ or ‘other’ to the
frequency of price changes. (b) Estimate, based on Park et al. (2010) Graph 1, p11.
Sources: Australia (Park et al., 2010), Canada (Amirault et al., 2006), the euro
area (Fabiani et al., 2006), the United Kingdom (Greenslade and Parker, 2012), the
United States Blinder et al. (1998).
than once, compared with 48 percent in the United Kingdom, 51 percent in
the United States and 67 percent in Canada. Similarly, 24 percent of firms
did not reset prices in the previous year, compared with 13 percent in the
United Kingdom, 10 percent in the United States and 8 percent in Canada.
As noted above, the New Zealand survey draws responses from a wider
range of sectors than previous surveys in other countries. This raises the
possibility that differences between surveys may arise from differences in
sectoral composition between economies, or between sampling strategies.
But comparing the responses of individual sectors in New Zealand, the
euro area and the United Kingdom still highlights divergence. For exam-
ple only 17 percent of distribution firms in the euro area change prices
more than 3 times a year, compared with 41 percent in New Zealand and
54 percent in the United Kingdom. These results suggest that the differ-
ences between country survey results are not solely down to differences in
sectoral composition.
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2.4 Sources of price rigidity
There are many potential reasons proposed in the literature on the causes
of price stickiness. Since many of these theories are observationally equiv-
alent using price quote data, it has been difficult to differentiate between
them. The advantage of a survey is that it is possible to ask firms to rate
some of these factors in terms of their importance in preventing price in-
creases, and their impact on the price review process.
Explicit and implicit contracts are most widely recognised as being
‘very important’ for causing price stickiness (figure 2.3). Strategic com-
plementarity is the third most recognised. Physical menu costs are not
widely perceived as being a factor preventing price increases.
Figure 2.3: Factors that prevent price increases (percent of firms citing fac-
tor as ‘very important’)
In the rest of this section, differing theories of price stickiness are ex-
plored in greater detail using firms’ responses to the survey.
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2.4.1 Explicit and implicit contracts
There is little empirical evidence for explicit contracts – studies based on
price quotes are unable to distinguish whether a price remains unchanged
because of a contract or otherwise.
Firms were asked what proportion of customers are on long-term (at
least one year) contracts. Half of firms had no customers on long-term con-
tracts, whereas a fifth had more than half of their customers on such con-
tracts. Use of long-term contracts is more prevalent among larger firms,
with 29 percent of large firms having the majority of their customers on
long-term contracts compared with 18 percent of small firms.
Firms that have a majority of their customers on long-term contracts
exhibit a greater degree of price stickiness. Only 27 percent of firms with
the majority of their customers on long-term contracts changed price more
than once, compared with 39 percent of firms who had a minority of cus-
tomers on long-term contracts and 45 percent of firms with no long-term
contracts.9
Table 2.6 shows the average marginal effects from an ordered probit on
the proportion of customers that a firm has on long-term fixed price con-
tracts. Firms were split into three categories: those with no customers on
fixed price contracts, those with a minority of customers on long-term con-
tracts (50 percent or less), and those with a majority (51 percent or more).
Larger firms are 13 percent more likely than small firms to have the ma-
jority of customers on long-term contracts. This increased likelihood for
long-term contracts is interesting, given that larger firms in general change
prices more frequently than small firms. There may be some legal costs
involved in setting up contracts, which may provide a barrier to smaller
firms.
There are some differences by sector, with firms in the services sectors
more likely to use long-term contracts, but those in the distribution sector
97 percent of firms answered ‘don’t know’ to this question. The price change be-
haviour of these firms was similar to those who answered ‘none’.
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Table 2.6: Average marginal effects on proportion of customers on long-
term contracts
Evaluated at: None Minority Majority
Firm size
Small reference reference reference
Medium −0.084∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.071∗∗
Large −0.145∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.131∗∗
Sector
Primary reference reference reference
Industry 0.047 −0.011 −0.036
Construction −0.069 0.009 0.060
Distribution 0.127∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.088∗∗
Private services −0.138∗∗ 0.007 0.132∗∗
Gov’t services −0.163∗∗ 0.002 0.161∗∗
Main customer
Firms within group reference reference reference
Households 0.224∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.199∗∗
Retailers 0.032 −0.004 −0.028
Firms outside group 0.045∗ −0.005∗ −0.040∗
Government −0.130∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.115∗∗
Perceived performance
Lower profitability 0.014 −0.002 −0.012
Higher profitability −0.006 0.001 0.005
Lower productivity 0.004 −0.000 −0.004
Higher productivity −0.044∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.039∗∗
Perceived competition 0.035∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.031∗∗
Multiple products 0.026 −0.003 −0.023
Note: *Significant at 5 percent and ** at 1 percent.
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less likely. Customer type has a large bearing on use of long-term con-
tracts. Firms selling to households are 22 percent more likely to have no
customers on long-term contracts. As noted above, households are less
likely to be repeat customers. Firms selling to the government are 12 per-
cent more likely to have the majority of customers on fixed-term contracts,
perhaps a function of government procurement practices.
Even in the absence of binding legal contracts, firms may choose to not
change their price to protect ongoing relationships with customers, termed
‘implicit’ contracts. Implicit contracts are the second most commonly cited
factor for preventing price increases, with 31 percent of firms citing it as
being ‘very important’. If firms have implicit contracts and are reluctant to
change prices for fear of losing customers, then they are unlikely to react
to temporary changes in factors causing price changes, since the loss of
customers will likely outweigh the profit gain for the temporary change in
prices. This hypothesis is confirmed in the survey responses: 29 percent of
firms who cite implicit contracts as ‘very important’ also cite not increas-
ing prices because the factors causing the price increase are temporary as
being ‘very important’. Only 9 percent of firms who placed less impor-
tance on implicit contracts cite temporary factors as ‘very important’.
2.4.2 Strategic complementarity (risk that competitors will
not follow suit)
The optimal price for a firm may depend on the prices set by other firms,
termed strategic complementarity. For example, following a positive mon-
etary shock the optimal price will rise. Following such a shock, firms
should increase prices once they have the ability to reset. Yet if other firms
in the sector have yet to reset their price, customers could mistake the price
increase as a real increase, resulting in lower market share. In this scenario
the firms who are able to reset may choose not to do so, creating stickiness
in prices.
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Strategic complementarity is the third most common factor cited by
firms as being ‘very important’ in preventing price increases. It is cited by
22 percent of firms, rising to 26 percent of firms weighted by employment.
This strategic complementarity is reflected in the method firms chose to
set their prices. The dominant price setting method (53 percent of firms)
for firms citing strategic complementarity as ‘very important’ is ‘influence
of competitors’ prices’. For firms that do not cite strategic complemen-
tarity as important, only 23 percent use this pricing strategy. The impor-
tance of strategic complementarity is also reflected in firms’ response to
the importance of competitors’ prices in determining price changes. Only
3 percent of firms who view strategic complementarity as ‘very important’
view competitors’ prices as being important for neither price increases or
decreases, compared with 28 percent of other firms.
2.4.3 Menu costs (price changes entail physical costs)
Taking the narrowest definition of menu costs – the cost of physically
changing prices – there is little evidence that it is a major factor. Just 8
percent of firms cite menu costs as being ‘very important’, the least recog-
nised factor in the survey.
Firms were also asked about the importance of pricing thresholds (e.g.
keeping prices at $4.99 rather than $5). Such pricing thresholds would
act in a similar fashion to menu costs, delaying a price change until the
optimal price moves sufficiently far from the current price to cross the
next pricing threshold. Widening the definition of menu costs to include
pricing thresholds results in 16 percent of firms citing menu costs as being
very important in preventing price increases – still less important than the
other factors discussed above.
Some authors interpret menu costs as being the cost of managerial time
and gathering information (e.g. Ball and Mankiw, 1994). Such an interpre-
tation suggests that the costs lie at the review, not price change, stage.
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Section 2.4.4 below considers whether the price review stage is the source
of price stickiness.
2.4.4 Sticky information
There is little support for sticky information in the survey. Price reviews
are notably more frequent than price changes. The number of firms that
review prices at least every month is double the number of firms that ac-
tually change them. 60 percent of firms review prices at least every six
months, but only 42 percent of firms change prices that frequently. Over-
all, the median number of reviews is twice per year, but the median num-
ber of changes is just once.
Table 2.7 shows the responses of firms to both the frequency of review
and price change questions. The sticky information quadrant lies below
the diagonal, shaded in light grey. Just 7 percent of firms lie in this area.
The sticky prices area, defined here as changing prices less frequently than
reviewing them, is shaded in dark grey. Nearly half – 47 percent – of New
Zealand firms fall in this category. Of the remaining 31 percent of firms
that review prices on a regular basis, most change prices once or not at
all over the preceding year. This evidence points to sticky prices, rather
than sticky information being the primary cause of nominal price rigidity
in New Zealand.
To further underline this finding, firms were asked to explain why re-
views were not carried out more frequently, and given a range of options.
The most frequently cited reason was that factors affecting pricing deci-
sions do not change more frequently (table 2.8). The second most-cited
reason was that the firm would not change prices more frequently – again
highlighting stickiness in the price change stage of the price-setting pro-
cess. The unavailability of information required to carry out the review
was cited by only a small number of firms.
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Table 2.7: Frequency of price reviews and changes (percent of firms)
Price changes
More 182 26 6
than times times times
182 or or or
Price reviews times less less less Twice Once Zero
Daily 2 1 1 1 0 0 0
Weekly 0 1 2 1 1 0 1
Monthly 0 0 2 4 3 2 1
Quarterly 0 0 0 2 5 5 1
Half-yearly 0 0 0 1 4 6 3
Annually 0 0 0 1 2 18 9
Less frequently than annually 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Specific events only 0 0 1 2 1 4 6
2.4.5 Multi-product firms
Firms were asked to respond to the survey in terms of their most impor-
tant product. They were also asked whether the pricing strategy were
representative of their other products. 23 percent of firms only sold one
product. There is a marked divergence by firm size, with only 11 percent
of large firms selling just one product.
Firms selling multiple products change prices more frequently than
those selling a single product. 29 percent of firms selling a single product
change price more than once, whereas 43 percent of multi-product firms
change the price of their main product more than once. As shown in ta-
ble 2.4 above, this more frequent price resetting persists even once other
factors, such as firm size and sector, are taken into account.
These results on the frequency of price resets by multi-product firms
affirm the findings of Bhattarai and Schoenle (2014). Conversely, their pro-
posed mechanism – economies of scope in price resets resulting in lower
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menu costs – is not supported by the responses to the survey. Multi-
product firms are more likely to cite menu costs as a reason for not re-
setting prices more frequently (table 2.9). Costs of managerial and non-
managerial time are also more commonly cited by multi-product firms as
factors for not reviewing prices more frequently. This higher response rate
by multi-product firms for these factors also holds in general when further
splitting by firm size or frequency of price changes (tables 2.11 and 2.12 in
the appendix).
Table 2.9: Importance of menu costs for single and multi-product firms
(percent citing factor as ‘very important’)
Single product Multi-product
Reasons for not reviewing more frequently
Cost of managerial time 5 11
Cost of non-managerial time 2 4
Other costs of the review process 7 6
Reasons for not changing price more frequently
Price changes entail physical costs 7 8
Prefer to maintain prices at certain thresholds 11 16
2.5 Implications for monetary policy in New Zealand
The findings from the survey have a number of implications for monetary
policy. The relatively sticky nature of price-setting in New Zealand implies
a potential for real effects of shocks, and a role for monetary policy in
macroeconomic stabilisation. The difference in behaviour of multiproduct
firms reaffirms this result, even in the presence of state-dependent pricing
(see Alvarez and Lippi, 2014; Midrigan, 2011).
Explicit contracts are the factor most widely recognised as being very
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important for preventing price changes. Wages are also typically only re-
set infrequently. Erceg et al. (2000) show that when there are long-term
contracts in both product and labour markets, monetary policy is unable
to recreate the flex-price equilibrium. In the presence of such rigidities,
a strict inflation targeting regime can lead to large welfare losses. Taking
into account wage and/or output deviations from optimum markedly im-
proves welfare. Barro (1977) points out that it matters for monetary policy
whether these contracts specify just price, or also volumes, with the first
case being most important for monetary policy. The survey is unclear as
to which type of contract is used.
The existence of firms using state-dependent rather than time-dependent
pricing can result in asymmetric reaction to shocks at both the firm and
macroeconomic level. For example, Devereux and Siu (2007) develop a
dynamic general equilibrium model of time-dependent firms which are
also able to react to specific shocks (which describes the price-setting prac-
tices of the majority of firms in this survey). In their model firms react
asymmetrically to shocks, with positive cost shocks more likely to cause
firms to change prices than negative cost shocks. This asymmetry of re-
sponses to cost shocks is supported by the results here.
Further, Devereux and Siu (2007) find non-linearities in response to
monetary policy, with positive monetary policy shocks resulting in smaller
output expansions than contractions caused by a negative monetary policy
shock of the same magnitude. This suggests that monetary policy may
have to work harder to stabilise output following a negative shock than in
response to a positive shock.
The heterogeneity of price setting behaviour between sectors also has
implications for the policy trade-off between inflation and output volatil-
ity. Imbs et al. (2011) estimate sectoral Phillips curves for 16 industries in
France. They show that there is aggregation bias in the estimation of the
aggregate Phillips curve, such that for given values of volatility in infla-
tion and nominal interest rates the aggregate model suggests up to double
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the volatility in the output gap.
With heterogeneity in sectoral stickiness, there arises the question of
which prices monetary policy should target. Aoki (2001) and Benigno
(2004) show in a two sector or two region model, respectively, that mon-
etary policy should focus on the relatively sticker sector / region to max-
imise welfare. The relatively stickier sectors have been highlighted here,
and broadly correlate with the sectors included in the non-tradable index
of inflation.
Finally, there may be valuable information for forecasting purposes
in the difference in evolution of inflation between sectors. Millard and
O’Grady (2012) construct a DSGE model with a sticky price and a flexible
price sector. They show that the flexible price sector may help provide
monetary policy makers with a more accurate estimate of the output gap,
whereas the sticky price sector may provide better guidance on medium-
term inflation expectations.
2.6 Conclusion
How firms set prices determines inflation dynamics within the economy
and is important for understanding the monetary transmission mecha-
nism and for microfoundations of price setting in macro models. This
paper brings new insights into price-setting behaviour, using a large sur-
vey of New Zealand firms. This is the first behavioural survey for New
Zealand, and the first survey internationally to cover all non-government
sectors.
The survey results indicate that New Zealand firms are rarely strictly
state-dependent price setters, but mostly use a mixed strategy of both re-
viewing prices periodically and also in response to specific events. The
median number of price reviews is twice per year, but the median number
of changes is just one. The perception of more intense competition and
greater productivity are associated with more frequent repricing. Con-
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versely, sectors where there are a larger number of repeat customers ex-
hibit greater price rigidity.
There is marked heterogeneity in price-setting behaviour across firm
sizes, with large firms reviewing and changing prices more frequently.
Multi-product firms reset prices more frequently, even accounting for other
firm characteristics. Yet these firms cite menu costs as a factor preventing
price increases more frequently than single product firms, contrary to the
assumption used in the literature.
Intermediate goods seem to exhibit higher price stickiness, while firms
that sell direct to households appear to price more flexibly. This suggests
that a focus on the flexibility of goods in the Consumer Price Index may
underestimate the degree of price stickiness in the economy. The most
recognised reasons for price stickiness are explicit and implicit contracts
and strategic complementarity. Pure menu costs – treated as the physical
cost of changing prices – are not widely recognised as an impediment to
changing prices. Similarly, sticky information does not appear to be the
main driver of nominal rigidities.
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2.A Appendix – additional tables
Table 2.10: Respondents to selected previous price-setting surveys
Respondents
Country Authors Sample frame (response rate, %)
Australia Park et al. (2010) CB contacts 700 (unknown)
Canada Amirault et al. (2006) CB contacts 170 (unknown)
Euro area(a) Fabiani et al. (2006) various 11,150 (46)
New Zealand Nat. Stat. Inst. 5369 (82)
Sweden Apel et al. (2005) Nat. Stat. Inst. 626 (49)
United Kingdom Greenslade and Parker (2012) CB contacts 693 (30)
United States Blinder et al. (1998) 3rd party database 200 (61)
Note: (a) The individual country surveys ranged from 330 to 2070 respondents. The
response rate ranged from 30 percent to 69 percent.
Table 2.11: Importance of menu costs for single and multi-product firms,
by firm size (percent citing factor as ‘very important’)
Single Multi
S M L S M L
Reasons for not reviewing more frequently
Cost of managerial time 4 6 11 10 11 17
Cost of non-managerial time 2 3 6 4 5 7
Other costs of the review process 7 5 5 5 7 12
Reasons for not changing price more frequently
Price changes entail physical costs 7 4 8 8 7 7
Prefer to maintain prices at certain thresholds 12 7 9 17 15 17
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Table 2.12: Importance of menu costs for single and multi-product firms,
by number of price changes (percent citing factor as ‘very important’)
Single Multi
0-1 2-26 27+ 0-1 2-26 27+
Reasons for not reviewing more frequently
Cost of managerial time 2 7 5 17 13 9
Cost of non-managerial time 1 4 2 7 5 3
Other costs of the review process 2 11 6 9 7 5
Reasons for not changing price more frequently
Price changes entail physical costs 1 11 6 8 9 7
Prefer to maintain prices at certain thresholds 19 20 8 15 21 14
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2.B Appendix – survey questionnaire
Section C: Price and Wage Setting
1 Section C should be completed by the General Manager
Definition
2 The following section asks about factors that are important when this business reviews
and sets prices. To answer these questions, apply the following definition.
Main product: The product (good or service) or product group from which this
business gets its largest share of revenue.
If this business does not have a main product (eg in the case of large-format retail stores),
provide answers that are most representative of this business’s price-setting process.
3 Mark one oval. Which of the following is the main customer group that pays for
this business’s main product (good or service)?
Note: This can be different to the end users of the product (eg government-funded services).
o individuals or households
o businesses within the business group (eg subsidiaries or parent companies)
o retailers or wholesalers outside the business group
o other businesses outside the business group
o government
4 Please estimate what proportion of this business’s customers have the prices
they pay set by long-term (at least one year) formal contracts?
o 0%
o 25% or less
o 50% or less
o 51% or more
o don’t know
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5 Please estimate what proportion of this business’s customers return for
repeat business?
o 0%
o 25% or less
o 50% or less
o 51% or more
o don’t know
6 For the following questions, please apply the definition of main product provided in 2.
7 Are all customers charged the same price for this business’s main product
(good or service)?
o yes
o no, but fixed pricing schedules are used for specific types of customers (eg
preset volume discounts)
o no, prices are set on a case-by-case basis
8 Mark one oval. Who reviews and sets the price of this business’s main product
o this business→ go to 9
o a parent business→ go to 23
o other→ go to 23
9 Mark one oval. When does this business typically review the price of its
main product?
Note: The review process must be sufficiently thorough that a price change could result.
o at regular intervals only, regardless of specific events
o generally at regular intervals, but also in response to specific events (eg a
substantial increase in costs)
o in response to specific events only→ go to 11
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10 Approximately how often does this business regularly review the price of its
main product?
o daily
o weekly
o monthly
o quarterly
o half-yearly
o annually
o less frequently than annually
11 Mark all that apply. Which of the following are important reasons why this
business does not review prices more frequently?
o cost of managerial staff time
o cost of non-managerial staff time
o other costs of the review process
o the factors affecting pricing decisions do not change more frequently
o the information used to inform pricing decisions is not available more frequently
o would not change prices more frequently
o other reasons
12 Approximately how much staff time in total is spent on an average price review
of this business’s main product?
Include both managerial and non-managerial staff hours.
Note:
• if this business has staff whose full-time job is reviewing prices, you may enter the
number of these staff members, instead of total staff hours spent on a price review.
• if less than one hour in total is spent on an average price review, please write 1.
total staff hours hrs
OR number of staff whose full-time job is reviewing prices staff
13 Mark all that apply. If during a price review, it becomes apparent that a relatively
large price change may occur, is extra time spent on the review process?
o yes, extra managerial time
o yes, extra non-managerial time
o no extra time is spent on the review process
o don’t know
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14 During the last financial year, how many times did this business change the
price of its main product?
o zero
o once
o twice Apply the
o 6 times or less definition of main
o 26 times or less product provided in
o 182 times or less 2
o more than 182 times
15 For a typical price change of this business’s main product, approximately how
many hours in total are spent explaining the change to customers?
Include both managerial and non-managerial staff hours.
Note:If the answer is ’zero’, please write 0 . If less than one hour in total is spent on
explaining the change, please write 1 .
total staff hours hrs
16 How important are temporary price reductions (ie sales) to the pricing strategy
of this business?
o not at all important
o a little important
o moderately important
o very important
o don’t know
17 Mark one oval. Which of the following methods best describes how this business
sets the price of its main product?
o rule of thumb (eg change by a fixed amount or in accordance with inflation)
o costs plus a profit margin (a mark-up over costs)
o the influence of competitors’ prices (eg matching market prices)
o other
48 CHAPTER 2. WHY ARE PRICES STICKY?
18 Mark one oval. Do the pricing decisions for this business’s main product
primarily rely on:
o current economic conditions
o expected future economic conditions (eg likely demand, cost projections)
o current and expected future economic conditions are equally important
o don’t know
19 Mark one oval for each item listed. How important are the following factors when
considering price changes for this business’s main product?
only only important for
important important both price not
for price for price increases and important don’t
increases decreases decreases for either know
a change in labour costs o o o o
a change in financing costs o o o o o
a change in other costs (eg
purchase of goods from o o o o o
suppliers, rent)
a change in demand o o o o o
a change in competitors’ o o o o o
prices
a change in productivity o o o o o
a change in stock levels o o o o o
a change in the number of o o o o o
competitors
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20 Mark one oval for each item listed. How important are the following
considerations in preventing this business from raising the price of its main
product?
not moderately very don’t
important important important know
the risk that competitors will not follow suit o o o o
the factors causing pressure to raise prices o o o o
may only be temporary
formal contracts specifying a fixed price o o o o
implicit contracts (customers expect prices o o o o
to remain stable)
preference for maintaining prices at certain o o o o
thresholds (eg $4.99 rather than $5.00)
price changes entail ”physical” costs (eg o o o o
printing catalogues)
the ability to adjust non-price elements (eg o o o o
the level of after-sales service)
21 Mark one oval. Do the customers of this business view price increases resulting
from increased costs as:
o less acceptable than price increases resulting from increased demand
o more acceptable than price increases resulting from increased demand
o no different to price increases resulting from increased demand
o don’t know
22 Mark one oval for each item listed. Comparing the current pricing practices of
this business with two years ago, which, if any, of the following have changed?
stayed the don’t
decreased same increased know
proportion of customers on long-term (at o o o o
least one year) contracts
frequency of price reviews o o o o
frequency of price changes o o o o
profit margin o o o o
sensitivity of customers to price changes o o o o
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22 Are the answers provided for this business’s main product representative of the
pricing process used for other products?
o yes
o no
o This business only sells one product
22 Has this business conducted, or is in the process of conducting, a price review
specifically because of the announced GST increase?
o yes
o no, but this business plans to
o no, and this business does not expect to
Chapter 3
How do exporters set their prices?
3.1 Introduction
How exporters set prices in foreign markets and the widely attested dis-
connect between exchange rate movements and the local price of traded
goods are the subject of a large literature. This paper contributes to that lit-
erature by analysing the responses to a large behavioural survey of 12811
exporting New Zealand firms. The use of surveys is relatively rare in the
literature, which typically focuses on unit record customs data.
We focus on two main channels of incomplete pass-through of exchange-
rate movements to domestic prices: pricing to market (PTM) and local cur-
rency pricing (LCP). PTM is where a firm optimally chooses to differentiate
prices across destinations, resulting in variable mark-ups. LCP is where a
firm invoices its customers in foreign markets in a different currency to its
own, producer, currency. Traditionally in the literature, the other currency
was taken to be that of the destination market (hence ‘local’), but more
recently the literature also considers the use of third-party, or ‘vehicle’,
currencies. These two channels of incomplete pass-through are related in
1This number, and other firm counts appearing in this paper, has been randomly
rounded to base three in accordance with Statistics New Zealand’s policies for publishing
summaries of confidential responses.
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practice, although not exclusively so. The majority of respondents to the
survey that invoice in producer currency also charge the same price across
destinations, and the majority of those that invoice in other currencies also
typically price to market.
This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we
find that primary producers do price to market, in stark contrast to what is
commonly believed. Second, we demonstrate that service sector firms also
price to market, a new finding for the literature that hitherto has concen-
trated on goods exporters. Finally, we investigate the firm characteristics
that underly firms’ decisions on currency of invoice and pricing to market.
We find larger firms, and more productive firms, to be more likely to price
to market. The sector the firm operates in has a significant bearing on the
choice of invoice currency.
The commonly held view on primary exports is that such products are
homogenous, and that the price is determined by the balance of interna-
tional demand and supply, and hence the same across countries. The re-
sponses analysed here do not support this view. New Zealand primary
exporters not only price to market, but are more likely to do so than firms
in all other sectors, even taking into account other firm characteristics.
This result may be a consequence of the type of primary products ex-
ported by New Zealand, which for the main part are agricultural in na-
ture. Agricultural products have greater potential for product differenti-
ation (such as by taste, appearance, safety of consumption, or being free
range) than other primary products such as metals. Primary sector firms
are more likely than firms in other sectors to cite ‘customer characteris-
tics’ as being ‘very important’ for determining price across markets. New
Zealand exporters also account for a large market share in the exports of
certain primary products, including milk, sheep meat and kiwifruit. This
high market share may well provide some pricing power. In common with
the literature, we show that primary products are frequently invoiced in
vehicle currencies, most notably the US dollar.
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There are a number of advantages in the use of a survey to consider
firm decisions on export pricing relative to the unit record customs data
that are widely used in the literature. First, the survey explicitly asks
firms whether the price (in domestic currency terms) is the same across
all markets, both foreign and domestic. Customs data do not, of them-
selves, include information on the domestic market, so are unable to iden-
tify cases where the export price (even if common to all foreign destina-
tions) is different from the domestic price. Second, the survey used here
covers the service sector. Customs data require the physical movement of
goods across borders, so is silent on the pricing behaviour of service sector
firms, who account for a significant share of advanced countries’ exports.
Third, the survey directly asks firms the reasons for choosing to differen-
tiate prices between markets. It also provides other information on the
exporters to permit a more thorough understanding of the firm character-
istics that contribute to the decisions on invoice currency and whether to
price to market.
Service sector exports account for a fifth of total New Zealand exports,
and for a significant share of exports of other advanced economies. De-
spite this significant share of exports, there is scant evidence in the lit-
erature on how service sector firms price exports. We provide evidence
that some service sector firms invoice in currencies other than the New
Zealand dollar and also price to market. Once other firm characteristics
are taken into account, the export pricing behaviour of service sector firms
is not significantly different from manufacturers.
Recent research has highlighted the role of firm characteristics in the
decisions over currency of invoice and whether to differentiate prices be-
tween markets. Using the survey responses, we find that the sector the
firm operates in has a significant impact on the currency of invoice. Nei-
ther size of the firm nor productivity relative to competitors have a system-
atic bearing on the choice of currency of invoice. Conversely, larger firms
are more likely to price to market, as are more productive firms. Taking
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into account these firm characteristics, the firm’s sector does not affect the
decision to price to market, with the sole exception of firms in the primary
sector.
Survey data are not without disadvantages. The identification of price
differentiation does require that firms act in the way that they respond to
the survey. More importantly, PTM requires the exact same product to be
sold at different prices in different markets. It is not uncommon for firms
to differentiate between markets by sending different varieties to differ-
ent destinations. The survey requests that the firm answers the question
in terms of its main product, but it is possible that respondents did not
carefully distinguish between the exact products sold in each market. Fi-
nally, as with all surveys, the quality of the responses rely on the quality
of the survey itself. The large number of respondents, the detailed strati-
fication of the sample, and the very high response rate (82 percent) of the
survey used here provide comfort. That said, there is a marked lacuna in
the coverage of firms selling to tourists located in New Zealand, who are
exporters but do not always recognise themselves as such.
3.1.1 Related literature
The literature on the so-called ‘exchange rate disconnect’, where domestic
prices for traded goods vary by less than the exchange rate is large, and
is surveyed in Burstein and Gopinath (2013). Within this large literature,
this paper is most closely related to studies of two particular channels –
pricing to market and local currency pricing (and more broadly the choice
of invoice currency). Recent work has highlighted the role of firm charac-
teristics in the operation of these channels.
The theory of pricing to market dates back to the models of Dornbusch
(1987) and Krugman (1987), and was first modelled in a general equilib-
rium framework by Betts and Devereux (1996). In monopolistically com-
petitive markets firms set prices, and hence mark-ups, in relation to the
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elasticities of demand for their product. If an exporter wishes to maintain
market share in an export market, it will lower its mark-up when the ex-
porter’s currency appreciates against that of the market in question, which
is to say it will choose to price to market. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) de-
velop the pricing to market framework, demonstrating the role of trade
costs in the decision to price to market. In their framework, larger firms
are more likely to price to market.
A small number of recent papers have considered the role of firm char-
acteristics on the decision of whether to price to market. Berman et al.
(2012) study pricing by French exporters using unit record customs data.
They provide evidence that high-performing firms maintain prices in for-
eign markets when the currency depreciates, increasing mark-ups at the
cost of smaller change in export volumes. Amiti et al. (2014) study the
impact of imported intermediates on export prices. They show that more
productive firms, and those with a larger market share exhibit a lower
exchange rate pass-through. Firms with low market share pass through
exchange rate movements in almost their entirety, whereas the firms with
the highest market share pass on around half of the exchange rate move-
ment. Li et al. (2015) and Chatterjee et al. (2013) similarly find a key role
for firm productivity in determining exchange-rate pass-through.
The widespread use of customs data in the literature results in most pa-
pers considering only the prices of goods that are internationally traded,
and not any potential differences between how an exporter prices in the
domestic and foreign markets. One rare exception is Fitzgerald and Haller
(2014), who study pricing by Irish manufacturers exporting to the United
Kingdom, using matched priced data from the Producer Price Index. For
exporters invoicing in local currency, relative mark-ups between the do-
mestic and the foreign market move one-for-one with the exchange rate.
A few general surveys about price-setting behaviour have also asked
about export pricing. Greenslade and Parker (2010) survey the price-setting
behaviour of UK firms and find that three quarters of exporters price to
56 CHAPTER 3. HOW DO EXPORTERS SET THEIR PRICES?
market. Exchange rate changes and transportation costs are cited as the
most important factors in deciding on price within markets. Some of the
country surveys reported in Fabiani et al. (2006) also enquire about export
pricing, finding that half of firms price to market, even when exporting
within the euro area. However, these surveys had a lower number of re-
spondents than the New Zealand survey (Greenslade and Parker, 2010,
had responses from 128 exporters), and lower response rates (typically
around a third).
Several authors have investigated the role of currency of invoice on
exchange-rate pass-through (ERPT). Theories of endogenous currency choice
include minimising currency volatility (Donnenfeld and Haug, 2008), low
macroeconomic volatility (Devereux et al., 2004) and choosing a currency
with low transaction costs (Devereux and Shi, 2013). Gopinath et al. (2010)
observe differential ERPT for US importers dependent on the currency of
invoice. They use this finding to motivate a theory of endogenous cur-
rency choice. Using customs unit record data, they show that differences
in pass-through for (US) dollar and non-dollar denominated imports per-
sist through several rounds of price adjustments, suggesting differences in
desired pass-through between firms.
Goldberg and Tille (2008) use data on 24 countries to demonstrate a ‘co-
alescing’ effect where firms choose an invoice currency to minimise price
movements relative to their competitors. Thus exporters to the United
States choose to invoice in US dollars to help maintain their prices relative
to domestic US firms. Similarly, exporters of homogenous goods, such as
commodities, choose a common currency, usually the US dollar. Gopinath
et al. (2010) similarly find that imports of homogenous goods to the United
States are more likely to be invoiced in US dollars.
Goldberg and Tille (2009) use unit record customs data for Canadian
imports to demonstrate that exporters tend to use the currency of the coun-
try that dominates the industry in which they operate. Large shipments
into Canada are more likely to be priced in Canadian dollars than smaller
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ones, especially if the exporter has a large market share. Goldberg and
Tille (2013) formalise this finding in a theoretical model of bargaining be-
tween exporters and importers over price and invoice currency.
There have been a small number of surveys that consider firm choices
over the currency of invoice. Friberg and Wilander (2008) survey 256
Swedish goods exporters, using a stratified sample in similar fashion to
that carried out here. Their survey questions focus on the various stages
of invoicing, to a greater degree than covered in the survey here, although
with less attention to pricing to market. They conclude that both the price
and currency of invoice are subject to negotiation between the importer
and exporter, using a survey of Swedish exporters. They also find that
large orders are more likely to be invoiced in local currency, as are ex-
ports to large countries. The survey in Friberg and Wilander (2008) has a
markedly smaller number of respondents to the survey used in this paper,
and does not cover the service sector. There are no breakdowns by sector
given, so it is unknown whether behaviour differs between sectors indeed
there is no breakdown of behaviour by sector in Friberg and Wilander
(2008).
Ito et al. (2012) survey a small number of Japanese manufacturing ex-
porters and find invoicing in local currency is typical when exporting to
advanced countries, whereas firms with highly differentiated goods or
dominant global market shares are more likely to invoice in yen, even
when exporting to advanced countries.
Martin and Me´jean (2012) study a survey of euro-area manufacturers
and find that large companies are more likely to both invoice in foreign
currency and to hedge exchange rate risk. The survey used here does
not give evidence on whether the respondents use financial instruments
to hedge, but does provide information on primary and service sectors as
well as pricing to market behaviour that the survey in Martin and Me´jean
(2012) does not. Evidence for New Zealand suggests the hedging strate-
gies of exporters (at the very least, those to Australia) vary over time,
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and are related to perceptions of exchange rate momentum (Fabling and
Grimes, 2015).
For New Zealand, there is little previous firm-level evidence on ex-
port pricing. Fabling and Sanderson (2015) examine exchange rate pass-
through using shipment-level export data. They combine the approaches
of Gopinath et al. (2010) and Berman et al. (2012) by considering the impact
of both firm characteristics and currency of invoice. Similar to Gopinath
et al. (2010) they find that short- and long-run pass-through differs by cur-
rency of invoice. They also find that higher-performing firms are more
likely to absorb exchange rate fluctuations in their margins, in line with
Berman et al. (2012). However, within currency groups, they find little
role for firm characteristics. That is to say, the differences in observed pass-
through by firm type is entirely explained by the choice of invoice currency
with higher performing firms electing to invoice in local currency, with di-
rect implications for pass-through.
3.2 New Zealand exports
This section briefly describes New Zealand’s main exports to provide con-
text for the remainder of the paper. We use 2010 data to be contemporane-
ous with the survey, but the main exports and main destinations are little
changed in the most recent data. New Zealand is a commodity exporter,
with over half of exports by value occurring in the primary sector. Agri-
cultural products dominate these primary sector exports, although there
are also important contributions from forestry and crude petroleum. New
Zealand’s biggest export is dairy, which accounts for 18.7 percent of all ex-
ports (table 3.1). Not only is dairy important for New Zealand exports, but
New Zealand plays a significant role in world dairy exports. At the time
the survey used in this paper was carried out, New Zealand accounted for
55 percent of world exports of whole milk powder and 58 percent of world
butter exports (USDA, 2014). Around 90 percent of New Zealand dairy ex-
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Table 3.1: Major New Zealand exports and main merchandise export des-
tinations in 2010
Product Share Destination Share
Dairy 18.7 Australia 23.0
Meat 9.1 China, PR 11.1
Tourism 7.8 United States 8.6
Wood 5.3 Japan 7.8
Transportation 4.4 United Kingdom 3.5
Mineral fuels 3.7 Korea, Rep. of 3.2
Education travel services 3.2 Indonesia 2.1
Machinery 3.1 India 2.1
Fruit and nuts 2.6 Hong Kong (SAR) 2.0
Beverages, liquor 2.4 Taiwan 1.9
Source: Statistics New Zealand (2011).
ports are carried out by one company – the dairy co-operative Fonterra.
New Zealand’s second biggest export is meat, notably beef and lamb.
New Zealand is a major world exporter of sheep meat; according to data
from the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organisation, New Zealand
accounts for more than a third of overall world exports in sheep meat, and
a higher share of world lamb exports. New Zealand also accounts for
around a third of world kiwifruit exports. As with dairy, New Zealand
kiwifruit exports are for the most part carried out by a single co-operative,
Zespri, which markets all exports outside of those to Australia.
Service sector exports account for over a fifth of total exports. New
Zealand’s principal exports of services are tourism, transportation and ed-
ucation travel services. Tourism represents the spending of non-residents
within New Zealand. As noted below, since the expenditure takes place
within New Zealand, not all firms recognise these sales as exports. Trans-
portation includes not just sea freight, but also transport of foreign tourists
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by resident airlines. Education travel services is the provision of education
within New Zealand to non-residents, such as foreign residents attending
university in New Zealand.
Australia is the biggest destination for New Zealand’s merchandise ex-
ports, accounting for around a quarter of exports. China is the second
largest export partner, and is the main destination for dairy exports. The
United States is the third largest destination. Emerging markets in South
East Asia combined account for around a third of exports.
3.3 Business Operations Survey
This paper uses the responses to module on price and wage setting in the
2010 Business Operations Survey carried out by Statistics New Zealand.2
The survey sample was stratified by industry and firm size (see Parker,
2014, for a fuller description of the survey design) . The survey had 5369
responses, which is approximately one seventh of the total population of
firms in New Zealand with at least 6 employees and 30,000 annual GST
(New Zealand equivalent of Value Added Tax) turnover. The high re-
sponse rate of 81.8 percent is explained by the legal requirement for firms
to respond to survey requests by Statistics New Zealand. Of these respon-
dents, 1281 self-identified as being exporters. The survey questions on
how exports are priced are provided in the appendix.
Results in the tables are weighted using the stratification weights pro-
vided by Statistics New Zealand, in order to represent the averages for the
population of private sector New Zealand firms. Since export volumes
tend to be dominated by larger firms, the summary tables also include a
total figure weighted by employment share. This employment share is cal-
culated using average employment by industry and firm size strata: small
2A full copy of the survey questionnaire is available at http://www2.stats.
govt.nz/domino/external/quest/sddquest.nsf/12df43879eb9b25e4c256809001ee0fe/
6233ea80fe191165cc25777d007a8490/$FILE/BOS%202010 Sample.pdf.
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(6-19 employees), medium (20-100 employees) and large (100+ employ-
ees).
Firms were asked who reviews and sets the price for the firm’s main
products. The vast majority – 82 percent – set their own price. A further
8 percent have their price set by their parent firm. The remaining 10 per-
cent of firms selected ‘other’ for the price setter. Firms that were majority
owned by foreigners were more likely to have prices set by the parent – 23
percent versus 7 percent for domestically owned firms.
It is worth noting that the survey relies on firms self-identifying as ex-
porters. In general, the proportion of exporting firms by sector within the
survey is well correlated with the share of that sector’s output that is ex-
ported, according to the 2007 input-output tables. There are a few excep-
tions, most notably in accommodation and food services where 29 percent
of sector output is exported, but firms did not identify themselves as ex-
porters. Since these firms export by providing services to non-residents
physically located within New Zealand (i.e. tourists) they may not con-
sider themselves to be exporters. This hypothesis is supported by the 73
percent of firms in that sector who responded that they derived some share
of their revenue from tourism. Overall, 33 percent of firms self identified
as being either exporters or selling to tourists.
3.4 Export-pricing behaviour
Overall, 15 percent of firms identify themselves as exporting (table 3.2). A
large proportion of firms in agriculture and manufacturing self-identified
as exporting. There were also a large proportion of firms in certain service
sectors – mostly those that had other businesses as their main customer –
that self-identified as exporters. For example, half of firms in the computer
design industry exported, with 11 percent of firms in the sector exporting
more than 75 percent of their output. Conversely firms in construction and
certain service sectors, mostly those serving households or individuals,
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rarely export.
The 36 industries in the sample are grouped in the rest of the paper to
facilitate the presentation of the results, with the groupings set out in table
3.2. Service sectors have been split between business services and personal
services, determined by their main customer. Sectors where the most firms
report ‘individuals or households’ as their main customer have been allo-
cated to personal services, whereas those sectors where most firms report
other businesses as their main customer have been allocated to business
services.3
3.4.1 Currency of invoice
Firms were asked in what currency they predominantly invoiced. The four
options given were currency of the destination market, New Zealand dollar,
United States dollar, other.4 Half of firms invoice in New Zealand dollars,
with the remaining firms roughly evenly split between currency of desti-
nation and vehicle currencies (table 3.3). These responses closely match
the results found by Friberg and Wilander (2008) for Swedish exporters.
Manufacturers are the most likely to invoice in the destination cur-
rency, whereas firms in the primary sector are the most likely to price in US
dollars. Two thirds of firms in the distribution sector price in New Zealand
dollars. Use of vehicle currencies other than the US dollar is rare. There
is a noticeable difference in currency of invoice for those firms that do not
set their own price. In particular, the majority of such firms use vehicle
currencies. The use of vehicle currencies is most pronounced when the
3In what follows, the results for ‘other industry’ and ‘personal services’ have been
omitted from the tables given the low number of exporters within these sectors. However,
all exporters are included in the ‘overall’ figures.
4The intention of the ordering of the question was for firms that export to the United
Stated and invoice in US dollars would selected currency of the destination market, but
it is possible that some firms in this scenario selected US dollars. In any case, the share
of respondents that principally invoice in US dollars far exceeds the share of exports that
goes to the United States.
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Table 3.2: Share of firms that export and share of output exported by
sector(a)
Firms Share of sales exported
that 25% 50% 75% More
Number export or or or than
Industry name of firms (%) less less less 75%
Primary 3216 28 4 2 2 20
Agriculture 2103 40 6 3 3 29
Commercial fishing(b) 42 29 0 0 7 14
Forestry & logging 210 6 0 0 4 0
Agr., forestry, & fishing support serv. 762 2 0 0 0 2
Mining 99 18 3 0 6 6
Manufacturing 5016 36 19 6 5 5
Food, beverage, & tobacco 921 46 16 11 11 8
Textile, clothing, footwear, & leather 357 48 29 10 3 5
Wood & paper product 528 28 17 2 5 4
Printing, publishing, & recorded media 306 17 12 3 1 0
Petroleum, coal, chemical, & assoc. prod. 414 63 39 10 7 7
Non-metallic mineral product 165 18 18 2 0 0
Metal product 912 21 15 4 1 1
Transport and ind. machinery & equip. 831 36 17 6 5 8
Other machinery & equipment 210 57 29 9 0 20
Other manufacturing 369 33 19 6 4 4
Other industry 3582 2 1 0 0 0
Electricity, gas, water, & waste services(b) 114 8 3 0 3 0
Construction 3468 2 1 0 0 0
Distribution 7077 20 15 1 1 2
Machinery & equipment wholesaling 903 36 31 0 0 4
Other wholesale trade 1959 40 31 3 1 5
Retail trade 4215 7 5 0 1 0
Business services 6807 16 8 2 2 3
Transport, postal, & warehousing 1362 9 2 3 2 2
Publishing 120 23 13 3 0 3
Motion picture 135 16 11 2 2 0
Telecommunications(b) 87 28 17 3 0 3
Auxiliary finance 303 13 12 0 1 0
Other professional scientific 2907 15 8 3 1 4
Computer systems design 558 49 26 4 8 11
Administrative & support services 1335 9 5 1 1 2
Personal services 9609 2 1 0 0 1
Accommodation & food services 4194 0 0 0 0 0
Finance 159 4 0 0 2 2
Insurance(b) 45 7 7 0 0 0
Rental, hiring, & real estate services 804 3 3 0 0 0
Education & training 717 7 2 0 0 5
Health care & social assistance 2226 0 0 0 0 0
Arts & recreation services 486 2 1 0 1 1
Other services 978 5 4 0 0 0
Overall 35307 15 8 2 2 4
Notes: (a) Shows share of firms in each sector that export and proportion of firms in
each sector by share of output exported. Rows may not correctly sum due to rounding,
or where results are suppressed to protect the anonymity of individual respondents.
(b) The number of respondents for these sectors is low, so results should be treated
with caution.
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Table 3.3: Predominant currency of invoice for export market contracts
(percent of firms)
Destination NZD USD Other
Firm size
Small 26 50 20 4
Medium 34 45 19 3
Large 29 41 26 4
Sector
Primary 32 18 44 9
Manufacturing 36 44 17 4
Distribution 25 65 9 1
Business services 23 51 22 4
Price reviewer / setter
Firm itself 29 54 15 2
Domestic parent 20 26 47 6
Foreign parent 8 20 43 29
Other 37 14 44 10
Overall 29 48 20 4
Employment weight 29 44 25 3
Note: Firms were asked to mark one response. A small number of
firms marked more than one, particularly those where the price-
setter was ‘other’. The multiple responses have been retained.
3.4. EXPORT-PRICING BEHAVIOUR 65
price is set by a foreign parent – 72 percent of these firms price in vehicle
currencies.
To understand the influence of firm characteristics on the choice of in-
voice currency, we carry out a number of multinomial probit models. A
multinomial probit extends the standard probit model framework to con-
sider the case where there are more than two choices and where there is no
particular order between the choices.5 We allocate the predominant cur-
rency of invoice between three categories – New Zealand dollar, currency
of the destination market and vehicle currencies. For each multinomial
probit there are two equations, estimating the impact of firm character-
istics on the decision to invoice in, respectively, the destination currency
and an invoice currency, relative to the base currency choice, New Zealand
dollars. In terms of firm characteristics, the reference firm is taken to be
a small manufacturer. To mitigate potential mis-specification of the error
terms such as heteroscedasticity, the multinomial probits are estimated us-
ing White (1980) robust standard errors.
The average marginal effects from the multinomial probits are shown
in tables 3.4 and 3.5. Table 3.4 shows the impact of firm characteristics on
the likelihood a firm chooses to invoice in destination currency relative to
New Zealand dollars. Table 3.5 shows the impact on the choice to invoice
in a vehicle currency relative to New Zealand dollars. The parameter esti-
mates from the underlying equations are provided in the appendix.
Column (1) displays the average marginal effects from a multinomial
probit that uses the sector the firm operates in, its size and share of pro-
duction that is exported as explanatory variables for the choice of currency
of invoice. The sector that a firm operates in has a large bearing on in-
voicing in the destination currency, with all sectors being less likely than
manufacturers to choose this currency of invoice. Primary sector firms
are more likely to choose to invoice in vehicle currencies than manufac-
5The estimation of probit models is briefly outlined in the appendix. See Greene (2012)
(p.752-5) for a more detailed exposition of multinomial probits.
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Table 3.4: Average marginal effects from multinomial probits on predom-
inant currency of invoice – destination currency relative to New Zealand
dollars
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sector – Primary −0.122∗∗ −0.127∗∗ −0.128∗∗ −0.127∗∗
Manufacturing reference reference reference reference
Other industry −0.208∗ −0.191∗ −0.195∗ −0.193∗
Distribution −0.091∗ −0.066 −0.061 −0.066
Business services −0.091∗ −0.066 −0.065 −0.070∗
Personal services −0.270∗∗ −0.261∗∗ −0.240∗∗ −0.262∗∗
Size – Small reference reference reference reference
Medium 0.054 0.072∗ 0.062∗ 0.072∗
Large −0.001 0.031 0.018 0.030
Export share 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗
Foreign owned −0.121∗∗ −0.119∗∗ −0.121∗∗
Price set by foreign parent −0.083 −0.071 −0.084
Main customer type
Households −0.091
Business within group −0.043
Retailer / wholesaler 0.032
Other business outside group reference
Government 0.075
Productivity rel. to competitors
Lower 0.003
On par / don’t know reference
Higher 0.011
N 1281 1281 1281 1281
Note: * Significant at 5 percent level, ** Significant at 1 percent level. Average marginal
effects show the percentage point increase in probability of selecting to invoice in
respectively currency of destination and vehicle currencies relative to choosing to
invoice in New Zealand dollars of a one unit increase in the explanatory variable.
Underlying estimation coefficients given in table 3.9 in the appendix.
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Table 3.5: Average marginal effects from multinomial probits on predomi-
nant currency of invoice – vehicle currencies relative to New Zealand dol-
lars
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sector – Primary 0.169∗∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.172∗∗
Manufacturing reference reference reference reference
Other industry 0.140 0.131 0.115 0.133
Distribution −0.038 −0.041 −0.039 −0.042
Business services 0.006 −0.004 −0.021 −0.005
Personal services −0.008 −0.015 −0.014 −0.011
Size – Small reference reference reference reference
Medium 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.014
Large 0.076∗ 0.077∗ 0.087∗ 0.077∗
Export share 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
Foreign owned −0.001 −0.003 −0.001
Price set by foreign parent 0.152∗ 0.142∗ 0.155∗
Main customer type
Households −0.041
Business within group −0.003
Retailer / wholesaler −0.073∗∗
Other business outside group reference
Government −0.031
Productivity rel. to competitors
Lower 0.062
On par / don’t know reference
Higher 0.026
Observations 1281 1281 1281 1281
Note: * Significant at 5 percent level, ** Significant at 1 percent level. Average marginal
effects show the percentage point increase in probability of selecting to invoice in
respectively currency of destination and vehicle currencies relative to choosing to
invoice in New Zealand dollars of a one unit increase in the explanatory variable.
Underlying estimation coefficients given in table 3.9 in the appendix.
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turers. Medium-sized firms are more likely than small firms to invoice in
the destination currency, and large firms are more likely to invoice in ve-
hicle currencies. However, there is not a systematic relationship between
firm size and invoice choice as large firms are as likely as small firms to
invoice in destination currency, and medium-sized firms are as likely as
small firms to invoice in vehicle currencies.
Firms that export a greater share of their production are more likely to
invoice in foreign currencies. A 10 percent increase in the share of pro-
duction that is exported increases the probability of invoicing in the des-
tination currency by 1 percent, and the probability of invoicing in vehicle
currencies by 3 percent. This finding is in line with that of Fabling and
Sanderson (2015), who find that firms with high export receipts are more
likely to use local or vehicle currencies.
The impact of foreign ownership is considered in the equation reported
in column (2). We construct a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is 51
percent or more owned by an overseas firm and zero otherwise. A sec-
ond dummy variable is constructed that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s
price is both set by the parent, and that parent is foreign, and zero in all
other cases. Foreign-owned parents are around 12 percent less likely than
domestic owned firms to price in the currency of the destination market,
although vehicle currency use is the same. Fabling and Sanderson (2015)
similarly find that foreign-owned firms are more likely to use producer
currency pricing. However, when the price setter is also taken into ac-
count, firms where the foreign parent sets the price are 15 percent more
likely to use vehicle currencies than where the foreign-owned firm sets its
own price.
Column (3) includes the firm’s main customer type as an additional ex-
planatory variables, using a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm ticked
the respective customer type as its main customer, and 0 otherwise.6 Be-
6Firms were asked to select one main customer type, but a small number ticked more
than one option. These multiple responses have been maintained.
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yond firms selling to retailers / wholesalers being less likely to use vehicle
currencies, customer type appears to have little impact on the choice of
invoice currency.
Column (4) includes the impact of firm perceptions of productivity rel-
ative to competitors on currency choice. We use the responses made by
firms in an earlier part of the survey on their perceptions of relative pro-
ductivity. Firms were given four options: lower than competitors, on a par
with competitors, higher than competitors and don’t know. Fabling et al. (2012)
demonstrate that firm responses to the BOS on their perceptions of relative
productivity are representative of actual productivity differentials. The in-
cluded explanatory variables are a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 if the firm believes its productivity to be lower than its competitors and
zero otherwise, and the equivalent for firms that believe they have higher
productivity than their competitors. The results show that the perception
of relative productivity has no significant impact on the choice of currency
of invoice.
3.4.2 Pricing across markets
Firms were asked whether the New Zealand dollar price of their main
product was the same across different countries, including sales in New
Zealand and all export markets. Responses were roughly evenly split be-
tween those firms that had the same price across markets and those that
differentiated, with 48 percent differentiating (table 3.6). The share of firms
differentiating is markedly lower than the recent UK survey where three
quarters of firms differentiated prices between foreign markets (Greenslade
and Parker, 2010, p.26), but in line with the euro area, where approx-
imately 50 percent of firms differentiate prices across markets (Fabiani
et al., 2006, p.21). As noted previously, there are a number of firms that
sell to tourists, but do not self identify as exporters. Assuming those firms
set the same price to domestic and tourists, the overall share of exporters
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Table 3.6: Proportion of firms where the price (in New Zealand dollars) is
not the same across countries
% %
Firm size Productivity relative to competitors
Small 45 Lower 57
Medium 51 On par / don’t know 44
Large 61 Higher 54
Sector Invoice currency
Primary 75 Currency of destination 64
Manufacturing 50 New Zealand dollar 29
Distribution 37 US dollar 68
Business services 42 Other vehicle 62
Overall 48 Employment weight 57
that do not differentiate increases to around three quarters – in line with
the recent UK survey.
Larger firms are more likely to differentiate prices – 61 percent of large
firms differentiated compared with 45 percent of small firms. Weighted
by employment shares, 57 percent of firms differentiated price across mar-
kets. In terms of sectors, firms in manufacturing are split evenly, but firms
in the distribution and business services sectors are more likely to have
the same New Zealand dollar price across countries. The striking find-
ing is that three quarters of firms in the primary sector differentiate prices.
This is a higher share than any other industry, and in contradiction to the
assumption made in previous surveys that prices in this sector are deter-
mined by the balance of international supply and demand.
There is a strong, but not perfect, correlation between currency of in-
voice and the decision to differentiate prices. 71 percent of firms that in-
voice in New Zealand dollars charge the same price to all countries. Con-
versely around two thirds of firms that invoice in other currencies differ-
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entiate prices.
To understand the joint influence of firm characteristics on the decision
to differentiate prices between markets, we carry out a number of probit
regressions. The explanatory variable is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if the firm differentiates the price of its main product across mar-
kets and a value of 0 otherwise. The reference firm is a small manufacturer
selling to businesses outside its group other than retailers or wholesalers.
The results are unweighted, and full parameter estimates of the underly-
ing probit models are included in the appendix. The probits are estimated
using White (1980) robust standard errors. Table 3.7 shows the average
marginal effects from these regressions.
Column (1) provides the average marginal effects from a probit model
that uses the sector the firm operates in, firm size and the share of out-
put that is exported as explanatory variables. Larger firms are more likely
to differentiate prices, with a medium-sized firm 11 percent more likely
to differentiate prices than a small firm, and a large firm 20 percent more
likely to differentiate. That larger firms are more likely to price to market
is consistent with the implications of the model of Atkeson and Burstein
(2008), and recent empirical studies of the influence of firm characteristics
on the decision to price to market. Firms are more likely to differentiate
prices the greater the share of their output that is exported. A 10 per-
centage point increase in the share of output that is exported increases the
likelihood of differentiating prices by 2 percent.
The sector that the firm operates in has an important influence on the
decision to differentiate prices. Firms operating in other industry and per-
sonal services are less likely than manufacturers to differentiate prices.
Conversely firms in the primary sector are more likely to differentiate,
even taking into account firm size and export share. This result appears
somewhat counter-intuitive since primary products are normally assumed
to be homogenous commodities with the price set by the balance of in-
ternational supply and demand. Indeed, earlier surveys of price setting
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Table 3.7: Average marginal effects of firm characteristics on pricing to
market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sector
Manufacturing reference referencereference reference
Primary 0.126∗ 0.128∗ 0.127∗ 0.116∗
Other industry −0.207∗ −0.152 −0.159 −0.136
Distribution −0.062 −0.060 −0.063 −0.066
Business services −0.067 −0.037 −0.042 −0.016
Personal services −0.145∗ −0.110 −0.112 −0.038
Size
Small reference reference reference reference
Medium 0.105∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.081∗
Large 0.200∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.171∗∗
Export share 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001∗
Main customer
Households −0.046 −0.047 −0.008
Business within group −0.011 −0.008 0.008
Retailer / wholesaler 0.070∗ 0.073∗ 0.083∗∗
Other business outside group reference reference reference
Government −0.070 −0.070 −0.084
Productivity rel. to competitors
Lower −0.005 −0.018
On par / don’t know reference reference
Higher 0.069∗ 0.058∗
Invoice currency
Destination market 0.278∗∗
New Zealand dollars reference
Vehicle currency 0.268∗∗
Observations 1281 1281 1281 1281
Observed frequency 53 53 53 53
Predicted frequency 58 57 57 57
Log likelihood -837 -833 -830 -780
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.12
Pearson Chi2 560 (0.14) 869 (0.14) 1020 (0.21) 1140 (0.27)
Note: * Significant at 5 percent level, ** significant at 1 percent level. Average marginal
effects show the percentage increase in the probability of choosing to differentiate
prices of a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. Underlying estimation
coefficients given in table 3.11 in the appendix.
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explicitly excluded primary firms on the basis of this assumption (see e.g.
Blinder et al., 1998; Fabiani et al., 2006; Greenslade and Parker, 2010).
There are a number of candidate explanations for why New Zealand
primary firms are more likely to differentiate prices. First, as noted in sec-
tion 3.2, New Zealand has a large share of world exports of a number of its
main primary exports, including milk powder, lamb meat and kiwifruit.
In both the models of Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Amiti et al. (2014),
a larger market share results in a greater degree of price differentiation.
The second explanation relates to the nature of New Zealand’s main
primary exports. Primary exports are generally assumed to be homoge-
nous and invariant to origin – a copper rod is the same worldwide irre-
spective of where the ore was mined. Crude oil varies along two prin-
cipal dimensions: viscosity and sulphur content. Agricultural products,
conversely, have the potential for a wider differentiation along a number
for dimensions, including appearance, taste, and inputs used. Auer and
Chaney (2009) develop a model where even under perfect competition dif-
fering tastes of consumers can lead to pricing-to-market behaviour, with
PTM more prevalent for higher quality goods.
There are a number of examples where this applies to New Zealand’s
agricultural exports. New Zealand lambs are free range, grass fed, are
not injected with growth hormones and the geographic isolation has pro-
tected New Zealand from diseases such as scrapie and foot and mouth.
This allows the lamb meat to be marketed overseas as a clean, green brand
(Clemens and Babcock, 2004). Exports of infant formula to China increased
markedly after the 2008 Sanlu scandal, where a Chinese-based company
mixed melamine with infant formula, resulting in six deaths and 50,000
babies hospitalised. New Zealand infant formula was seen as a ‘safe’
source, with New Zealand formula reaching prices of $70 in China, com-
pared with $20 in the domestic market (Galtry, 2013). Zespri focuses on
the health benefits when marketing kiwifruit, and its own market research
has indicated that repeat sales are heavily influenced by customer experi-
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ences of taste and consistency (Zespri, 2010, p. 15). Zespri also has a large
research programme to establish new cultivars, such as the gold kiwifruit
SunGold R©, which receives a much higher return than the standard green
cultivar.
The role of quality and country of origin in determining agriculture
prices has been noted previously, if not necessarily recently, in the litera-
ture. Lord (1989) notes the impact of product differentiation on the export
price elasticities of Latin American agricultural exports. Other authors
have noted the impact of quality for a number of agricultural commodi-
ites, including coffee (Marshall, 1983), cocoa (Curtis and Scheu, 1987) and
wheat (Grennes et al., 1978).
Column (2) provides the average marginal effects from a probit model
that also includes the main customer type of the firm. The reference cate-
gory is a business outside the firm’s group, other than a retailer or whole-
saler. For the most part, the type of main customer has little bearing on the
decision to differentiate prices, the sole exception being firms that mainly
sell to retailers and wholesalers. Such firms are 7 percent more likely to
differentiate prices than those selling to other types of firm. This finding is
in line with the model of Corsetti and Dedola (2005), where the presence
of additive distribution costs result in variable mark-ups at the producer
level.
Recent research on the impact of firm characteristics has highlighted
the role of productivity in the decision to differentiate prices. Column (3)
shows the results from a model that includes dummy variables for firms
with lower and higher productivity relative to their competitors, as used in
the multinomial probit in section 3.4.1. In line with the previous findings
in the literature, high productivity firms are more likely to differentiate
prices, by 7 percent relative to firms who perceive their productivity to be
on a par with their competitors.
Finally, column (4) presents the results from a probit model that addi-
tionally includes the currency of invoice as explanatory variables. The ref-
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erence category is invoicing in New Zealand dollars. We include a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm invoices in the currency of the
destination and 0 otherwise and another dummy variable which takes the
value of 1 if the firm invoices in US dollars or other vehicle currencies and
0 otherwise. For both invoicing dummy variables, the firms that invoiced
in currencies other than New Zealand dollars were markedly more likely
to differentiate prices, even when controlling for the other characteristics
discussed above. The strength of the marginal response does suggest that
the decisions on whether to differentiate prices and the currencies of in-
voice are related and not independent. Given this potential endogeneity,
the exact coefficient estimates should be treated with caution.
Throughout the individual models presented in table 3.7 there are a
number of consistent conclusions that can be drawn on the firm character-
istics that bear on the decision to differentiate prices. In keeping with the
recent literature on the subject, we find that firms that are larger, export
a greater share of their production, sell to retailers or wholesalers and are
more productive are more likely to differentiate prices. In contrast to the
literature, we also find that firms in the primary sector are more likely to
differentiate prices than other types of firms, even when accounting for
these other firm characteristics.
3.4.3 Factors influencing price differentiation across mar-
kets
Those firms that differentiate were asked to indicate the importance of
a number of potential factors for determining price in the foreign market,
rating each of the given list of factors as not important, moderately important,
very important, or don’t know.
The factors most commonly cited as being ‘very important’ for deter-
mining prices are exchange rate movements, the level of competition in
the market and transport costs (table 3.8). These three factors rank highest
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across sectors and firm sizes. Tax system of destination market was the
factor least recognised as being ’very important’ for determining price.
Customer characteristics and cyclical fluctuations in demand are impor-
tant for primary firms, but less so for firms in other sectors.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper studies how exporters set prices, focusing in particular on the
decisions over which currency to use for invoicing and whether to price
to market. It uses the responses to a large behavioural survey of New
Zealand exporters, an alternative, complementary approach to the widespread
use of unit-record customs data in the literature. The survey asks firms to
consider prices in both the domestic and all foreign markets, allowing for
a more accurate study of pricing to market than the straight use of customs
data, which does not consider the domestic market.
The analysis here demonstrates that firm characteristics play a statisti-
cally significant role in the decision to differentiate prices. Larger firms are
more likely to price to market, as are those that have the perception that
they are more productive. Conversely, once other characteristics are taken
into account, the sector that the firm operates in has no significant impact
on the likelihood that a firm differentiates prices between countries, with
the exception of firms in the primary sector. That primary sector firms
price to market (let alone are more likely to do so than firms in other sec-
tors) contrasts sharply with the widely held assumption that these prod-
ucts are priced in international markets.
Since customs data rely on the physical shipment of goods, the litera-
ture is silent on the export pricing behaviour of service sector firms, who
represent a large share of exports of developed economies. We demon-
strate that these firms do price to market, although their behaviour is not
significantly different from those of manufacturers.
Finally, the survey responses enable a better understanding of the fac-
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Table 3.8: What determines prices across countries?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Firm size
Small 71 55 45 41 39 37 36 15
Medium 67 60 54 35 37 37 33 20
Large 64 62 51 36 32 37 32 16
Sector
Primary 79 74 55 59 61 66 66 23
Manufacturing 70 58 51 33 32 29 23 13
Distribution 63 48 53 35 31 27 28 36
Business services 59 43 24 24 20 16 17 17
Overall 69 57 48 39 37 37 35 17
Employment weight 63 61 50 39 35 42 35 17
Note: Firms were asked to cite each factor separately. Table shows
share of firms that differentiate across markets citing factor as
‘very important’.
1: Exchange rate movement
2: Level of competition in the market
3: Transport costs
4: Regulations
5: Tariff
6: Customer characteristics
7: Cyclical fluctuation in demand
8: Tax system of destination market
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tors that influence firms’ decisions on pricing in foreign markets. Ex-
change rate movements are the most cited factor as being very important
for determining the price within market. The level of competition in the
market and transport costs are also widely recognised. Cyclical fluctu-
ations in demand and the tax system of the destination market are less
widely recognised as being very important for setting the price within
market.
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3.A Appendix – probit estimation
This appendix briefly outlines the estimation of probit models.7 The basic
probit model is used in situations where the variable in question has two
possible outcomes (typically recorded as 0 and 1). For example, in section
3.4.2 we model the firm’s choice between charging the same price to all
markets, or differentiating prices. The model assumes that the choice, Y is
a function of a number of explanatory factors, X specifically:
Pr(Y = 1 | X) = Φ(X ′β) (3.1)
where Pr is the probability and Φ is the cumulative normal distribution.
An alternative way of expressing 3.1 is to assume there is some unob-
served, latent variable, Y ∗, such that
Y ∗ = X ′β +  (3.2)
where  ∼ N(0, 1). Then Y is an indicator of whether the latent variable
Y ∗ is positive:
Y =
{
1 if Y ∗ > 0
0 otherwise
(3.3)
The log likelihood function for a sample of n observations, {yi, xi}ni=1, is
given by:
lnL =
n∑
i=1
(
yi ln Φ(x′iβ) + (1− yi)ln
(
1− Φ(x′iβ)
))
(3.4)
Maximum likelihood estimation is used to derive an estimate for β. The
coefficients from these estimations follow in this appendix. However, since
the coefficients from these estimations refer to the effect of the explanatory
variables on the latent variable, their interpretation is not straightforward.
Instead we prefer to present the average marginal effect (see tables 3.4, 3.5
and 3.7), which is to say the effect that changing the explanatory has on
7See Greene (2012, Ch.17) for a more detailed description.
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the probability of choosing outcome 1, averaged across all observations.
These marginal effects are expressed as the change in probability associ-
ated with a one unit change in the explanatory variable.
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Table 3.9: Invoice currency mulitnomial probit – currency of destination
coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary −0.184 −0.220 −0.228 −0.219
(0.229) (0.228) (0.231) (0.228)
Other industry −0.773 −0.713 −0.786 −0.717
(0.478) (0.479) (0.472) (0.476)
Distribution −0.507∗∗ −0.406∗ −0.378∗ −0.409∗
(0.163) (0.165) (0.166) (0.166)
Business services −0.376∗∗ −0.339∗ −0.361∗ −0.346∗
(0.144) (0.146) (0.153) (0.146)
Personal services −1.529∗∗ −1.521∗∗ −1.369∗∗ −1.515∗∗
(0.334) (0.343) (0.351) (0.342)
Medium 0.304∗ 0.391∗∗ 0.349∗ 0.387∗∗
(0.139) (0.141) (0.142) (0.141)
Large 0.167 0.337∗ 0.297 0.338∗
(0.157) (0.162) (0.165) (0.162)
Export share 0.014∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign owned −0.605∗∗ −0.603∗∗ −0.603∗∗
(0.138) (0.138) (0.138)
Foreign parent sets prices −0.048 −0.008 −0.044
(0.384) (0.385) (0.383)
Households −0.555∗
(0.219)
Business within group −0.221
(0.188)
Retailer / wholesaler −0.018
(0.120)
Government 0.302
(0.277)
Lower productivity 0.164
(0.229)
Higher productivity 0.117
(0.123)
Constant −0.663∗∗ −0.641∗∗ −0.577∗∗ −0.681∗∗
(0.144) (0.145) (0.157) (0.149)
Observations 1281 1281 1281 1281
Log likelihood -1260 -1246 -1237 -1245
*, ** significant at 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively.
White (1980) robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.10: Invoice currency multinomial probit – vehicle currency coeffi-
cients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary 0.552∗ 0.545∗ 0.545∗ 0.549∗
(0.218) (0.218) (0.221) (0.219)
Other industry 0.209 0.202 0.116 0.206
(0.380) (0.380) (0.408) (0.382)
Distribution −0.416∗ −0.382∗ −0.358∗ −0.388∗
(0.179) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181)
Business services −0.159 −0.185 −0.270 −0.192
(0.151) (0.153) (0.159) (0.153)
Personal services −0.604 −0.627 −0.587 −0.610
(0.324) (0.320) (0.325) (0.320)
Medium 0.228 0.254 0.251 0.244
(0.147) (0.148) (0.150) (0.149)
Large 0.400∗ 0.485∗∗ 0.513∗∗ 0.487∗∗
(0.162) (0.167) (0.171) (0.167)
Export share 0.020∗∗ 0.0208∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign owned −0.299∗ −0.305∗ −0.297∗
(0.141) (0.142) (0.141)
Foreign parent sets price 0.634 0.619 0.654∗
(0.333) (0.336) (0.333)
Households −0.450∗
(0.223)
Business within group −0.120
(0.190)
Retailer / wholesaler −0.328∗
(0.131)
Government 0.012
(0.297)
Lower productivity 0.349
(0.230)
Higher productivity 0.171
(0.128)
Constant −1.216∗∗ −1.179∗∗ −1.007∗∗ −1.241∗∗
(0.154) (0.154) (0.167) (0.159)
Observations 1281 1281 1281 1281
Log likelihood -1260 -1246 -1237 -1245
*, ** significant at 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively.
White (1980) robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.11: Differentiation across markets probit coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary 0.346∗ 0.353∗ 0.351∗ 0.337∗
(0.146) (0.148) (0.147) (0.154)
Other industry −0.551∗ −0.404 −0.423 −0.388
(0.273) (0.281) (0.280) (0.278)
Distribution −0.162 −0.158 −0.166 −0.066
(0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.115)
Business services −0.174 −0.098 −0.110 −0.045
(0.094) (0.098) (0.098) (0.100)
Personal services −0.381∗ −0.290 −0.296 −0.108
(0.188) (0.193) (0.191) (0.192)
Medium 0.277∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.230∗
(0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093)
Large 0.531∗∗ 0.512∗∗ 0.513∗∗ 0.489∗∗
(0.103) (0.105) (0.105) (0.107)
Export share 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Households −0.124 −0.126 −0.0243
(0.132) (0.131) (0.137)
Businesses within group −0.031 −0.022 0.024
(0.117) (0.117) (0.120)
Retailers and wholesalers 0.189∗ 0.196∗ 0.238∗∗
(0.079) (0.079) (0.082)
Government −0.189 −0.188 −0.241
(0.185) (0.184) (0.185)
Lower productivity −0.012 −0.053
(0.155) (0.163)
Higher productivity 0.185∗ 0.168∗
(0.0802) (0.0818)
Destination currency 0.801∗∗
(0.091)
Vehicle currency 0.772∗∗
(0.097)
Constant −0.355∗∗ −0.421∗∗ −0.474∗∗ −0.839∗∗
(0.095) (0.103) (0.106) (0.115)
Observations 1281 1281 1281 1281
Log likelihood -837 -833 -830 -780
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.12
Pearson Chi2 560 (0.14) 869 (0.14) 1020 (0.21) 1140 (0.27)
*, ** significant at 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively.
White (1980) robust standard errors in parentheses.
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3.B Appendix – survey questionnaire
Section C: Price and Wage Setting
1 Section C should be completed by the General Manager
Definition
2 The following section asks about factors that are important when this business reviews
and sets prices. To answer these questions, apply the following definition.
Main product: The product (good or service) or product group from which this
business gets its largest share of revenue.
If this business does not have a main product (eg in the case of large-format retail stores),
provide answers that are most representative of this business’s price-setting process.
Exporting
25 During the last financial year, did this business have any sales of goods or
services that came from exports?
o yes→ go to 26
o no→ go to 32
26 For the following questions, the New Zealand dollar price refers to the price of the product
when converted to New Zealand dollars.
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27 Is the New Zealand dollar price of this business’s main product the same across
different countries?
Include sales in New Zealand and all export markets
o yes→ go to 29
o no→ go to 28
28 Mark one oval for each item listed. How important are the following factors in
determining differences in the New Zealand dollar price across countries?
not moderately very don’t
important important important know
exchange rate movements o o o o
tariffs o o o o
tax system of the destination market o o o o
customer characteristics (eg consumer o o o o
tastes, standards of living)
cyclical fluctuations in demand (eg markets o o o o
are at different points in the business cycle)
level of competition in the market o o o o
regulations o o o o
transport costs o o o o
29 Mark one oval. What is the predominant currency of invoice for this business’s
export market contracts?
o currency of the destination market (eg Australian dollars when exporting to Australia)
o New Zealand dollar
o United States dollar
o other
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30 How high would the New Zealand dollar have to appreciate before this business
would raise prices?
percent appreciation in the New Zealand dollar %
or o appreciations are always passed on to export prices because → go to 32
the New Zealand dollar price is held fixed
o there is no scope to raise export prices → go to 32
31 Would the resulting rise in export prices match the exchange rate appreciation
recorded in question 30?
o yes
o no, the rise in export prices would be smaller
o no, the rise in export prices would be larger
Chapter 4
Global inflation: the role of food,
housing and energy prices
4.1 Introduction
The beginning of the 21st Century was marked by low and stable infla-
tion across the developed world, and reduced inflation in the developing
world. This stability has been threatened since the mid-2000s by volatility
in commodity prices, most notably food and energy, causing concern for
policymakers (See, among others, Bernanke, 2008; IMF, 2008; ECB, 2008).
Since mid-2014, falling energy prices have once more been at the forefront
of policymakers’ minds. Research into the effects of these movements in
commodity prices on domestic inflation has generally been restricted to a
small sample of typically advanced countries, owing principally to a lack
of readily available data.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, it constructs a dataset
for consumer prices for 223 countries and territories1 for the period 1980-
1The official status of the countries and territories included here varies from inter-
nationally recognised sovereign states to overseas regions, dependencies, territories and
autonomous regions. The term ‘country’ is used hereafter for brevity, and is in keeping
with the practice of the World Bank.
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2012. For headline inflation alone this is wider coverage than existing
datasets. In addition to headline consumer prices, this dataset also con-
tains, where publicly available, the sub-indices for food, housing and en-
ergy, along with a core index excluding these sub-indices. Existing datasets
for these sub-indices rarely extend beyond a small number of advanced
countries. Every effort has been made to standardise the indices using the
international standard Classification of Consumption according to Pur-
pose (COICOP) in order to aid comparisons.
The second main contribution of this paper is to use this dataset to
consider the role of food, housing and energy prices in driving global co-
movement in consumer prices. Recent literature has noted how move-
ments in national inflation rates can be explained in large part by move-
ments in global inflation factors, most notably for advanced economies.
That analysis is extended here in two dimensions – first by considering a
more diverse group of countries, including low income countries which
have for the most part been ignored by the literature to date. Second,
greater consideration is given to the role of sub-components in generating
co-movement in inflation. Analysis of sub-components has to date been
limited to a small number of countries, given the lack of comparable inter-
national datasets.
There is a growing recent literature on the influence of global infla-
tion factors on national inflation rates. The seminal contribution to this
literature is Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010), who study the headline inflation
rates for 22 OECD countries over the period 1960-2008. They establish
that almost 70 percent of the variance of national inflation rates can be ex-
plained by a common, global factor. They demonstrate that including this
global factor improves the forecasting performance of augmented Phillips
curves.
Eickmeier and Pijnenburg (2013) similarly augment the Phillips curves
of 24 OECD countries with global factors, finding a role for the common
global component in domestic inflationary pressures. Neely and Rapach
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(2011) decompose the inflation rates of 64 (mostly high income) countries
into global, regional and domestic factors, finding that the global factor ac-
counts for 36 percent of total inflation variance and regional factors a fur-
ther 16 percent. Their regions are geographic in nature, so can include di-
verse economies such as the United States and Barbados in one group. The
divide is also somewhat arbitrary at times – grouping English-speaking
Caribbean nations into North America and Spanish-speaking ones into
Latin America.
There have been a small number of studies that have studied the influ-
ence of global factors beyond just headline inflation. Mumtaz and Surico
(2012) use a dynamic factor model to investigate the influence of global in-
flation factors on a wide range of price indices for 10 advanced economies.
Their analysis suggests that the comovement in the series has increased
since the 1980s. Karagedikli et al. (2010) study the global component of
28 matched product categories for 14 advanced countries. They allow for
a global inflation factor, category-specific factors and individual country
factors. They find that category-specific factors account for a large share
of variance of products that are exposed to international trade.
Fo¨rster and Tillmann (2014) use the four-level dynamic hierarchical
model proposed by Moench et al. (2013) to disentangle the effects of CPI
sub-components, specifically food, energy and the remainder of the index,
for a group of 40 countries, all but six of which are high income. Fo¨rster
and Tillmann find common factors explain large shares of the variance for
energy and food, but not for the remainder of the index. We extend their
analysis in section 4.4.4 below to a markedly wider sample of countries
and also by including CPI housing inflation.
The following analysis extends the literature by considering the influ-
ence of global factors on national inflation rates for a far broader, and more
diverse, group of countries. We confirm the findings of Ciccarelli and
Mojon (2010) that global factors can explain a large majority of the vari-
ance of national inflation rates for advanced countries. We also demon-
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strate that this finding does not generalise to less developed countries.
For medium income countries the share of national inflation variance ex-
plained by global factors is in the order of 15 to 20 percent, falling to
around 10 percent for low income countries.
There are a number of potential country characteristics that could ex-
plain the differing effects of global inflation factors on national inflation
rates. Considered individually, lower average inflation, lower inflation
volatility and higher trade openness appear to increase the influence of
global factors. However, when considered in a multivariate framework,
these factors are not significant. Instead it is higher GDP per capita, deeper
financial development and more transparent monetary policy that explain
a greater role for global inflation factors. Relatively rich countries with
deep domestic capital markets and good monetary policy are likely to
be better able to mitigate idiosyncratic, domestic shocks. The apparent
greater influence of global factors in these countries appears to be a func-
tion of this reduced idiosyncratic volatility.
In terms of sub-components of consumer prices, there is a more marked
influence of global energy and food prices on the respective national in-
flation rates. Housing prices appear for the most part idiosyncratic and
unrelated to global factors. Global factors can explain a greater share
of the variance of national inflation for advanced countries for all sub-
components. This finding demonstrates that the greater explanatory power
of global factors is not a function of differing consumption patterns be-
tween high and low income countries.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Desired series
This paper uses consumer prices for nearly all sovereign states, territories
and geographically distinct autonomous regions (e.g. French overseas re-
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gions such as Re´union). Ultimately, CPI figures were found for 223 coun-
tries.2 The coverage roughly coincides with the countries in the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
The data are at quarterly frequency to maximise coverage. Many coun-
tries only publish at this frequency, particularly developing ones. For
those countries that publish monthly, the quarterly index value is calcu-
lated as the average of the monthly outturns, in keeping with standard
international practice. For example, the annual inflation rate for 2012Q4 is
calculated as the average index level for October to December 2012 over
the average index level for October to December 2011, rather than just the
end-quarter index values of December 2012 over December 2011.
Differences in exact definitions of CPI can render cross-country com-
parisons difficult. The scope of items covered and the exact structure of
sub-indices differs between countries. Where possible, the indices used
here are standardised using the international standard Classification of
Consumption according to Purpose (COICOP).3 COICOP is used for a
number of modern CPIs, including the European Union’s Harmonised In-
dex of Consumer Prices. The desired COICOP categories are:
Headline (CPI) : the all items index. The COICOP classification does not
include mortgage payments, which have been excluded, where
possible, from the national indices that include them.
Food (CPIF) : COICOP 01.1 food purchased for consumption at home.
Housing (CPIH) : COICOP 04.1-04.4 rents, maintenance and repair of
dwellings, water supply and local authority taxes based on housing.
Energy (CPIE) : COICOP 04.5 electricity, gas and other fuels and
2Of widely recognised sovereign states, only Eritrea, the People’s Democratic Repub-
lic of Korea, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the bulk of Somalia are missing here.
3See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=5 for a description of the
categories.
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COICOP 07.2.2 fuels and lubricants for operation of personal
transport equipment.
For countries that do not publish on a COICOP basis, the closest sub-
index to the desired COICOP category was used, except where that closest
series remains far from the desired definition. For example, food and non-
alcoholic beverages was used in place of food, the series for electricity, gas
and other fuels was deemed sufficient for CPI energy. Conversely, the full
transport category was deemed too far removed from fuels and lubricants
given it includes public transport, purchase of vehicles, tax on vehicles
and spare parts. An online data appendix sets out the exact series used for
each country.4
Not all statistical agencies publish CPI at a detailed level. Many only
publish at the 12 COICOP division level, which means it is not possible to
separate out housing and energy. For these countries, COICOP division
04 - Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels is used for a combined
housing and energy series (CPIHE). For countries where separate housing
and energy series are available, CPIHE combines the estimates for housing
and energy.
National statistical agencies periodically rebase and re-reference their
CPI series.5 For the most part, an overlapping period is published for both
the new and old series, allowing for the two series to be spliced together.
In some cases there are no overlapping observations, but the old series
has data covering the reference period for the new series. For example,
the new series may only be published from 2008Q1, but is referenced to
2007=100 and the old series has observations for 2007. For the small num-
ber of cases where no overlap exists, the old and new series have been
4The appendix is available at https://sites.google.com/site/milesparkereconomics/
CPIsources.pdf.
5Technically, the base refers to the period where the underlying expenditure used to
calculate the weights takes place. The reference period is the period when the index is set
to equal 100, or occasionally 1000. Since these periods often coincide, the use of the term
‘base’ for both is common practice.
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linked using the average growth of the relevant period in the preceding
and subsequent five years. All such cases are noted in the online data ap-
pendix under the relevant country. The data have been re-referenced to
2010=100 (with a few exceptions of countries that do not have 2010 data).
Also included in the accompanying data are the weights of the sub-
indices in the total index. Weights for CPI sub-indices are typically esti-
mated using surveys of household spending. The frequency with which
weights are updated varies between countries, with updates usually more
frequent in advanced countries. Where weights are not published, esti-
mates are derived using ordinary least squares. The online data appendix
notes the cases when this method is used.
Core inflation indices are constructed using the sub-indices and weights.
The accompanying dataset contains series on CPI excluding food (CPIxF),
excluding energy (CPIxE), excluding housing (CPIxH) and excluding hous-
ing and energy (CPIxHE). The data also include series for CPI excluding
food and energy (CPIxFE). This measure is commonly used internation-
ally as a measure of core, or underlying, inflation. The final core measure,
discussed in more detail below, is CPI excluding food, housing and energy
(CPIxFHE).
To calculate a core measure it is necessary to unchain the relevant in-
dices by setting the base period equal to 100. This unchaining is required
for each change in weight. The unchained indices are then weighted to-
gether using the current period weights. Finally, the unchained core in-
dices are once more chain-linked together. As an example, the formula for
calculating CPI excluding food and energy is shown below.
CPIxFEt =
100
(
100 · CPIt
CPIb
)
− wF
(
100 · CPIFt
CPIFb
)
− wE
(
100 · CPIEt
CPIEb
)
100− wF − wE
Where CPIt, CPIFt and CPIEt are the current index numbers for
overall, food and energy prices, CPIb, CPIFb and CPIEb are the index
numbers for the base period – the quarter immediately before the change
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to the current weights – and wF and wE are the current weights for food
and energy. The weight of headline CPI is 100.
4.2.2 Sources
There are a number of international databases with CPI data. The Inter-
national Financial Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund
contain data on overall CPI for most member countries. The Laborstats
database of the International Labour Organisation has indices for overall
CPI and CPI food. Neither of these sources has information on the other
sub-indices, nor on the weights.
The Main Economic Indicators of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development contain more detailed information on sub-
indices, including energy, and weights for its (advanced economy) mem-
bers. There are also a number of regional organisations with CPI data for
several countries, including the Economic and Statistical Observatory for
sub-Saharan Africa (AFRISTAT) and the Secretariat of the Pacific Com-
munity. Two major international subscription databases were also used –
Thomson Reuters Datastream and Haver Analytics.
For the most part, the sub-indices and weights must be obtained from
national sources. When particular series were not all available on the web-
site of the national statistical agency nor the central bank, both were con-
tacted to request the data. A number of these institutions provided the
requested data and have been noted in appendix 4.B.
There are data for headline CPI for 127 countries in 1980Q1, and for
over 200 countries by 1998Q1. Coverage of CPI food is also extensive. The
availability of CPI energy and CPI housing is mostly restricted to high
income countries in the first half of the period. The combined housing
and energy series is more widely available, as noted above.
There are a number of reasons why the panel is not fully balanced,
despite these systematic attempts to obtain the relevant CPI data. First,
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country formation during the sample period creates periods of no data
pre-independence. Examples include the states formed from the break-
up of the Soviet Union and later of Yugoslavia, as well as several newly
independent states (e.g. Timor-Leste, South Sudan). Second, it was not
always possible to obtain information on previous vintages of CPI for all
countries – the records have not all been digitised or made available on-
line. Furthermore, some countries did not publish CPI data on a quarterly
or higher frequency throughout the sample (e.g. United Arab Emirates,
Greenland). Finally, other breaks in collection have been caused by war,
disasters or a lack of personnel at statistical agencies.
Related to issues around data availability are issues surrounding data
quality. There has been a recent public case surrounding the accuracy of
the official inflation data in Argentina, and the reliability of data in coun-
tries such as Greece, Hungary and Ukraine (Michalski and Stoltz, 2013).
Beyond countries carrying out systematic fraud of the inflation numbers,
there is also the risk of measurement error in the calculation of the indices.
For the CPI, measurement error is likely to come in two forms: unrepresen-
tative price quotes and incorrect household expenditure shares. Undertak-
ing a sufficiently large number of geographically dispersed price quotes
should help with the former problem, and regularly updating weights
should help with the latter.
The IMF maintains standards with regards the publication of “com-
prehensive, timely, accessible and reliable” data under the Dissemination
Standards Bulletin Board.6 But even these standards may not provide
a full quantitative measure of quality. For example, New Zealand does
not qualify for the lowest tier of the IMF’s standards, along with Eritrea,
North Korea and Somaliland, yet its process for CPI construction com-
pares favourably to those (and many other) countries. Similarly, prior to
2002 the US only updated its weights around once per decade, far short
of the yearly updating common in many countries. The US CPI is con-
6See http://dsbb.imf.org/
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structed from around 81,000 price quotes per month, compared with 41,000
for Botswana, a much smaller, less populous and poorer country.
Early vintages of the Penn World Tables (see Summers and Heston,
1984) contained a variable for data quality, although the exact formula
is not published and in the authors’ own words is calculated in ’quite a
subjective way’. This includes assuming that countries with higher GDP
per capita have better quality data. Dawson et al. (2001) note that elim-
inating all but the countries with the highest data quality from the Penn
World Tables removes two thirds of the countries, and most of the cross-
sectional variation. In the absence of any realistic quantitative measure of
data quality, the analysis here takes the published indices at face value. If
data quality is positively correlated with income, as Summers and Heston
(1984) assert, then the differing results by income found below may in part
arise from issues surrounding data quality.
4.3 Evolution of inflation since 1980
4.3.1 Distribution of country headline inflation rates
There is a marked difference in headline CPI inflation between high in-
come countries and less developed countries. For high income countries,
there was a period of disinflation through the first half of the 1980s (figure
4.1). Inflation in these countries settled at low and stable rates from the
early 1990s through to the middle of 2007. In the 15 year period between
1992Q3 and 2007Q3, the median inflation rate for high income countries
ranged between 1.4 and 3.2 percent. This period is also remarkable for the
reduction in the right-hand skew of the distribution of country inflation
rates.
That period of inflation stability was followed by increased volatility
during the global financial crisis (GFC) with a sharp peak in inflation, fol-
lowed by an immediate trough. Inflation in 2011 and 2012 appears more
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of annual overall CPI inflation
(a) High income
(b) Middle income
(c) Low income
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in keeping with the pre-GFC distribution.
The median inflation for middle income countries follows a similar pat-
tern to high income countries, albeit at a higher rate overall. The disinfla-
tion of the early 1980s is less marked, and continues through to 2000. This
disinflationary period was accompanied by a reduction in skew. The pe-
riod 2000-2007 appears to be a period of relative stability in inflation. The
volatility around the GFC is more marked.
Inflation for low income countries is more volatile than for high or mid-
dle income countries. The median inflation rate follows a similar path to
that of middle income countries, but with a greater variance. Deflation
is more common in low income countries than in high or middle income
countries. Indeed, there are periods when the 25th percentile lies below
zero. There is a sharp spike in inflation in the early 1990s, in part reflect-
ing the high inflation rates as former Soviet Union states transitioned from
command to market economies.
4.3.2 Sub-indices
This section considers whether the evolution of CPI inflation noted in sec-
tion 4.3.1 above is attributable to movements in any particular sub-index.
In particular, are movements in the overall index dominated by the evo-
lution of prices for food, housing and energy, or by the remainder of the
index?
The evolution of food price inflation mirrors that for overall CPI. For
middle and low income countries this is perhaps not surprising given
the weight of food in the total index (see section 4.3.4 below). There is
a marked run-up in food price inflation worldwide immediately prior to
the GFC, which quickly reversed following the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers in September 2008. This period is the most marked episode of volatility
for high income countries, and appears to be a major contributing factor to
movements in the headline index. For middle and low income countries,
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the food price inflation rate is higher on average, more volatile and more
dispersed.
The median rate of housing inflation in high income countries displays
less volatility than food price inflation. The median housing inflation rate,
and indeed the interquartile range, is not affected around the time of the
GFC, in contrast to the volatility witnessed with food price inflation. It
also contrasts with the widespread increase, and reversal, in house prices
at that time. The housing component of the CPI is principally rents, and
the lack of increase in the CPI component in line with house prices is con-
sistent with evidence that house prices over the period became divorced
from historic relationships with rents (e.g. OECD, 2012).
The energy sub-index is the most volatile of the sub-indices studied
here, and also the most prone to outright price falls. There have been a
number of cycles in energy prices since the early 1980s. This is most ob-
vious in higher income countries where the distribution of inflation rates
is tight relative to the volatility of the median. The outcomes are more
dispersed for middle and low income countries (note there are few obser-
vations for these countries in the early part of the period).
For high income countries, the remainder of the CPI – the index ex-
cluding food, housing and energy – has been low and stable for most of
the period. The outcomes across countries are similar, with very little dis-
persion in inflation rates. A minority of high income countries had an
increase in CPIxFHE inflation immediately prior to the GFC, but in gen-
eral this sub-index did not exhibit the same volatility around the GFC that
the other sub-indices did. The stability in the CPIxFHE inflation rate was
less evident in middle and low income countries.
4.3.3 Inflation volatility
Table 4.1 shows the mean, median and standard deviation of inflation for
the period 1981-2012, split by country income level and by sub-index. In
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of annual inflation of CPI sub-indices
(a) Food - high income (b) Food - middle/low income
(c) Housing - high income (d) Housing - middle/low income
(e) Energy - high income (f) Energy - middle/low income
(g) CPIxFHE - high income (h) CPIxFHE - middle/low income
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order to remove the influence of a small number of extreme outliers, we
exclude periods of hyperinflation from the analysis. Following Fischer
et al. (2002), we define this as the quarter when the annual inflation rate
exceeds 100 percent until the annual rate again drops below 100 percent.
Headline inflation averaged 4.9 percent over the whole period for high
income countries. For middle and low income countries, the mean infla-
tion rate was double that at 9.9 percent. As noted above, there was dis-
inflation over the course of the three decades studied here, in both high
income and middle/low income countries.
The energy sub-index exhibited the highest average rate of inflation,
followed by food, then housing and finally the remainder of the index.
Note the populations are not the same across sub-indices, so the sub-
indices do not ‘add up’ to the headline result. In particular, there is a
reporting bias, with those countries that provide separate information on
housing and energy likely to be more economically developed and in gen-
eral exhibit lower overall inflation.
Inflation volatility exhibits similar patterns to the mean rates. The stan-
dard deviation of inflation rates is lower for high income countries than for
middle and low income countries. The standard deviation falls through
the period under analysis. In terms of the sub-indices, energy is the most
volatile, followed by food, then housing. Not only do the remaining items
of the index have the lowest rates of inflation, they also have the lowest
variance.
4.3.4 Expenditure weights
How households allocate expenditure has been the subject of a large liter-
ature dating back to Engel (1857). Engel’s Law states that as households
become richer, the share of their spending devoted to food declines: food
has an income elasticity of less than 1. Research has extended to consider-
ing more categories of expenditure than just food, but in general focuses at
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Table 4.1: Mean, median and standard deviation of inflation, by country
type
Full sample 1980-1991 1992-2006 2007-2012
Income H M/L H M/L H M/L H M/L
Mean
Headline 4.9 9.9 7.9 13.7 3.8 9.4 3.3 7.0
Food 4.5 8.7 7.1 10.8 3.1 7.9 4.7 8.6
Housing 4.4 6.3 7.8 7.7 3.7 5.4 3.5 7.1
Energy 5.3 8.0 5.5 8.1 4.9 9.1 5.8 6.8
CPIxFHE 3.5 6.0 7.0 9.3 2.7 6.1 2.4 5.2
Median
Headline 3.0 6.1 5.1 9.1 2.5 5.2 2.8 5.5
Food 3.1 5.8 5.1 8.1 2.2 4.7 3.8 6.5
Housing 3.3 3.6 6.4 5.6 3.0 2.7 2.9 4.1
Energy 4.3 5.9 4.8 5.4 3.5 6.3 5.9 5.6
CPIxFHE 2.3 4.0 5.2 6.8 1.9 3.8 1.9 3.9
Standard deviation
Headline 7.8 13.6 11.0 16.5 6.5 13.8 2.9 7.2
Food 6.1 12.1 8.4 13.6 4.5 12.7 5.1 9.3
Housing 5.2 17.6 6.3 8.9 4.8 9.6 4.4 25.1
Energy 9.2 13.8 10.8 11.1 7.6 13.6 10.3 14.3
CPIxFHE 4.7 8.6 6.0 13.3 4.3 9.5 2.3 6.1
Note: H: high income countries; M/L: middle and low income countries.
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the level of the individual household, using surveys of household expen-
diture. These same surveys are typically used to construct the expenditure
weights in the CPI. These expenditure weights are used to combine the in-
dividual price series to form the overall index.
Despite the large literature at the household level, international com-
parisons of expenditure shares have been rare. Notable exceptions include
Seale and Regmi (2006) who study expenditure shares for 114 countries
and Kaus (2013) who studies 50 countries using UN data over the course
of 50 years. These authors study a finer breakdown of expenditure weights
by type than covered here, but have a markedly smaller coverage of coun-
tries. Only Anker (2011), who studies the food share of consumption, ap-
proaches the country coverage.
Comparisons between countries suffer from a number of potential prob-
lems. First, the exact nature of expenditure needs to be standardised across
countries. For example, some countries include restaurants and cafe´s in
their CPI food index. Second, transport costs, tariffs, taxes and subsidies
can affect the relative price of goods and services between countries, and
hence consumption shares. For example, petrol is frequently subsidised
in developing countries, but taxed in advanced countries (Kojima, 2013).
In some advanced countries the tax share of the price paid by consumers
for petrol can exceed 40 percent. This difference is also true over time –
changes in world commodity prices for oil and food can affect the relative
price of these goods.
Finally, the frequency of updating expenditure weights varies between
countries. Since household expenditure surveys are expensive, updating
tends to be more frequent in high income economies. The longer between
updates, the less likely the index represents true household spending.
New expenditure surveys also allow for the incorporation of new goods
and services, such as mobile phones, internet broadband providers and
pet insurance. Infrequent weight updates in some countries means that
there are several income observations for the same expenditure share.
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Figure 4.3: Engel curves for CPI components, updated weights
(a) Food (b) Housing
(c) Energy (d) CPIxFHE
Figure 4.3 shows international Engel curves for food, housing, energy,
and the remaining items of consumer spending. These curves match the
share of expenditure on these items, as measured by their weight in the
CPI, against the average per capita income of the country. As noted above
in section 4.2.1, every effort has been made to put the series on as consis-
tent a basis as possible. The scatterplots show the respective weights only
when updated, to avoid the aforementioned problem with income chang-
ing over the period between updates. Scatterplots using just the 2010 Q4
data (see figure 4.7 in appendix 4.A) yield qualitatively similar results to
the entire sample, suggesting that shifts in relative prices are of secondary
importance to shifts in income.
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The Engel curves are fitted in a non-parametric fashion, using locally
weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS, Cleveland, 1979). LOWESS is
a local linear estimator using the tricube kernel function to calculate suffi-
ciently smooth weights for neighbouring observations.
For food, there is a clear negative slope to the cross-country Engel
curve; the relationship between income and the expenditure share of food
across countries replicates that observed at the household level. For the
most part the Engel curve for energy is downward sloping – a ‘necessity’
in the parlance of the literature. For the poorest countries, the Engel curve
for energy is upward sloping, suggesting that these countries are income
constrained and consuming less energy than desired.
The Engel curve for housing is upward sloping, implying that housing
is a ‘luxury’. While shelter is a basic necessity, countries with higher in-
comes can devote a greater share of income on larger, and better quality
housing. The remaining items of consumer spending also have an upward
sloping Engel curve. The results here are qualitatively similar to the results
found by Kaus (2013) for a much smaller sample of countries.
4.4 Measures of global inflation
This section uses the data described above to consider the extent to which
national inflation rates can be explained by measures of global inflation.
4.4.1 Headline
Like Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010), we consider three estimates of global
headline inflation:
1. The median country-level inflation rate.
2. The average country-level inflation rate, weighted by GDP, and
3. A measure based on principal components analysis.
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The median inflation rate is calculated separately for each quarter from
1981Q1 to 2012Q4. It uses all available national headline inflation rates
for each quarter, so the sample changes over time. The GDP-weighted
average inflation rate weights together available headline inflation rates
for each quarter by real GDP (in 2005 US dollars) from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. Since the raw calculated series is heavily
influenced by a small number of countries experiencing hyperinflation,
the series used here excludes countries in quarters where their headline
inflation exceeds 100 percent. Such episodes are rare, and account for less
than 2 percent of the total.
The third measure is based on a static principal component approach
(See Stock and Watson, 2002). This approach models the nx1 vector of
national inflation rates, Πt, as being comprised of two parts:
Πt
n×1
= Λ
n×1
ft
i×1
+ t
n×1
(4.1)
where the first part is the effect of the common, global factor ft. Λ is the
loading – the extent to which each country’s inflation rate reacts to the
global factor. The second term, t, is the idiosyncratic component, repre-
senting the shocks to inflation that are domestic in nature. ft and t are as-
sumed to be orthogonal, and t is assumed to be normally distributed. The
estimation of the static factors requires a balanced panel, so the inflation
rates of the 104 countries for which there are observations of annual infla-
tion in every quarter are used. These inflation rates are then de-meaned
and standardised to have unit variance before the factors are estimated.
The first principal component – the factor that explains the greatest share
of the total variance – is taken as the measure of global inflation.
Figure 4.4 shows these three measures of global inflation. All three
measures display the main features of inflation through the period – the
disinflation through the 1980s and 1990s, the relatively low and stable in-
flation of the early 2000s and the sharp volatility around the time of the
GFC. Overall, the three measures track reasonably closely through time,
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Figure 4.4: Measures of global inflation
Note: The median and GDP-weighted measures have been de-meaned
and standardised for the figure.
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Table 4.2: Share of inflation variance explained by measures of global in-
flation (percent)
Median Weighted mean Principal components
Median
Advanced 62.1 64.6 71.4
Other high income 31.9 24.4 26.9
Medium income 17.6 15.8 14.7
Low income 11.1 6.0 7.9
Mean
Advanced 60.3 59.0 68.5
Other high income 32.7 30.3 34.1
Medium income 20.2 19.6 19.7
Low income 15.4 12.6 13.0
with the exception of the mid 1990s. This may be a function of the differ-
ent samples, since a number of countries enter the sample over that period
(notably the transition economies of Eastern Europe) that are picked up in
the median and weighted mean series, but not the principal component
measure.
Table 4.2 shows the share of the variance of national inflation that is
explained by each of the three measures of global inflation. Countries are
divided into four groups by income levels. Advanced countries make up
the first group, defined as high income countries that were members of
the OECD in 1990, essentially the countries incorporated in the analysis by
Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010). The second group are the remaining countries
classified as ‘high income’ by the World Bank that are not also classified
as advanced. The final two categories are those countries classified by the
World Bank as middle and low income. The variance shares are calculated
by obtaining the R2 from a regression of each national inflation rate on the
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global inflation measure and a constant.7
The advanced income countries are mostly the same countries as the
22 countries studied by Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010). The share of infla-
tion variance of advanced countries explained by global factors is high
– around two thirds, and in line with the findings of Ciccarelli and Mo-
jon (2010). These findings, however, do not generalise to less developed
economies. The three measures of global inflation explain a much smaller
share of the variance of inflation rates of other countries – on average
around a third of the variance of other high income countries, a fifth of
the variance of middle income countries and slightly more than a tenth of
the variance of low income countries.
The divergence between country groups of the share of variance of na-
tional inflation rate explained by the median global inflation measure is
shown clearly in figure 4.5, which shows the kernel densities of the distri-
bution by country type. There is a clear negative correlation between in-
come and share of inflation variance explained by the global factors. The
kernel densities by country type for the mean and principal components
measures (not reported here) are broadly similar.
Ciccarelli and Mojon conclude that there is a need for international
policy co-ordination between monetary policy makers. The evidence pre-
sented here suggests that advanced countries are better at eliminating id-
iosyncratic volatility, so the remaining volatility derives from movements
in global factors, potentially related to commodity factors. The next sec-
tion considers what can be learned by considering the sub-components of
consumer prices.
7For those countries whose inflation rates are used to calculate the principal compo-
nent measure, the method used here is equivalent to the λ2i var(ft)/var(piit) more typi-
cally used for principal components. This latter method cannot be used since the factor
loadings, λi do not exist for those countries not used in the calculation of the principal
component measure.
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Figure 4.5: Kernel density of share of variance explained by median global
inflation measure
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4.4.2 Sub-components
As shown in section 4.3.4 above, the weights of the sub-indices vary markedly
between countries, so differences in the proportion of domestic inflation
variance explained by global factor might simply be a function of differing
consumption baskets. To test that hypothesis, we investigate the relation-
ship between global factors and the individual sub-indices. Analogous to
the method used above for headline CPI, we calculate the median global
inflation rate for food, housing, energy and CPIxFHE. We then regress
the national inflation rates for these sub-indices on their respective global
counterparts to estimate the proportion of national variance that can be
explained by the global factor.
Figure 4.6 shows the kernel densities for the proportion of national in-
flation explained by global factors, split by country type and sub-component.
Global factors appear to explain a greater proportion of inflation vari-
ance for advanced countries than for less developed countries for all sub-
components. This demonstrates that the greater share of headline inflation
variance explained by global factors for these countries is not just an arte-
fact of the composition of the index.
In terms of sub-components, the variance of national energy price in-
flation is the most explained by the global median. For advanced countries
variance in food and CPIxFHE inflation is also explained in large part by
global factors. Conversely, global factors do not appear to explain a large
proportion of housing price inflation for any country group. It appears
therefore that the divergence between countries of the influence of global
factors is not a function of index composition and the differing consump-
tion patterns that underlie that composition, but are instead a function of
other country characteristics.
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Figure 4.6: Kernel density of share of variance explained by global median
inflation, by subcomponent
(a) Food (b) Housing
(c) Energy (d) CPIxFHE
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4.4.3 Country characteristics
What explains the divergence in the proportion of national inflation vari-
ance explained by global inflation? As shown in section 4.4.2, differing
consumption patterns are not the principal cause. There are a number of
additional country characteristics that could potentially explain a greater
or lesser influence of global factors on domestic inflation. We consider
nine such factors in this section, extending the work of Neely and Rapach
(2011).
The nine characteristics considered here are (1) the average headline
inflation rate (2) inflation volatility as measured by the standard devia-
tion (3) average real GDP per capita (4) trade openness, as measured by
the trade share of GDP from the World Bank World Development Indicators
(5) average government share of GDP from the World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators (6) financial development, measured by the domestic credit
provided by financial sector as a share of GDP from the World Bank World
Development Indicators8 (7) the Chinn and Ito (2006) index of capital ac-
count openness (8) the Ilzetzki et al. (2004) measure of de facto exchange
rate regime (9) The average Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) central bank
transparency index. There is a close correlation between transparency and
independence of central banks, so we use transparency here since this in-
dex is available for a larger sample of central banks.
In a similar fashion to Neely and Rapach (2011) we regress the propor-
tion of each country’s national inflation rate explained by global median
inflation on each of the characteristics in turn using a bivariate regression,
then on all seven characteristics. The model of the bivariate regression is:
Gi = α + βjZj,i + ei (4.2)
where Gi is the proportion of the inflation variance of country i (i =
8The liquid liabilities measure used by Neely and Rapach (2011) gives similar results,
but is available for far fewer countries.
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1,2,...,223) explained by the global median, and Zj,i is the average value
for characteristic j (j = 1,2,...,9) in country i for the period where inflation
data is available for country i. The multivariate regression is given by:
Gi = α +
9∑
j=1
βjZj,i + ei (4.3)
We estimate equations 4.2 and 4.3 using ordinary least squares and
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The explana-
tory variables studied here vary both cross-sectionally and over time. Given
that for each country we only have one observation forGi, we are only able
to use the average of each explanatory variable over the period for which
inflation data exist. Unfortunately, this does not allow for consideration of
the time-varying component. That said, time variation is of second order
of importance compared with the cross-sectional variation; the average
variance over time for each country for each variable is markedly smaller
than the variance of country averages. The results of the bivariate and
multivariate regressions are presented in table 4.3.
For the bivariate equations, average inflation and inflation volatility are
negatively related to Gi and significant at the 1 percent level. This means
that global factors explain less of national inflation variance in countries
with higher average inflation, or greater volatility of inflation. GDP per
capita, financial development, capital account openness and central bank
transparency are positively related to Gi and again significant at the 1
percent level. The more freely floating the country’s exchange rate, the
smaller the influence of global inflation on domestic inflation. There is
some evidence that increased trade openness increases the influence of
global factors on domestic inflation, but this effect appears small (increas-
ing trade openness by 50 percent of GDP increases the share of inflation
explained by global factors by 3 percentage points), and is only significant
at the 10 percent level. The size of government appears to have no impact
on Gi.
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Table 4.3: Cross-sectional regression results for country characteristics that
explain link between national and global inflation
Bivariate regressions Multivariate regressions
Country characteristic Slope t-stat N R2 Slope t-stat N R2
Average inflation -0.0003 −2.71∗∗∗ 222 0.03 0.0001 0.07 127 0.53
Inflation volatility -0.0001 −2.84∗∗∗ 222 0.02 -0.0002 −0.83
GDP per capita 0.0732 9.07∗∗∗ 199 0.27 0.0394 2.50∗∗
Trade openness 0.0006 1.85∗ 190 0.01 -0.0000 −0.13
Government size 0.0025 1.04 187 0.00 -0.0034 −1.03
Financial development 0.0027 8.28∗∗∗ 182 0.28 0.0014 3.90∗∗∗
Capital acct. openness 0.0653 5.46∗∗∗ 175 0.22 -0.0070 −0.55
De facto exchange rate -0.0543 −3.32∗∗∗ 184 0.28 -0.0463 −2.22∗∗
CB transparency 0.0387 7.51∗∗∗ 138 0.28 0.0213 3.49∗∗∗
Note: F -statistic, testing a null hypothesis that the slope coefficients for the multivariate regression
are jointly zero is 35.29***. t-stats and F -stat calculated based on the White (1980)
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance matrix respectively. *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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When the country characteristics are jointly considered in the multi-
variate model, only GDP per capita, financial development the de facto
exchange rate regime and central bank transparency remain significant.
Higher income, and greater availability of credit enables such economies
to reduce the impact of domestic shocks. Similarly, a flexible exchange rate
insulates domestic prices from shifts in global inflation. Better monetary
policy, as indicated by higher transparency, also reduces the idiosyncratic
part of national inflation variation. With the idiosyncratic component re-
duced, the influence of global factors on national inflation becomes rela-
tively greater.
4.4.4 A dynamic hierarchical factor model for global infla-
tion
The disadvantage of the measures used in section 4.4.1 is that they treat all
components of the CPI in equivalent fashion. Yet global shocks can have
differing effects on sub-components. For example the greater integration
of China into the global economy has depressed the prices of manufac-
tured goods and at the same time put upward pressure on commodity
prices. Increased global liquidity over the 2000s put upward pressure on
housing, food and energy prices, pressure which abated dramatically fol-
lowing the crisis in 2008/2009. To take into account these potential dif-
ferences in spillovers, we use an alternative modelling strategy for global
inflation, by using the dynamic hierarchical factor model developed by
Moench et al. (2013). As noted above, this has been used by Fo¨rster and
Tillmann (2014) for a group of 40, mostly high income, countries. We ex-
tend their analysis by including a much larger sample of countries, and by
examining the housing sub-component of the CPI.
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Model
The model has a hierarchical structure of order four. Specifically, at time t,
let Ft denote the global factor that captures movements in inflation com-
mon to all sub-indices and all countries. Gbt are the factors that capture
variations in sub-indices, indexed by b and Hbst are the factors that cap-
ture the variations in country group s in the CPI sub-index block b. The
structure of the model is give by:
Zbsnt = ΛZbsnHbst + uZbsnt (4.4)
Hbst = ΛHbsGbt + uHbst (4.5)
Gbt = ΛGbFt + uGbt (4.6)
whereZbsnt represents an observation for country n in country group (sub-
block) s of the CPI sub-index (block) b at period t. ΛZbsn, ΛHbs and ΛGb
are constant factor loadings. One useful feature of this model is that the
total number of time series, Nbs can differ between blocks b and sub-blocks
s, allowing for different coverage of sub-indices by country group. The
global factor is dynamic and assumed to follow an autoregressive process
of order one:
Ft = ρFFt−1 + Ft (4.7)
We make the following assumptions to match persistence in the data:
uZbsnt = ρZbsnuZbsn(t−1) + Zbsnt (4.8)
uHbst = ρHbsuHbs(t−1) + Hbst (4.9)
uGbt = ρGbuGb(t−1) + Gbt (4.10)
with jt ∼ N(0, σj) for j = Zbsn, Hbs, Gb, F . All residuals jt are uncor-
related across j and t. For identification purposes,the first entries of ΛZbsn,
ΛHbs and ΛGb are set equal to 1, and the variances σ2Hbs, σ
2
Gb, σ
2
F to 0.1.
Since the hierarchical nature of the model imposes vertical dependency
of the factors, along with the time-varying intercepts from equations 4.8 to
4.10, the model is estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods
and the Kalman filter. In brief, each factor is first drawn conditional on
the other factors and parameters. Then the factor loadings, autoregressive
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parameters and sub-block level variances σ2Zbsn are drawn conditional on
the factors estimated in the first step.9 After the first 50,000 draws are
discarded as burn-in, a further 50,000 draws are carried out, storing every
fiftieth draw. The 1,000 stored draws are used to calculate the posterior
means shown below.
The advantage of the hierarchical nature of the model is that it allows
for global factors to affect all sub-indices in each country, but does not
allow for idiosyncratic factors affecting, say, energy prices to affect other
indices. By imposing this hierarchy it is possible to isolate the contribution
of each individual factor for individual time series, something not possi-
ble under joint modelling of global and regional factors. In particular this
allows the analysis of differing contributions of global factors in energy
prices to variance in high and middle income countries as against global
food price factors in these groups of countries. The main disadvantage
of the method is that it is computationally intensive, requiring a day to
estimate. The other disadvantage is that we impose the country group-
ings between high, middle and (in some sub-blocks) low income. This is
somewhat arbitrary and there could be countries which are more accu-
rately included into other groups, or may differ in groups depending on
the sub-index in question.
We choose the following ordering for the estimation: the first block is
CPI excluding food, housing and energy, the second block is CPI housing
followed by CPI energy with the final block being CPI food. For the sub-
blocks, the countries are grouped by income, rather than the grouping by
geographical region that is used by e.g. Neely and Rapach (2011). We
believe that commonalities associated with income and macroeconomic
institutions are likely to be stronger than those associated with geographic
location, a belief reinforced by the findings in section 4.4.3.
9Moench et al. (2013) set out in full detail the MCMC approach and the use of the filter.
The estimation of the model here is made with the help of the MATLAB code available
on Serena Ng’s website.
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Consider Australia and New Zealand: these two countries are small,
open advanced economies whose monetary policy has been based on in-
flation targeting for the period in question. These characteristics are com-
mon with many other geographically distant high income countries – Canada,
Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom to name but a few. Neighbouring
countries to Australia and New Zealand in Oceania, such as Fiji, Samoa
and Tonga, are small island developing states with markedly different eco-
nomic characteristics.
The sub-blocks are ordered by high income countries first and medium
income countries second. For the CPIxFHE and CPIF blocks there are suf-
ficient observations to have sub-blocks for low income countries. To max-
imise the sample, the analysis is run on annual inflation starting in 2001Q1
and ending in 2012Q4.
The factor model set out above assumes that the underlying data series
are stationary. There are a large number of studies on the stationarity of
inflation rates, with the evidence inconclusive. Several authors finding in-
flation to exhibit some form of non-stationarity (e.g. King et al., 1991; Baba
et al., 1992; Johansen, 1992), while others argue that inflation is stationary
(e.g. Rose, 1988; Culver and Papell, 1997). We first test for stationarity of
the series using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, using both one
and two lags (table 4.4). For CPI excluding food, housing and energy, we
find significant evidence to reject the null of non-stationarity for around
half the countries at the 5 percent significance level using two lags. The
results for housing are similar. We find significant evidence to reject the
null of non-stationarity of energy prices for all but one country, and also
reject the null for a large proportion of food price series.
ADF tests have low power, and struggle to reject the null hypothesis
when roots are stationary, but close to unity. This is particularly the case in
short time samples such as the one used here. Given this lack of power for
the ADF test, we adopt two panel methods for testing for stationarity. The
first is the LLC test (Levin et al., 2002) for panel stationarity. The LLC test is
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Table 4.4: Tests for stationarity
ex Food, housing & energy Housing Energy Food
No. of countries 96 62 63 148
ADF(1) 1% 9 2 3 9
ADF(1) 5% 24 7 22 19
ADF(2) 1% 29 5 51 62
ADF(2) 5% 53 24 62 114
LLC −18.50∗∗ −10.33∗∗ −24.01∗∗ −27.70∗∗
CIPS −2.43∗∗ −2.10 −2.73∗∗ −2.79∗∗
Notes: ADF(1) is an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with one lagged coefficient, ADF(2)
has two lagged coefficients. Numbers reported for the ADF tests are the number of
countries which reject the null of non-stationarity at respectively the 1 percent
and 5 percent levels of significance. LLC is the Levin et al. (2002) test for panel
stationarity, CIPS is the panel unit root test of Pesaran (2007) that accounts for
cross-sectional dependence. For both LLC and CIPS the null hypothesis is that all panels
are non-stationary. *, ** denote significance at 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
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less commonly used in the literature because it requires a balanced panel
and has the restrictive hypotheses that each panel (i.e. country) is non-
stationary versus the alternative that all are stationary. LLC recommend
using the test for panels of n between 10 and 250 and T between 25 and
250, which range covers the data here. The LLC test is significant at the 1
percent level for all series used here.
The second panel unit root test used here is the CIPS test of Pesaran
(2007). If there is cross-sectional dependence between countries,10 then
the LLC test is not properly specified, exhibits downward bias and lacks
power. The CIPS test explicitly accounts for cross-sectional dependence.
For three of the series considered here, the CIPS test rejects the null of non-
stationarity at the 1 percent level of significance. The test statistic for CPI
housing inflation lies just outside the 5 percent significance level of -2.12.
Given the low power of the ADF tests, and the clear results from the panel
unit root tests it is reasonable to assume that the inflation rates in the panel
are stationary and that the DHFM is appropriate.
Results
Table 4.5 reports the proportion of the variance of each sub-block explained
by the different hierarchical levels of the model. The first observation is
that the idiosyncratic component accounts for the majority of the variance
in each sub-block, with the sole exception of high income countries’ CPI
energy. For these countries, global factors explain just over half of the vari-
ance, split between the global factor (16.4 percent), the energy sub-index
(18.6 percent) and the high income countries’ energy price factor (19.1 per-
cent). For middle income countries, the idiosyncratic component of CPI
energy explains a much larger (82.3 percent) share of total variance. The
difference in the share of variance explained by common factors may arise
because of differences in regulation. Regulated fixed prices and subsidies
10Chapter 5 discusses cross-sectional dependence between countries in more detail.
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Table 4.5: Decomposition of variance from dynamic hierarchical factor
model (percent)
CPI Country
Block Subblock N Global subindex group Idiosyncratic
CPIxFHE High 48 2.1 1.4 1.1 95.5
CPIxFHE Middle 38 5.7 3.6 1.5 89.1
CPIxFHE Low 10 5.1 3.2 2.7 89.0
CPIH High 44 0.8 1.7 0.7 96.7
CPIH Middle 18 0.0 0.1 9.9 90.0
CPIE High 45 16.4 18.6 19.1 46.0
CPIE Middle 18 7.1 8.0 2.7 82.3
CPIF High 59 7.5 11.1 11.9 69.5
CPIF Middle 68 9.0 13.3 1.0 76.7
CPIF Low 21 3.2 4.7 9.6 82.4
Note: CPIxFHE: CPI excluding food, housing and energy prices; CPIH: CPI housing;
CPIE: CPI Energy; CPIF: CPI food.
for fuel are relatively common in emerging and developing countries (Ko-
jima, 2013), but less so in advanced countries.
Common factors also account for a relatively large share of the vari-
ance of food price inflation – around a third for high income countries and
around a quarter for middle income countries. For both these groups of
countries, the food sub-index factor accounts for at least 10 percent of the
total variance. Yet even over a period marked by large volatility in world
food commodity prices, the idiosyncratic components explained the ma-
jority of the variance. As with energy, the common factors for food ex-
plained a greater share of the variance for high income countries than for
relatively poorer countries. This may be a result of higher food import
shares for richer countries, and the existence of food price regulation in
some countries.
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For housing and for CPIxFHE, the common factors explain little of the
variance. For high income countries, the common factors explain 3.3 per-
cent of the variance of CPI housing and 4.5 percent of the variance of
CPIxFHE. For middle and low income countries, the proportion explained
by common factors is in the order of 10 percent.
It is clearly important to consider the role of sub-components when as-
sessing the extent of influence by global factors, given the divergent shares
explained by common factors. For high income countries, common factors
explain a large share of the variance of food and energy prices. This is per-
haps understandable since there is a common world oil price, and central
banks typically ‘look through’ the first round effects from movements in
commodity prices. Given these components are also more volatile that the
other components of the CPI, it follows that these factors account for a
large share of total CPI variance.
Monetary policy makers in advanced countries have been successful in
eliminating the domestic, idiosyncratic fluctuations in inflation. The main
source of remaining inflation variance in advanced countries is the move-
ments in commodity prices, notably food and energy. In lower-income
countries, monetary policy makers have been less successful in eliminat-
ing the influence of domestic factors on inflation, resulting in a propor-
tionately smaller influence from global factors.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper sets out the construction of a comprehensive dataset of con-
sumer prices for 223 countries and territories for the period 1980-2012. The
dataset includes, where publicly available, the sub-indices for food, hous-
ing and energy, together with their respective weights in the overall in-
dex. Comparable international datasets for these sub-indices are rare, and
almost exclusively confined to advanced economies. As a consequence,
research on inflation, and in particular its sub-components, has typically
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been confined to a small number of relatively rich countries.
There are a number of stylised facts on the cross-section and time-
series properties of inflation provided by the dataset. Global inflation
fell through the early part of the period studied, particularly in high in-
come countries, and was relatively stable until the period around the re-
cent global financial crisis. This recent volatility was mostly attributable to
food and energy prices. Food and energy prices are the most volatile sub-
indices, and also exhibit the highest average inflation over the past three
decades. Inflation in consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy
is comparatively low and stable. The share of food in total expenditure
falls as income rises; the share of housing increases.
Using this dataset we extend the literature on the role of global infla-
tion factors on national inflation rates to a larger, and more diverse, group
of countries. We confirm the findings of Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010) that
global factors can explain around 70 percent of the variance of advanced
economies’ inflation. However, we find that this conclusion does not gen-
eralise to a more diverse group of countries than that originally consid-
ered. The amount of national inflation variance explained by global factors
declines markedly for lower income countries.
The extent that national inflation variance can be explained by global
factors does not appear to be solely a function of the composition of the
index. Global factors can explain a greater share of the variance of the
sub-indices for food, energy, and CPI excluding food, housing and energy
in higher income countries than in middle and low-income countries. Us-
ing an alternative approach of the dynamic hierarchical factor model of
Moench et al. (2013) we show that common factors are important for ex-
plaining energy and, to a lesser extent, food prices.
There are a number of country characteristics that explain a greater
apparent influence of global factors. In particular, higher GDP per capita,
greater financial development and greater central bank transparency are
associated with a greater share of national inflation variance explained by
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global factors. This suggests that advanced countries are more successful
at eliminating domestic sources of inflation variation, resulting in a greater
proportionate role for global factors.
Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010) conclude their paper with a view that in-
flation should be modelled, to some extent, as a global rather than a lo-
cal phenomenon. We agree that common global elements exist, notably
in food and energy prices, but conversely argue that such considerations
become important only once domestic sources of inflation instability are
eliminated.
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4.A Appendix – additional figures
Figure 4.7: Engel curves for CPI components, 2010Q4 weights
(a) Food (b) Housing
(c) Energy (d) CPIxFHE
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4.B Appendix – CPI data coverage
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by the relevant national (*)
central bank and (†) statistical agency. Indices: CPI: headline, CPIF: CPI food, CPIH: CPI
housing, CPIE: CPI energy, CPIHE: CPI housing and energy, CPIxFE: CPI excluding food
and energy, CPIxFHE: CPI excluding food, housing and energy.
Country CPI CPIF CPIH CPIE CPIHE CPIxFE CPIxFHE
Afghanistan 04Q2
Albania 93Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1
Algeria 80Q1 90Q1 02Q1 02Q1
Amer. Samoa 83Q1 83Q1 99Q1 99Q1
Andorra 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1
Angola 98Q1 00Q1
Anguilla 98Q1 00Q4 00Q4 00Q4 00Q4 00Q4 00Q4
Antigua & Barb. 94Q1 94Q1 0Q4 00Q4 00Q4 00Q4 00Q4
Argentina 80Q1 93Q1 93Q1 93Q1
Armenia * 95Q1 95Q1 98Q1 06Q1
Aruba 84Q1 84Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1
Australia 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Austria† 80Q1 80Q1 96Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 96Q1
Azerbaijan 91Q1 98Q1
Bahamas 80Q1 86Q1
Bahrain 80Q1 85Q3 07Q3
Bangladesh 93Q3 93Q3 08Q1 08Q1
Barbados* 80Q1 85Q1 85Q1 85Q1 85Q1 85Q1 85Q1
Belarus* 91Q1 02Q1
Belgium 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 84Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Belize* 83Q1 85Q1 90Q4 90Q4
Benin 92Q1 97Q1 03Q1 97Q1 98Q1 97Q1
Bermuda 82Q1 82Q1
Bhutan 03Q2 03Q2
Bolivia 80Q1 88Q1 88Q1 88Q1 88Q1 88Q1 88Q1
Bonaire 96Q2 96Q2 96Q2 96Q2
Bosnia Herz. 05Q1 05Q1 05Q1 05Q1
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Country CPI CPIF CPIH CPIE CPIHE CPIxFE CPIxFHE
Botswana 80Q1 80Q4 04Q3 04Q3
Brazil 80Q1 94Q4 94Q4 94Q4
Br. Virgin Is. 85Q1 85Q1
Brunei 83Q1 83Q1 06Q1 06Q1 06Q1 06Q1 06Q1
Bulgaria 91Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1
Burkina Faso 80Q1 82Q4 03Q1 97Q1 00Q1 97Q1
Burundi† 80Q1 09Q1 09Q1 09Q1
Cambodia 94Q4 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1
Cameroon 80Q1 94Q1 94Q1 94Q1
Canada* 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Cape Verde 92Q1 05Q4
Cayman Is. 80Q1 84Q3 08Q2 08Q2
Central Afr. Rep. 81Q1 81Q1 06Q1 06Q1
Chad 82Q4 88Q1 06Q1 95Q1 06Q1
Chile 80Q1 80Q1 89Q1 89Q1 89Q1 80Q1 89Q1
China 84Q1 93Q1 01Q1 93Q1 01Q1
Colombia 80Q1 88Q1 88Q1 99Q1 88Q1
Comoros 90Q1 92Q1 92Q1 92Q1 92Q1 92Q1 92Q1
Congo (Brazz.) 80Q1 80Q1 90Q1 90Q1
Congo, DR 80Q1
Cook Is. 80Q1 80Q1 06Q1 06Q1 06Q1 06Q1 06Q1
Costa Rica 80Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1
Cote dIvoire 80Q1 97Q1 03Q1 97Q1 97Q1 97Q1
Croatia† 94Q1 94Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1
Cuba 00Q1 00Q1
Curac¸ao 80Q1 90Q4 96Q1 96Q1
Cyprus 80Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1
Czech Republic 93Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1
Denmark† 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Djibouti 99Q3 99Q3 99Q3 99Q3
Dominica 80Q1 85Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1
Dominican Rep. 80Q1 91Q1 91Q1 91Q1 91Q1
Ecuador 80Q1 81Q1 97Q1 97Q1
Egypt 80Q1 95Q1 03Q2 04Q1 03Q2
El Salvador 80Q1 80Q1 93Q1 93Q1
Eq. Guinea 85Q1
Estonia 96Q1 96Q1 98Q1 98Q1 96Q1 98Q1 98Q1
Ethiopia 80Q1 80Q1
Falkland Is. 82Q1 82Q1
Faroe Is. 83Q1 83Q1 83Q1 83Q1 83Q1 83Q1 83Q1
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Country CPI CPIF CPIH CPIE CPIHE CPIxFE CPIxFHE
FS Micronesia 00Q2 00Q2 00Q2 00Q2 00Q2 00Q2 00Q2
Fiji*† 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Finland 80Q1 80Q1 96Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
France 96Q1 80Q1 96Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
French Guiana 80Q1 80Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1
French Polynesia 80Q1 81Q1 81Q1 81Q1 81Q1 81Q1 81Q1
Gabon 80Q1 90Q3 90Q3 90Q3
Gambia 80Q1 80Q1
Georgia† 97Q1 97Q1 04Q1 04Q1 00Q1 04Q1 00Q1
Germany 80Q1 80Q1 91Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Ghana* 80Q1 84Q1 97Q4 97Q4
Gibraltar 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Greece 80Q1 80Q1 96Q1 89Q1 80Q1 89Q1 80Q1
Grenada 80Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1
Guadeloupe 80Q1 80Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1
Guam 80Q1 80Q1 96Q3 96Q3 86Q2 96Q3 86Q2
Guatemala 80Q1 90Q1 01Q1 95Q1 01Q1
Guernsey 80Q1
Guinea 87Q1 87Q1 03Q1 03Q1 03Q1
Guinea Bissau 86Q1 86Q1 03Q1 97Q1 03Q1 97Q1
Guyana 94Q1 94Q1 01Q1 01Q1
Haiti 80Q1 81Q1 99Q1 99Q1
Honduras 80Q1 80Q1 00Q1 00Q2 00Q1
Hong Kong 80Q4 82Q1 82Q1 82Q1 82Q1 82Q1 82Q1
Hungary† 80Q1 92Q1 01Q1 92Q1 01Q1 92Q1 01Q1
Iceland 80Q1 80Q1 96Q1 93Q1 93Q1 93Q1 93Q1
India 80Q1 80Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1
Indonesia 80Q1 80Q1 99Q2 99Q2 96Q1 91Q1 96Q1
Ireland 80Q1 80Q1 96Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Iran 80Q1 82Q1 06Q2 06Q2
Iraq 04Q1 04Q1 04Q1 09Q1 04Q1 04Q1 04Q1
Isle of Man† 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Israel 80Q1 86Q1 86Q1 86Q1 86Q1 86Q1 86Q1
Italy 80Q1 80Q1 96Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Jamaica 80Q1 80Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1
Japan* 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Jersey 89Q1 00Q2 83Q1 83Q1 83Q1 83Q1 83Q1
Jordan 80Q1 80Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1
Kazakhstan 94Q1 97Q4 08Q1 03Q1 08Q1
Kenya* 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 90Q1 90Q1 90Q1 90Q1
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Country CPI CPIF CPIH CPIE CPIHE CPIxFE CPIxFHE
Kiribati 83Q1 88Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1
Kosovo 02Q3 02Q3 02Q3 02Q3
Korea 85Q1 81Q1 85Q1 85Q1 85Q1 80Q1 85Q1
Kuwait 80Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1
Kyrgyzstan 95Q1 03Q1 03Q1 03Q1 03Q1 03Q1 03Q1
Lao PDR 93Q2 00Q1
Latvia 92Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1
Lebanon 00Q1 08Q1 08Q1 08Q1 08Q1 08Q1 08Q1
Lesotho 80Q1 84Q1 02Q1 02Q1
Liberia 01Q1 06Q1 06Q1 06Q1
Libya 01Q1 04Q1 04Q1 04Q1
Lithuania 92Q2 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1
Luxembourg 80Q1 80Q1 96Q1 80Q1 96Q1 80Q1 96Q1
Macau 88Q1 89Q1 01Q1 v
Macedonia 96Q1 96Q1 05Q1 05Q1 05Q1 05Q1 05Q1
Madagascar 80Q1 80Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1
Malawi 80Q1 91Q1 01Q1 01Q1
Malaysia 80Q1 80Q1 05Q1 05Q1 84Q1 94Q1 84Q1
Maldives 85Q1 85Q1 85Q1 85Q1
Mali 87Q3 90Q1 03Q1 97Q1 03Q1 97Q1
Malta 80Q1 80Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1
Marshall Is. 91Q4 91Q4 03Q1 03Q1
Martinique 80Q1 80Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1
Mauritania 85Q3 04Q1 04Q1 06Q2 04Q1 04Q1 04Q1
Mauritius 80Q1 87Q3 87Q3 87Q3 87Q3 87Q3 87Q3
Mexico† 80Q1 89Q1 89Q1 89Q1 89Q1 89Q1 89Q1
Moldova* 93Q4 95Q1 99Q1 99Q1 99Q1
Mongolia 91Q4 96Q1 05Q4 05Q4 96Q1 05Q4 96Q1
Montenegro† 01Q1 05Q1 07Q1 07Q1 07Q1 07Q1 07Q1
Montserrat† 92Q1 92Q1 89Q1 89Q1 89Q1 89Q1 89Q1
Morocco 80Q1 80Q1 90Q1 90Q1
Mozambique 94Q1 94Q1 94Q1 94Q1
Myanmar 80Q1 80Q1
Namibia 80Q1 80Q1 01Q1 01Q1
Nauru† 08Q4 08Q4 08Q4 08Q4 08Q4 08Q4 08Q4
Netherlands 80Q1 80Q1 96Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Nepal 80Q1 80Q1
New Caledonia 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
New Zealand† 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Nicaragua 92Q1 00Q1 99Q1
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Country CPI CPIF CPIH CPIE CPIHE CPIxFE CPIxFHE
Niger 80Q1 80Q1 03Q1 97Q1 98Q1 97Q1
Nigeria 80Q1 80Q1 03Q1 03Q1 03Q1
Niue 80Q1 80Q1 92Q1 92Q1 92Q1
Norfolk Is. 90Q4 90Q4
N. Mariana Is. 88Q2 88Q2 88Q2 88Q2
Norway† 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Oman 90Q1 90Q1 04Q4 04Q4 04Q4 04Q4 04Q4
Pakistan 80Q1 81Q3 98Q2 98Q2 98Q2 98Q2 98Q2
Palau 00Q2 00Q2 00Q2 00Q2 00Q2
Palestinian Terr. 97Q1 97Q1 07Q1 07Q1
Panama 80Q1 80Q1 07Q1 07Q1 03Q1 07Q1 03Q1
Papua New Guinea* 80Q1 80Q1 89Q1 89Q1 80Q1 89Q1 80Q1
Paraguay 80Q1 83Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1
Peru 80Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1
Philippines 80Q1 80Q1 94Q1 00Q1 94Q1
Poland 88Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1
Portugal 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Puerto Rico 80Q1 84Q1 84Q1 84Q1 84Q1 84Q1 84Q1
Qatar 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1
Re´union 80Q1 80Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1 98Q1
Romania* 90Q4 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1
Russian Fed. 92Q1 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1
Rwanda 80Q1 85Q1 06Q1 06Q1 06Q1 06Q1
St Helena† 82Q4 82Q4 89Q4 89Q4 89Q4 89Q4 89Q4
St Kitts & Nevis 80Q1 83Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1
St Lucia 80Q1 84Q2 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1
St Pierre & Miq. 97Q1 97Q1 04Q4 04Q4 05Q1 05Q1 05Q1
St Vincent & Gren. 80Q1 86Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1 01Q1
San Marino 83Q2 83Q2
Samoa† 81Q1 81Q1 90Q1 90Q1
Sa˜o Tome´ & Prı´n. 93Q1 96Q4 96Q4 96Q4
Saudi Arabia 80Q1 84Q1 99Q1 99Q1
Senegal 80Q1 80Q1 03Q1 97Q1 97Q1 97Q1
Serbia 95Q1 01Q1 04Q1 04Q1 01Q1 01q3 04Q1
Seychelles† 80Q1 86Q1 86Q1 86Q1 86Q1 86Q1 86Q1
Sierra Leone 80Q1 93Q1 05Q1 05Q1 05Q1 05Q1 05Q1
Singapore 83Q1 80Q1 83Q1 83Q1 83Q1 83Q1 83Q1
Sint Maarten 80Q1 07Q1 07Q1 07Q1 07Q1 07Q1 07Q1
Slovak Republic 91Q1 91Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1 96Q1
Slovenia 93Q1 93Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1 00Q1
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Country CPI CPIF CPIH CPIE CPIHE CPIxFE CPIxFHE
Solomon Islands 80Q1 80Q1 07Q1 07Q1
Somaliland 07Q1 10Q1 10Q1 10Q1
South Africa*† 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
South Sudan 07Q2 07Q2 07Q2 07Q2 07Q2
Spain 80Q1 84Q1 84Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 84Q1
Sri Lanka† 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Sudan 80Q1
Suriname 80Q1 96Q1
Swaziland 80Q1
Sweden 80Q1 80Q1 96Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Switzerland 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Syria 80Q1 80Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1 95Q1
Taiwan 80Q1 81Q1 81Q1 81Q1 81Q1 81Q1 81Q1
Tajikistan 00Q1 00Q1 02Q1 00Q1 02Q1 00Q1 02Q1
Tanzania 80Q1 98Q2 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1
Thailand 80Q1 85Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 85Q1 85Q1
Timor-Leste 03Q2 03Q2 03Q2 03Q2 03Q2 03Q2 03Q2
Togo 80Q1 97Q1 03Q1 97Q1 97Q1 97Q1
Tonga* 80Q1 80Q1 06Q1 06Q1 06Q1 06Q1 06Q1
Trinidad & Tob. 80Q1 80Q1 04Q1 04Q1 04Q1 04Q1 04Q1
Tunisia 80Q1 01Q1 06Q1 06Q1 01Q1 06Q1 01Q1
Turkey 80Q1 99Q1 03Q1 99Q1 03Q1 99Q1 03Q1
Tuvalu 87Q4 87Q4 96Q2 96Q2 96Q2 96Q2 96Q2
Uganda 81Q1 97Q3 05Q3 05Q3 97Q3 05Q3 97Q3
Ukraine 94Q1 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1 02Q1
Utd. Arab Emir. 08Q1 08Q1 08Q1 08Q1
United Kingdom 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
United States 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1 80Q1
Uruguay* 80Q1 93Q2 97Q1 97Q1 93Q2 97Q1 93Q2
Vanuatu 81Q1 81Q1 81Q1 81Q1
Venezuela 80Q1 97Q1 99Q1 00Q1 00Q1 99Q1 00Q1
Viet Nam 90Q1 98Q1 91Q1 98Q1
Wallis & Futuna 99Q4 99Q4 99Q4 99Q4 99Q4 99Q4 99Q4
Yemen 01Q1 05Q1
Zambia 85Q1 04Q1
Zimbabwe 80Q1 90Q1
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Chapter 5
What is the impact of disasters on
inflation?
5.1 Introduction
Disasters caused by natural hazards have the potential to cause massive
economic disruption, and often are accompanied by a significant human
toll. Recent examples of disasters include: earthquakes in Japan, Chile,
Haiti and New Zealand in 2010 and 2011; the devastation of Vanuatu by
Cyclone Pam in 2015; The 2011 floods in Thailand; ongoing drought in
California and the eruption of Eyjafjallajo¨kull in Iceland in 2010. With
greater concentrations of population and activity in vulnerable regions,
the incidence of economically significant disasters is increasing (Cavallo
and Noy, 2011). Barro (2009) estimates the welfare cost of these rare, but
extreme, events at 20 percent of output, far beyond the 1.5 percent esti-
mated welfare cost of normal business cycle fluctuations.
Until recently, our understanding of the economic impact of disasters
was limited. Progress has been made over the past decade in investigat-
ing the impact of disasters on output, but this incipient literature remains
silent on the impact on prices. Cavallo and Noy (2011) in their recent sur-
vey of the literature on disasters point to the effect on prices as being one
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of the main remaining gaps in our knowledge. The aim of this paper is to
address that lacuna by systematically analysing the effects of disasters on
inflation.
Understanding the effect on prices provides monetary policy makers
with greater guidance on how to set policy in the immediate aftermath of
the disaster. There are a number of other benefits in knowing the likely
path for inflation following a disaster: it can help with estimating the in-
surance costs for rebuild or cash settlement; it provides aid donors with a
metric for determining the value of cash donations or gifts in kind; it as-
sists fiscal authorities with calculating the future costs of the rebuild pro-
gramme. Finally, the path for inflation has implications for the exchange
rate and capital account policies.
We combine two sets of data to undertake the analysis here. The first
is the EM-DAT database collected by the Centre for Research on the Epi-
demiology of Disasters at the University of Louvain. This contains infor-
mation on a wide range of disasters, including number of people killed,
number of people affected and (less frequently) damage caused. This data
set is widely used in the literature and is the only one with widespread
coverage that is publicly available.
The second data set is the consumer price data presented in chapter 4.
These data cover consumer prices for 223 countries and territories over the
period 1980-2012. We restrict our sample to those countries with at least
40 quarterly observations, resulting in 212 included in the analysis here.
The data include information on headline consumer prices, as well as sub-
indices for food, housing, energy and the remainder of the index. The
panel is not balanced, with coverage for the sub-indices less complete for
less developed countries. Nonetheless, coverage of sub-indices far exceeds
any other database for consumer prices.
Previous studies have highlighted a large heterogeneity in the impact
of disasters on output, particularly between advanced and developing
countries. The impact on inflation is similarly diverse. Disasters on av-
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erage have negligible impact on inflation in advanced countries, but typ-
ically increase inflation in developing countries. That said, the impact for
severe disasters (those in the upper quartile) is larger, and significant even
in high income countries.
The impact of diasters on inflation differs by sub-index. The impact
on food price inflation is in general positive, if short lived. The impact on
housing and other sub-indices is in general negative. Differences in ex-
penditure weights on these sub-indices will in part explain the differences
witnessed in headline inflation numbers by level of development.
Earthquakes do not significantly affect headline inflation, but do signif-
icantly reduce CPI inflation excluding food, housing and energy. Storms
cause an immediate increase in food price inflation for the first six months,
although this impact is reversed in the subsequent two quarters, resulting
in no significant impact over the entire first year, or beyond. Floods in-
crease headline inflation in the quarter that the flooding occurs in middle
and low income countries, but have no significant impacts in subsequent
quarters. In high income countries, the impact on headline inflation is
negative, although insignificant. Droughts increase headline inflation for
a number of years.
5.2 How disasters may affect prices
As noted above, there has yet to be a systematic review of the impact
of disasters on prices. Nonetheless, evidence from the literature on the
impact on economic activity and a small number of case studies provide
some guide to the potential channels of impact. The literature on other
sources of major economic dislocation is also instructive. Rockoff (2015)
studies the impact of US wars on inflation. He notes that wars against
minor powers has little effect on inflation, but that (larger) wars against
major powers have a strong, positive influence on inflation. Nonetheless,
once the war has finished, prices tend to fall towards their pre-war lev-
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els. Prices can also fall following financial crises (e.g. see Kindleberger,
1978; Mishkin, 1992), notably the deflation in the Great Depression, fol-
lowing Japan’s crisis in the 1990s and the low rates of inflation currently
witnessed in advanced countries following the global financial crisis of
2007-2008.
5.2.1 Short-run impacts
Disasters affect economic activity via a number of channels in the short
run. The immediate direct impact of diasters can cause death and injury
to people, and cause damage to buildings, transport infrastructure and
livestock. The destruction of harvests or housing can create shortages,
pushing up the price of remaining food or houses. The size of the increase
in prices may depend on market power of firms and perceptions of cus-
tomers – it may not be in the long-run interest of a firm to be seen to be
profiteering from customers’ misery. Rotemberg (2005, p.835) notes exam-
ples of customer protests at prices increases following the 1994 earthquake
in the Los Angeles area.1
Beyond the direct impact, other businesses and households may be in-
directly affected, such as being unable to bring goods to market due to lack
of transport infrastructure. For example, farmers may react to the short-
age of feed caused by a drought by slaughtering livestock. This could
potentially reduce meat prices in the near term, but increase them in the
medium term as farmers act to rebuild livestock numbers once the drought
has ended. If the disruption to economic activity is sufficiently large it may
reduce demand for goods and services from sectors not directly affected.
This lower demand could reduce the prices in these other sectors.
There are a number of papers that aim to quantify the impact of disas-
ters on economic activity. Noy (2009) examines the impact of 507 disasters
1In some jurisdictions it is illegal to increase prices of certain goods, termed ‘price
gouging’, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster (Gerena, 2004).
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over the period 1970-2003, finding a significant impact on GDP. The effect
is greater for smaller and for less developed countries. Higher per capita
income, literacy rates and institutional capacity help to mitigate the im-
pact. The impact of disasters appears to differ by type of disaster. Raddatz
(2009) finds that climatic disasters (storms, floods, droughts and extreme
temperatures) have a significant negative impact on GDP, mostly in the
year of the disaster. Other disasters are not found to have a significant
impact.
A number of authors also consider the impact of disasters on differ-
ing sectors of the economy. Loayza et al. (2012) find no significant effect
on overall GDP using five-year growth averages over the period 1961-
2005, although droughts are negative and storms and floods are posi-
tive. Droughts and storms negatively affect agricultural output, whereas
floods are positive. The authors suggest that this positive effect may de-
rive from plentiful rainfall providing benefit to crops that outweighs the
localised damage from flooding, and the additional nutrients that aid the
following season. Furthermore, cheaper electricity from more abundant
hydropower aids industry. Nonetheless, this positive effect disappears in
the presence of more severe flooding. Fomby et al. (2013) find that earth-
quakes affect agricultural production in developing countries, potentially
a result of damaged infrastructure. Fomby et al. (2013) also find differing
impacts of disasters depending on their severity.
Small-scale studies of individual disasters, or small groups, point to
differing inflation impacts by type of disaster. The most comprehensive
study to date, Heinen et al. (2015), considers the impact of hurricanes and
floods on the inflation rates of 15 Caribbean islands. Damaging hurricanes
increased monthly headline CPI inflation by 0.05 percentage points, with
a greater effect on impact on food prices. More damaging hurricanes have
a proportionately higher impact on inflation, with the implied inflation-
ary impact of the largest hurricane in their sample being 1.4 percentage
points on monthly headline CPI inflation. Flooding had an average 0.083
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percentage point impact on inflation, with the implied largest effect 0.604
percentage points. The impact of both hurricanes and floods takes place in
the month of the event, with no significant effects in subsequent months.
In terms of case studies of individual events or countries, Laframboise
and Loko (2012) estimated that headline inflation increased by an addi-
tional 2 percent in Pakistan following the severe floods of 2010. Abe et al.
(2014) find little increase in prices following the Great East Japan earth-
quake of 2011. Reinsdorf et al. (2014) compare this earthquake with the
Chilean earthquake of 2010 using online data for supermarkets. Their data
point to a sharp fall in product availability in the immediate aftermath of
both earthquakes, without concurrent increases in price.
Doyle and Noy (2015) find no significant aggregate impact on New
Zealand consumer prices from the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and
2011. At a disaggregated level, Parker and Steenkamp (2012) and Wood
et al. (2016) find large increases in rents and construction costs within Can-
terbury, consistent with restricted housing supply following the widespread
destruction of the housing stock. Munoz and Pistelli (2010) investigate the
impact on inflation of a small number of large earthquakes, by comparing
inflation outturns with a forecast based on information prior to the event.
While they find that some earthquakes resulted in higher inflation, it was
by no means universal. Given their small sample of events they were un-
able to explain the causes of this different response.
Kamber et al. (2013) study the impact of droughts on New Zealand,
using measures of rainfall and soil moisture deficit in a VAR framework.
Their findings suggest a drought of the magnitude of that of early 2013
raises CPI food prices by around 1.0 - 1.5 percent. In particular, milk
cheese and eggs prices increase by 3 percent, reflecting the importance of
dairy in domestic agriculture. Wholesale electricity prices increase by as
much as 8 percent following such a drought, as lower lake levels increase
the cost of hydroelectricity, although this cost increase does not appear
to pass through to retail. Conversely, depressed economic activity results
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in falling prices for other non-tradable sectors, resulting in no significant
impact on overall CPI. Buckle et al. (2007) similarly found no significant
overall impact on consumer prices from droughts in New Zealand.
5.2.2 Medium-run impacts
There may be some longer-lasting impacts on prices beyond the immedi-
ate destruction and disruption. The destruction of ports and infrastructure
may disrupt imports, driving up the price for those goods which are im-
ported. Conversely, the lack of ports for export may lead to a domestic
oversupply and price falls in goods normally exported. International in-
vestors may also choose to withdraw capital from a country recently hit
by a disaster, pushing down on the exchange rate and increasing the cost
of imports. Ramcharan (2007) finds that in flexible exchange rate regimes,
the real exchange rate depreciates by 10.25 percent in the year following a
windstorm. The exchange rate effect is uncertain, however, since domestic
investors repatriating foreign investments could lead to an exchange rate
appreciation; the yen appreciated sharply in the immediate aftermath of
the 2011 To¯hoku earthquake (Neely, 2011).
Over the medium term, as resources are allocated to damage and re-
construct destroyed buildings and infrastructure there may be a ‘demand
surge’, placing upward pressure on prices. Keen and Pakko (2011) cali-
brated a DSGE model to simulate the impact of Hurricane Katrina. In their
simulation, the destruction of capital stock and temporary fall in produc-
tivity causes firms to raise prices, resulting in higher inflation
However, this demand surge is not certain. The incidence of a disaster
may cause revisions of people’s perception of disaster risk and cause out-
ward migration. Boustan et al. (2012) find outward migration from areas
affected by tornadoes, Hornbeck (2012) from heavily eroded counties in
the Dust Bowl era, and Hornbeck and Naidu (2014) document substantial
outward migration following the 1927 Mississippi floods. Coffman and
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Noy (2012) use synthetic control methods to estimate a 12 percent drop in
population on the island of Kauai in Hawaii, following Hurricane Iniki.
The population of New Orleans fell sharply following Hurricane Katrina
(Vigdor, 2008), although the destruction of housing stock was far greater,
resulting in higher house prices and rents. The destruction of disasters
may also create poverty traps where households are unable to regain pre-
vious wealth and income (Carter et al., 2007). Such scenarios would put
downward pressure on prices over the medium term in areas affected by
disasters, although it is less certain the extent to which this affects the over-
all national price level.
Taking the above factors into consideration, the overall impact of dis-
asters on inflation is ambiguous. The prior research on activity suggests
there may be at the very least differences in the impact of disasters on infla-
tion: by type of disaster; between the short and medium term; by different
sub-component of the inflation basket; by level of development, and; by
severity of the disaster. The analysis that follows accounts for these differ-
ing potential effects in turn.
5.3 Data and method
5.3.1 Disasters
The most widely used source for disasters is the EM-DAT database col-
lected by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the
University of Louvain. The database covers disaster events which meet
one of the following criteria: ten or more people killed; 100 or more peo-
ple affected; declaration of a state of emergency; or call for international
assistance. Alongside the date of the disaster, the EM-DAT database also
includes information on the number of people killed and the number of
people affected. For a smaller set of disasters the database includes an
estimate of the damage caused.
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It is worth noting that the EM-DAT database measures the ex post ef-
fects of disasters, which as shown in Noy (2009) and elsewhere depend
on a number of country specific factors such as institutions. The rele-
vant institutional factors, for example good economic governance, may
also affect inflation dynamics. To understand the impact of the underly-
ing natural hazards, it is necessary to have data on the event in question,
such as wind speed, rainfall, or intensity of ground shaking. Heinen et al.
(2015) use such a dataset for their study of windstorms and floods for a
select group of Caribbean islands. The GeoMet database used by Felber-
mayr and Gro¨schl (2014) does have sufficiently widespread geophysical
and meteorological data for the analysis here, but is not publicly available
at this time.
Only disasters with likely macroeconomic effects are considered here,
namely: earthquakes, storms, floods, droughts and other disasters (mass
movements, insect infestations, extreme temperatures, volcanoes and wild-
fires). In order to estimate the effect of disasters on inflation, we require
the quarter in which the disaster took place. The EM-DAT database does
not always have precise start dates for droughts (even to the three-month
period required) so as a consequence many droughts have been dropped
from the analysis.
Even with these selection criteria, there are a large number of disasters
in the EM-DAT database which are small relative to the overall size of the
country and are unlikely to have any discernable macroeconomic effects.
To aid estimation, only disasters with at least major impact are considered
in the analysis below. To estimate the severity of the impact of the disasters
we construct an impact variable for each disaster, calculated in a similar
fashion to Fomby et al. (2013).
The impact variable used in this paper is:
IMP
′
i,t = (EQIMPi,t, STIMPi,t, FLIMPi,t, DRIMPi,t, OTIMPi,t)
′ (5.1)
where EQIMP , STIMP , FLIMP , DRIMP and OTIMP represent the
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respective total impact of earthquakes, wind storms, floods, droughts and
other disasters. IMPi,t is calculated as:
IMPi,t(k) =
J∑
j=1
intensityki,t,j (5.2)
where
intensityki,t,j = 100 ∗
fatalitieski,t,j + 0.3 ∗ total affectedki,t,j
populationi,t,j
, if intensity > 0.1
= 0 otherwise (5.3)
and J is the total number of each type-k events (k=1,2,3,4,5 and responds
to earthquakes, wind storms, floods, droughts and other disasters respec-
tively) that took place in each country i in quarter t. The creation of IMPi,t
can be described by the following steps. First, for each disaster the inten-
sity was calculated by dividing the number of fatalities and 30 percent of
the total people affected by the population. Where this intensity is smaller
than 0.1 percent, the impact is set to zero (equation 5.3). Then for each
country, the total impact for each type of disaster is calculated as the sum
of the intensities of each such disaster that occurred in each country for
each quarter (equation 5.2).
The criteria on disasters discussed above, together with the availability
of consumer price data (see section 5.3.2), result in a total of 1349 disasters
in 163 countries. Table 5.1 shows the incidence of disasters by type and
by country development. Floods and storms are the most frequently oc-
curring disasters that meet the criteria for inclusion. Measured droughts
are rare in advanced countries (following Noy (2009) we take these to be
high income members of the OECD in 1990) and other high income coun-
tries, with only three in the sample, compared with 124 in middle income
countries.
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Table 5.1: Incidence of disasters
Earthquakes Storms Floods Droughts Other Total
Number
Advanced 17 14 9 2 5 47
Other high income 3 39 21 1 3 67
Middle income 47 288 433 124 29 921
Low income 6 57 155 90 6 314
Total 73 398 618 217 43 1349
75th percentile
Advanced 1.19 0.66 0.40 1.68 1.09
Other high income 1.26 0.28 0.94
Middle income 0.93 1.56 0.89 5.47 1.20 1.46
Low income 0.53 1.26 0.92 6.68 8.25 2.75
Total 0.95 1.33 0.87 5.79 1.95 1.64
90th percentile
Advanced 2.07 1.69 1.09 5.10 4.63
Other high income 3.89 0.53 3.67
Middle income 2.34 6.12 2.43 10.75 2.38 4.53
Low income 13.47 3.83 3.28 14.34 12.24 7.00
Total 2.63 4.37 2.48 12.00 5.10 4.99
Notes: countries within advanced and other high income groups set out in table 5.7 in the
appendix. 75th and 90th percentile impact as calculated per equations (5.2) and (5.3).
Measured in percent of population. Impact omitted where there are fewer than 5 events.
146 CHAPTER 5. THE IMPACT OF DISASTERS ON INFLATION
The impact on inflation is likely to depend on the size of the disaster.
We follow Cavallo et al. (2013) and focus here on large disasters in the 75th
and 90th percentiles. The 75th percentile disaster is approximately the
impact of Hurricane Earl on Antigua and Barbuda in 2010. The hurricane
affected around 6 percent of the population and did damage estimated
to be around 1 percent of GDP. The 90th percentile is approximately the
impact of the 2010 earthquake in Chile, which killed 562 people, affected
2.7 million (16 percent of the population) and had estimated damages of
17 percent of GDP.
5.3.2 Consumer prices
As noted in section 5.2 above, different types of disasters may affect dif-
ferent prices, with the prices for food, housing (including rent) and en-
ergy being the most commonly cited in the literature. Commonly used
international databases, such as the International Financial Statistics of the
International Monetary Fund and theWorld Development Indicators of the
World Bank, typically contain information on just the overall, headline
CPI index. Information on the sub-indices is normally only available from
national sources.
The consumer price data used here are taken from the dataset in chap-
ter 4. This dataset contains CPI for 223 countries and territories on a quar-
terly basis for the period 1980-2012. The series contained are the overall in-
dex (CPI) the sub-indices for food (CPIF), housing (CPIH), energy (CPIE),
and all remaining items in the index (CPIxFHE). Coverage for CPIH and
CPIE is relatively sparse relative to the other indices, so a combined hous-
ing and energy index is also included (CPIHE) which has observations for
a greater number of countries.
We drop countries for which there are fewer than 40 quarters of CPI
data. This results in 212 countries with observations for headline CPI. The
average number of quarters of headline CPI data per country is 105. Fewer
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countries have data for the sub-indices, and the length of coverage is also
typically shorter, particularly for less developed countries.
5.3.3 Method
To estimate the impact of disasters on inflation, we run a panel regression
of the form:
pii,t =
p∑
j=0
βjDi,t−j + µi + λt + νit (5.4)
where pii,t is quarterly log difference in CPI in country i in quarter t. We
multiply the inflation rate by 100 to give coefficients that are in units of
percentage points for ease of reading. Di,t is a vector of variables captur-
ing the impact of disasters. The analysis that follows also considers the
impact on the inflation rate for food, housing, energy and cpi excluding
food housing and energy, respectively pifi,t, pi
h
i,t, piei,t, pi
xfhe
i,t . We consider
both the impact of all disasters combined, and the five types of disasters
(earthquakes, wind storms, floods, droughts and other) individually as
described in section 5.3.1 above. The parameters µi and λt are fixed ef-
fects for country and time respectively. The country fixed effects capture
the time invariant characteristics of each country that explain differences
in average inflation rates between countries. The time fixed effects cap-
ture global factors that affect all countries, such as global developments in
output growth and commodity prices or the Great Moderation. The occur-
rence of disasters is assumed to be exogenous, and unaffected by current
or previous values of CPI.
One potential problem with this estimation is that CPI data is typically
seasonal, which increases the variance of the underlying series. There are
a number of approaches to eliminate this seasonality. The first is to use a
seasonal adjustment process, the most widely used of which is the Census
Bureau’s X12. However, X12 uses both forward and backward looking
filters, which violates the exogeneity assumption over CPI and disasters.
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The use of country seasonal dummies for each quarter is also unsatis-
factory for our purposes if disasters do have an impact on CPI, but are
concentrated in particular quarters. Consider windstorms, whose inci-
dence is for the most part concentrated to certain times of the year. In such
cases, the seasonal dummy will absorb some of the true impact of disas-
ters. Such quarterly dummies are also unsatisfactory if the seasonal pat-
tern changes over time. Given these problems, we use the non-seasonally
adjusted data. The time fixed effects dummies already included do ac-
count for the average seasonal pattern across countries, and are robust to
changing seasonal patterns, but are unable to account for differences in
seasonal patterns across countries.2
Standard panel estimation assumes that the errors, νit, are not corre-
lated cross-sectionally, i.e.:
ρij = ρji = corr(νit, νjt) = 0 for i 6= j (5.5)
However, such an assumption may not be valid when macroeconomic
time series are used. Close trade ties and other economic interactions
between spatially grouped countries are likely to result in positive cross-
correlations. To test the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence
we use the Pesaran (2004) test, which is the most appropriate given the
unbalanced nature of the CPI dataset, and the large N relative to T. We ob-
tain a test statistic of 205, which is significant evidence against the null
of cross-sectional independence. The average absolute pairwise cross-
sectional correlation is 0.302. A positive cross-sectional correlation results
in substantial downward bias to the standard errors calculated using stan-
dard panel estimation techniques. To account for this large cross-sectional
correlation, and any potential serial correlation, we use Driscoll and Kraay
(1998) adjusted standard errors in the estimations that follow.3
2For robustness, we also estimate using country seasonal dummies and using data
seasonally adjusted using X12 (not reported). The results using the seasonally adjusted
data are qualitatively similar to those presented here.
3The Pesaran (2004) test is carried out in Stata using the xtcsd command of Hoyos and
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5.4 Results
This section describes the results from the regression described above in
equation (5.4). We initially consider the aggregate impact of all disasters
combined on inflation. Given the potential for heterogeneity of impact, as
discussed in section 5.2, we then analyse in turn the effects on inflation
by type of disaster, by level of development and by severity of disaster.
To verify the robustness of our findings, we also consider two alternative
specifications of impact – damage relative to GDP and considering just the
number of disasters rather than differentiating by impact.
5.4.1 Aggregate impact of disasters on inflation
We first estimate equation (5.4) on the aggregate impact of all disasters,
which is to say Di,t is the sum by country and by quarter of the impact
across all types of disaster. We include up to 11 lags, since we find joint
significance up to three years following the incidence of the disaster. Fur-
ther lags are not individually or jointly significant. The individual coeffi-
cients from the estimation are included in table 5.8 in the appendix. To aid
assessment of the impact of a typical disaster, we multiply the coefficients
by the impact value of the 75th and 90th percentile disasters (see table 5.1)
to give the estimated effect on inflation of these disasters. These estimated
impact results are shown in table 5.2.
Our results estimate that a disaster in the 75th percentile would have
a contemporaneous (i.e. quarter 0) impact on headline inflation of 0.26
percentage points (pp). There is a further significant impact of 0.18pp on
headline inflation in the quarter immediately following the disaster (quar-
ter 1). Since exact timing of effects may differ between individual disas-
ters, we combine the coefficients for quarters 2 and 3. The impact at this
horizon is positive, but insignificant. The combined impact on inflation of
Sarafidis (2006). The estimation using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) adjusted standard errors
is implemented using the xtscc command developed by Hoechle (2007).
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Table 5.2: Estimated inflation impact of disasters
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
75th percentile
Quarter 0 0.264∗∗ 0.164∗∗ −0.069 −0.149 0.016
Quarter 1 0.184∗ 0.158∗ −0.058 −0.149 −0.101∗
Quarters 2-3 0.159 −0.219∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.117 −0.121
Year 1 0.607∗ 0.102 −0.359∗∗ −0.414 −0.206∗
Year 2 0.910 −0.030 −0.351∗ 0.150 −0.142
Year 3 0.769∗ 0.274 −0.131 0.203 0.034
90th percentile
Quarter 0 0.799∗∗ 0.497∗∗ −0.210 −0.451 0.048
Quarter 1 0.557∗ 0.479∗ −0.175 −0.451 −0.306∗
Quarters 2-3 0.483 −0.666∗ −0.702∗∗∗ −0.355 −0.366
Year 1 1.840∗ 0.310 −1.088∗∗ −1.257 −0.624∗
Year 2 2.760 −0.089 −1.063∗ 0.456 −0.431
Year 3 2.331∗ 0.832 −0.398 0.617 0.104
Observations 22471 18933 8191 9167 12639
R2 0.050 0.042 0.046 0.171 0.054
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE
is consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Shows estimated impact
for 75th and 90th percentile disaster. Underlying regression coefficients in table 5.8
in appendix. Quarter 0 is the quarter the disaster takes place. Year 1 is quarters
0 through 3 combined, year 2 is quarters 4 through 7, year 3 is quarters 8 through 11.
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the 75th percentile disaster for the first year (quarters 0 through 3) is esti-
mated to be 0.61pp. The impact over the second year (quarters 4 through
7) is estimated to be 0.91pp, although this is not significant. Finally, the
impact over the third year (quarters 8 through 11) is significant, and esti-
mated to be 0.77pp.
Turning to the sub-indices, there is a positive and significant contem-
poraneous impact on food prices of 0.16pp, and a similar impact in the
first quarter following the disaster. However, in the subsequent two quar-
ters there is a negative and significant impact on inflation, such that the
overall impact on food prices over the first year is insignificant and close
to zero. There is no significant impact on food prices beyond the first year.
Housing inflation is significantly reduced in the aftermath of disasters,
by 0.36pp and 0.35pp in the first two years following the disaster. There
is no significant impact on energy prices. CPI inflation excluding food,
housing and energy is significantly lower in the aftermath of disasters,
by an estimated 0.21pp in the first year for the 75th percentile disaster.
There is no significant impact beyond the first year. Table 5.2 also includes
the estimated figures for the 90th percentile disaster. Since this involves
multiplying the underlying coefficients by a larger impact coefficient, the
overall pattern of effects and significance are unchanged from the 75th
percentile case.
Strictly speaking, it is not possible to draw conclusions from the indi-
vidual sub-indices for the overall impact on headline inflation. The sam-
ples differ for each sub-index because of the lack of availability of some
sub-indices. In particular, the sub-indices for housing and energy are fre-
quently unavailable outside of high income countries. There is also a no-
ticeable difference in relative weights in the sub-indices between coun-
tries. For example, the weight of food in the index is around 10-15 percent
in advanced countries, but frequently exceeds 50 percent in low income
countries (see chapter 4). For the purposes of robustness, we include the
estimation results on a balanced panel of 78 countries over the period 1996-
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2012 for the sub-indices for food, the combined housing and energy sub-
index and CPIxFHE (see table 5.9 in the appendix). The sample in this
balanced panel is heavily biased towards high income countries, and the
estimates are similar in nature to those for this group of countries (see sec-
tion 5.4.3).
5.4.2 Impact by type of disasters
As noted above in section 5.2, disasters have heterogeneous impacts on
activity, dependent on type. To test whether this finding also holds for
inflation, we re-estimate equation (5.4) with separate impact variables of
each type of disaster. The coefficients from this estimation are shown in
tables 5.10 through 5.14 in the appendix. The results are summarised in
table 5.3. We again multiply the coefficients by the impact of the 75th per-
centile disaster of the relevant type. The ‘other’ category of disasters has
almost no significant coefficients, perhaps unsurprising given the diver-
sity of disasters within the category, so these disasters are unreported in
table 5.3.
Earthquakes do not have a significant impact on headline or food in-
flation at any horizon. An earthquake in the 75th percentile is estimated to
increase housing inflation in the first quarter after it takes place by 0.18pp
and energy inflation in that quarter by 0.79pp. These increases appear to
be unwound in subsequent quarters, with the estimated impact over the
first year combined not significantly different from zero. CPI inflation ex-
cluding food, housing and energy is significantly reduced by earthquakes
in each of the three years following the disaster, by 0.63pp, 0.45pp and
0.36pp respectively.
Storms are estimated to have a contemporaneous positive impact on
headline inflation, and a positive impact the following quarter, although
insignificant in both cases. The second quarter following the storm is neg-
ative and significant. Overall, the estimated impact for the 75th percentile
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Table 5.3: Impact on inflation by type of disaster
Headline Food Housing Energy CPI ex FHE
Earthquakes
Quarter 0 0.228 0.238 −0.031 −0.287 −0.092
Quarter 1 0.047 −0.084 0.183∗ 0.785∗∗ −0.234∗∗∗
Quarters 2-3 −0.025 −0.165 −0.194 −0.473 −0.302∗∗∗
Year 1 0.250 −0.012 −0.043 0.024 −0.628∗∗∗
Year 2 0.364 0.273 0.026 1.931 −0.450∗∗∗
Year 3 0.220 0.397 −0.261 −0.736 −0.357∗
Storms
Quarter 0 0.101 0.155∗ −0.085 −0.523 0.021
Quarter 1 0.056 0.216∗ −0.039 −0.318 −0.099
Quarters 2-3 −0.156 −0.332∗∗∗ −0.260∗∗ 0.003 −0.063
Year 1 0.001 0.038 −0.384 −0.838 −0.140
Year 2 −0.124 −0.008 −0.641∗∗∗ 0.075 −0.113
Year 3 −0.067 0.059 −0.387∗ 0.161 0.201
Floods
Quarter 0 0.378∗ 0.144 −0.079 −0.242 −0.145
Quarter 1 0.170 0.071 −0.069 −0.327 −0.159∗
Quarters 2-3 0.368 −0.163 −0.005 −0.246 −0.028
Year 1 0.916 0.051 −0.153 −0.815 −0.332∗
Year 2 1.652 −0.029 −0.329 1.207∗∗ −0.061
Year 3 1.465 0.255 −0.118 −0.051 0.045
Droughts
Quarter 0 1.359∗ 0.540 −0.114 0.225 0.138
Quarter 1 1.300∗ 0.398 −0.295 −0.243 −0.170
Quarters 2-3 1.975 −0.088 −0.683∗∗ −0.554 −0.648∗∗
Year 1 4.634∗ 0.850 −1.092 −0.573 −0.680
Year 2 7.066 0.131 −0.697 −0.725 −0.207
Year 3 5.212∗∗ 1.735 −0.380 1.168 −0.131
Observations 22471 18933 8191 9167 12639
R2 0.055 0.045 0.050 0.174 0.060
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is
consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Shows estimated impact for
75th percentile disaster. Underlying regression coefficients in tables 5.10 through 5.14
in appendix. Quarter 0 is the quarter the disaster takes place. Year 1 is quarters 0
through 3 combined, year 2 is quarters 4 through 7, year 3 is quarters 8 through 11.
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storm over the first year is 0.00pp. There is no significant impact on head-
line inflation in subsequent years. There is a significant impact on food
price inflation during the first year. A 75th percentile storm significantly
increases food price inflation by 0.16pp contemporaneously and by a fur-
ther 0.22pp in the first quarter following the storm. These increases are
unwound in the subsequent two quarters, leaving the total estimated im-
pact over the first year to be insignificantly different from zero. Storms
reduce housing price inflation in the three years that follow, by 0.38pp,
0.64pp and 0.39pp respectively, although only the second year is signifi-
cant. The impact on other sub-indices is insignificant.
The 75th percentile flood is estimated to have a positive and significant
contemporaneous impact on headline inflation of 0.38pp. There is esti-
mated to be a positive impact on headline inflation throughout the first
three years following the flood, although this is not significant. Energy
price inflation is estimated to be lower for the first year, before rebound-
ing in the following year. This would be consistent with plentiful rainfall
lowering hydroelectric generation costs in the near term. The 75th per-
centile flood is estimated to have no significant impact on food or housing
price inflation. Inflation in the remainder of the index is estimated to be
lower by 0.33pp in the first year following the flood.
The 75th percentile drought is estimated to increase headline inflation
by 1.36pp in the start quarter, and by 1.30pp in the subsequent quarter.4
The impact on food price inflation is typically positive, although insignif-
icant. The impact on housing and CPIxFHE price inflation is negative,
significantly so in the second and third quarters following the start of the
drought.
4Note that unlike the other disasters considered here, droughts may continue for sev-
eral quarters, indeed even years. The 75th percentile drought is also much greater in
impact than the 75th percentile of the other disasters.
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5.4.3 Impact by level of development
Previous research has highlighted that disasters have greater impact on
activity in developing economies than in advanced economies (Noy, 2009;
Raddatz, 2009; Fomby et al., 2013). We investigate whether this finding
holds for the impact on inflation by estimating equation (5.4) separately
for advanced countries, other high income countries and for the remain-
ing countries. There are insufficient observations for low income coun-
tries, particularly for the sub-indices, to merit estimating these countries
separately. The estimated impact for the 75th percentile disaster in each
country group is shown in table 5.4. The underlying coefficient estimates
are provided in tables 5.15, 5.16 and 5.18 in the appendix. Given the rela-
tive lack of individual sub-indices for housing and energy in middle and
low income countries, we use the combined housing and energy sub-index
that is more widely available in these countries.
Disasters do not have significant impact on either headline, food or
energy price inflation in advanced countries. Housing price inflation is
significantly lower in the second year after the disaster, by 0.25pp for the
75th percentile disaster. CPIxFHE inflation is significantly lower in the
first year following the disaster, by 0.09pp.
In other high income countries, the 75th percentile disaster is estimated
to increase headline inflation 2.97pp over the first year, but only the in-
crease in quarters 2 and 3 is significant. There are significant increases in
the second and third year after the disaster, by 0.95pp and 0.69pp respec-
tively. Food price inflation is significantly increased in the first two years
following the disaster, conversely energy prices fall. There are no signifi-
cant impacts on the other sub-indices.
There are insufficient events to consider the impact by disaster sep-
arately for advanced and other high income countries, so table 5.17 in
the appendix considers the impact by type of disaster for all high income
countries. The 75th percentile earthquake in high income countries has no
significant effect on headline inflation, but significantly reduces CPIxFHE
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Table 5.4: Impact of disasters by level of development
Advanced countries
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
Quarter 0 0.005 0.054 −0.126 −0.050 −0.007
Quarter 1 −0.017 0.097∗ −0.018 −0.143 −0.034
Quarters 2-3 −0.076∗ −0.074 −0.080 −0.061 −0.049
Year 1 −0.088 0.076 −0.224 −0.254 −0.091∗
Year 2 −0.054 −0.162∗ −0.251∗ −0.221 −0.017
Year 3 0.124 0.121 0.229 0.143 0.067
Observations 2783 2741 2167 2715 2591
R2 0.302 0.247 0.172 0.507 0.361
Other high income countries
Headline Food Housing Energy CPI ex FHE
Quarter 0 1.066 0.135 −0.013 −2.454∗∗ 0.045
Quarter 1 1.144 0.297 0.060 −0.525∗ −0.175
Quarters 2-3 0.755∗ 0.353 0.034 0.949∗ −0.075
Year 1 2.965 0.785∗ 0.081 −2.031∗∗ −0.205
Year 2 0.950∗ 0.915∗∗∗ 0.084 0.221 −0.195
Year 3 0.691∗ 0.070 0.078 −0.169 0.101
Observations 4887 4106 2486 2465 2852
R2 0.093 0.134 0.116 0.295 0.139
Middle and low income countries
Headline Food Housing & Energy CPI ex FHE
Quarter 0 0.267∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.056 0.022
Quarter 1 0.176∗ 0.160∗ −0.043 −0.079
Quarters 2-3 0.179 −0.230∗ 0.051 −0.142
Year 1 0.621∗ 0.107 0.065 −0.200
Year 2 1.005 −0.022 −0.001 −0.121
Year 3 0.831∗∗ 0.306 −0.080 0.053
Observations 14801 12086 7301 7196
R2 0.057 0.042 0.064 0.057
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is
consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Shows estimated impact for
disaster in 75th percentile. Underlying regression coefficients in tables 5.15, 5.16 and 5.18
in appendix. Quarter 0 is the quarter the disaster takes place. Year 1 is quarters
0 through 3 combined, year 2 is quarters 4 through 7, year 3 is quarters 8 through 11.
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inflation by 1.43pp in the first year, by 1.62 in the second year and by
1.61pp in the third year . The 75th percentile storm has a positive impact
on headline inflation. Over the first year, the estimated impact is 4.59pp,
although this is insignificant. For the second and third year the impact
is positive and significant at 1.50pp and 0.96pp respectively. Food price
inflation is higher by 0.96pp in the first year and by 1.27pp in the second
year.
For middle and low income countries, the 75th percentile disaster is
estimated to increase headline inflation by 0.62pp in the first year, by (an
insignificant) 1.01pp in the second year and by 0.83pp in the third year. By
sub-component, food price inflation is significantly higher in the quarter
that the disaster takes place and in quarter 1. But in the subsequent two
quarters, this higher inflation is partly reversed, such that the combined
impact for the first year is insignificant. Disasters do not have significant
impact on the other sub-components in middle and low income countries.
Split by type of disaster (see table 5.19 in the appendix), earthquakes lower
CPIxFHE inflation, and the 75th percentile drought has a large and posi-
tive impact on headline inflation: 4.99pp in the first year, 7.34pp (insignif-
icant) in the second year and 5.37pp in the third year.
5.4.4 Impact by severity of disaster
Given the heavily skewed distribution of disaster impacts, it is possible
that there are non-linearities in their effect on inflation. We construct a
series for the impact of severe disasters, SEV IMPt,i in an analogous fash-
ion to equations (5.2) and (5.3), but set the cutoff threshold to be the 75th
percentile of the distribution. Thus the upper quartile of disasters – 337
disasters in total – are classified as ‘severe’. We then estimate equation
(5.4) including both IMPt,i and SEV IMPt,i in the vector of impact vari-
ables, Di,t. The estimated coefficients on the IMPt,i variables represent the
impact of major disasters (those in the first three quartiles of disaster im-
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pact) on inflation. The coefficients on SEV IMPt,i capture any additional
effect on inflation from severe disasters.
Given that the effect of disasters differs by level of development (sec-
tion 5.4.3), we estimate high income countries separate from middle and
low income countries. Table 5.5 shows the estimated impact on inflation
of a (severe) disaster in the 90th percentile, split by level of development.
For high income countries, there is a significant positive impact on in-
flation in the first two years following a severe disaster (table 5.21 in the
appendix). The impact on housing price inflation is negative for the first
two years. A split by disaster type is not worthwhile for high income
countries. There are only 23 severe disasters, and individual types are
concentrated in certain countries. For example, the four earthquakes are
split evenly between Chile and New Zealand, with the two New Zealand
earthquakes taking place less than six months apart.
For middle and low income countries, there are a number of significant
coefficients on the severe disaster variables. The reversal in the impact on
headline and food price inflation typically seen in quarters 2 and 3 is not
as pronounced, and is no longer significant. The impact on the other sub-
indices is more positive for severe relative to major disasters, significantly
so in the third year following the disaster, although the aggregate impact
of severe disasters on these sub-indices remains insignificant. The impact
of severe disasters by type of disaster in middle and low income countries
is similar in pattern to that when all disasters are combined (table 5.24 in
the appendix).
5.4.5 Alternative measures
For the purposes of robustness, we also consider alternative measures of
the impact of disasters that have been used in studies of the impact on
output. The first measure uses the information contained in the EM-DAT
database on damage. We calculate an intensity measure as the ratio of
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Table 5.5: Impact of severe disasters on inflation
High income countries
Headline Food Housing Energy CPI ex FHE
Quarter 0 1.647 0.183 −0.488∗∗ −3.732 0.103
Quarter 1 1.961 0.480 −0.130 −0.374 −0.490
Quarters 2-3 0.397 −0.104 −0.509∗∗ 0.583 −0.224
Year 1 4.004∗ 0.558 −1.128∗∗∗ −3.523 −0.611
Year 2 0.887∗ 0.717 −0.758∗ −0.624 −0.656∗
Year 3 0.410 −0.751 0.236 −0.131 −0.181
Observations 7670 6847 4653 5180 5443
R2 0.077 0.136 0.103 0.340 0.160
Middle and low income countries
Headline Food Housing & Energy CPI ex FHE
Quarter 0 0.619∗ 0.550∗∗ 0.293 0.036
Quarter 1 0.469 0.413∗ −0.100 −0.269
Quarters 2-3 0.627 −0.468 0.188 −0.348
Year 1 1.715 0.496 0.381 −0.581
Year 2 3.227 −0.059 −0.009 −0.339
Year 3 2.671∗ 1.123 −0.041 0.263
Observations 14801 12086 7301 7196
R2 0.058 0.044 0.066 0.059
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE
is consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Shows estimated impact for
disaster in 90th percentile. Underlying regression coefficients in tables 5.20 through 5.23
in appendix. Quarter 0 is the quarter the disaster takes place. Year 1 is quarters
0 through 3 combined, year 2 is quarters 4 through 7, year 3 is quarters 8 through 11.
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measured damage to GDP, using annual GDP data from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. To account for the potential contemporane-
ous impact of the disaster on output we use the GDP figure from the year
prior to the disaster. As with our previous intensity measure, we set the
intensity of a disaster to zero if the ratio of damage to GDP is less than 0.1
percent. Given the lower level of coverage for damages in the EM-DAT
database, we have estimates for the damage intensity for 525 disasters that
meet the threshold.
We estimate equation (5.4) using the intensity measure based on dam-
age. The estimated impact for the 75th percentile disaster on the damage
measure is markedly smaller than that based on the population-based in-
tensity (table 5.6). There is no significant impact on headline inflation in
the first two years following the disasters. The qualitative impact on food
prices is similar - higher inflation in the quarter that the disaster takes
place and the first quarter after, followed by lower inflation in the suc-
ceeding two quarters. The impact on housing is negative, although in-
significant. Finally the impact on CPIxFHE inflation is negative in the first
two years, significantly so in the second year.
There are a number of reasons why the estimated impact differs be-
tween the two measures of intensity. The intensity measure based on
population has an upper bound of 100 (where the disaster kills the en-
tire population), with the highest calculated intensity in our panel being
47. Conversely, damages can exceed annual GDP, with the highest damage
intensity in the panel 221. Excluding the 11 disasters that exceed a dam-
age intensity of 50, the short-run impact on inflation of the two measures
of intensity is closer.
The smaller coverage of the disaster intensity measure also biases the
estimation in two dimensions. First, coverage for damage intensity is
patchier in middle and low income countries, which have a different pro-
file for the inflation impact than high income countries. There is a fur-
ther composition bias, given that droughts, which typically have a more
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Table 5.6: Impact of disasters on inflation - alternative measures
Damage relative to GDP
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
Quarter 0 0.041 0.080∗∗∗ −0.133 0.629 −0.002
Quarter 1 0.014 0.042 0.086 0.571 −0.038
Quarters 2-3 −0.020 −0.113∗∗ −0.036 −0.499 −0.027
Year 1 0.034 0.009 −0.083 0.701 −0.066
Year 2 0.142 −0.005 −0.302 2.203∗ −0.050∗
Year 3 0.175∗ 0.161∗ −0.131 −0.468 0.092
Observations 22471 18933 8191 9167 12639
R2 0.047 0.042 0.044 0.172 0.053
Number of disasters - high income countries
Headline Food Housing Energy CPI ex FHE
Quarter 0 0.477 0.277 0.109 −0.804∗ −0.076
Quarter 1 0.815∗ 0.595∗ 0.400 −0.329 0.151
Quarters 2-3 0.642 0.051 0.312 0.579 −0.041
Year 1 1.934∗∗ 0.923∗ 0.820 −0.553 0.033
Year 2 0.087 0.195 −0.610 −0.719 −0.114
Year 3 0.007 0.222 −0.188 −0.168 0.386
Observations 7670 6847 4653 5180 5443
R2 0.076 0.134 0.099 0.336 0.159
Number of disasters - middle and low income countries
Headline Food Housing & energy CPIxFHE
Quarter 0 0.578∗ 0.319∗∗ −0.229 −0.024
Quarter 1 0.212 0.051 −0.128 −0.126
Quarters 2-3 −0.175 −0.681∗∗ −0.259 −0.308∗∗
Year 1 0.615 −0.311 −0.616 −0.458∗∗
Year 2 1.383 −0.177 −0.082 −0.128
Year 3 1.702 0.147 −0.760∗∗ −0.413
Observations 14801 12086 7301 7196
R2 0.056 0.043 0.065 0.057
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is
consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Shows estimated impact for disaster
in 75th percentile of damage caused. Underlying regression coefficients in tables 5.25 through
5.27 in appendix. Quarter 0 is the quarter the disaster takes place. Year 1 is quarters 0
through 3 combined, year 2 is quarters 4 through 7, year 3 is quarters 8 through 11.
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positive inflationary impact, are proportionately less represented in the
damage data. Further, the lack of coverage of the damage caused by dis-
asters introduces measurement error, since some observations are now in-
correctly classified as being disaster free.
Given the lack of coverage for damage, we also estimate equation (5.4)
using the number of disasters as our measure of intensity, which has been
used previously as a measure of impact (see, e.g. Skidmore and Toya,
2002). This alternative estimation calculates the average impact for all dis-
asters and does not allow for varying impacts by size of disaster. The
results are summarised in table 5.6, with separate estimations for high in-
come countries and middle and low income countries. The results for high
income countries are for the most part qualitatively similar to the those es-
timated under the original specification. Headline and food price inflation
is positively affected over the course of the first year. Energy price infla-
tion is lower on impact. Conversely, housing price inflation is no longer
significantly affected.
For middle and low income countries, the familiar pattern of food price
inflation initially higher, before reversal in quarters 2 and 3 is evident.
There is a negative impact on CPIxFHE inflation in the first year.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper has analysed the impact of disasters on inflation, using a panel
of consumer price indices for 212 countries. It is the first to systematically
analyse this impact, with previous studies confined to case studies of a
small number of events, or to small geographical regions. The findings
point to a considerable heterogeneity in the impact of disasters by type of
disaster, by sub-index of CPI, by level of development and by timing.
There is a clear differentiation in the inflation impact of disasters by
level of development. The impact of disasters in advanced countries is for
the most part insignificant, and even where there is a significant impact
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on a sub-index, its magnitude is negligible. Conversely, the impact for less
developed countries is more marked, with significant effects on headline
inflation persisting even three years post-disaster. That said, there is a
significant impact in high income countries from severe disasters (those in
the upper quartile).
In terms of sub-indices, the impact on food price inflation is in gen-
eral positive, if short lived. The impact on housing and other sub-indices
is in general negative. Differences in expenditure weights on these sub-
indices will in part explain the differences witnessed in headline inflation
numbers by level of development.
Earthquakes do not significantly affect headline inflation, but do signif-
icantly reduce CPI inflation excluding food, housing and energy. Storms
cause an immediate increase in food price inflation for the first six months,
although this impact is reversed in the subsequent two quarters, resulting
in no significant impact over the entire first year, or beyond. Floods in-
crease headline inflation in the quarter that the flooding occurs in middle
and low income countries, but have no significant impacts in subsequent
quarters. In high income countries, the impact on headline inflation is
negative, although insignificant. Droughts increase headline inflation for
a number of years.
As noted above, there is the potential for endogeneity between the
scale of the disaster and the impact of inflation. It would be useful to
consider the impact on inflation using the underlying natural hazard – the
ex ante strength of the event, rather than the ex post observed impact on
people and property. The data for natural hazards collected byFelbermayr
and Gro¨schl (2014) is not currently publicly available, but is scheduled to
be so in early 2016. Once those data are publicly available it would be a
useful extension of this paper to consider the impact of natural hazards on
inflation.
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5.A Appendix – country classifications
Table 5.7: Country groupings
Advanced
Australia France Japan Spain
Austria Germany Luxembourg Sweden
Belgium Greece Netherlands Switzerland
Canada Iceland New Zealand United Kingdom
Denmark Ireland Norway United States
Finland Italy Portugal
Other high income
Andorra Cyprus Korea Rep Russian Federation
Antigua and Barbuda Czech Republic Kuwait San Marino
Aruba Equatorial Guinea Latvia Saudi Arabia
Bahamas Estonia Lithuania Singapore
Bahrain Faeroe Islands Macau Sint Maarten
Barbados French Polynesia Malta Slovakia
Bermuda Guam New Caledonia Slovenia
Brunei Darussalam Guernsey North. Mariana Is. St Kitts and Nevis
Cayman Islands Hong Kong Oman Trinidad and Tobago
Chile Isle of Man Poland Uruguay
Croatia Israel Puerto Rico
Curacao Jersey Qatar
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Middle income
Albania El Salvador Macedonia, FYR Sao Tome et Principe
Algeria FS Micronesia Malaysia Senegal
American Samoa Fiji Maldives Serbia
Argentina Gabon Marshall Is. Seychelles
Armenia Georgia Mauritania Solomon Islands
Azerbaijan Ghana Mauritius South Africa
Belarus Grenada Mexico Sri Lanka
Belize Guatemala Moldova St Lucia
Bolivia Guyana Mongolia St Vincent & Gren.
Botswana Honduras Montenegro Sudan
Brazil Hungary Morocco Suriname
Bulgaria India Namibia Swaziland
Cameroon Indonesia Nicaragua Syria
Cape Verde Is. Iran Nigeria Thailand
China, PR Jamaica Pakistan Tonga
Colombia Jordan Palau Tunisia
Congo Kazakhstan Palestinian Territories Turkey
Costa Rica Kiribati Panama Tuvalu
Cote d’Ivoire Kosovo Papua New Guinea Ukraine
Djibouti Kyrgyzstan Paraguay Vanuatu
Dominica Lao, PDR Peru Venezuela
Dominican Rep. Lebanon Philippines Viet Nam
Ecuador Lesotho Romania Yemen
Egypt Libya Samoa Zambia
Low income
Bangladesh Congo, DR Madagascar Sierra Leone
Benin Ethiopia Malawi Tajikistan
Burkina Faso Gambia, The Mali Tanzania
Burundi Guinea Mozambique Togo
Cambodia Guinea Bissau Myanmar Uganda
Central African Republic Haiti Nepal Zimbabwe
Chad Kenya Niger
Comoros Liberia Rwanda
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Table 5.8: Impact of disasters on inflation – regression coefficients
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
totimp 0.160∗∗ 0.100∗∗ −0.042 −0.090 0.010
(0.055) (0.035) (0.045) (0.094) (0.033)
totimpt−1 0.112∗ 0.096∗ −0.035 −0.090 −0.061∗
(0.051) (0.040) (0.031) (0.086) (0.029)
totimpt−2 0.069 −0.067 −0.069∗∗ −0.128∗ −0.035
(0.070) (0.043) (0.022) (0.064) (0.031)
totimpt−3 0.028 −0.067 −0.071∗∗∗ 0.056 −0.038
(0.052) (0.037) (0.018) (0.075) (0.034)
totimpt−4 0.095 −0.010 −0.085∗∗ 0.028 0.022
(0.099) (0.029) (0.026) (0.078) (0.025)
totimpt−5 0.121 −0.056 −0.037 0.030 −0.070
(0.117) (0.037) (0.028) (0.061) (0.037)
totimpt−6 0.162 0.024 −0.074∗ 0.014 −0.017
(0.099) (0.047) (0.035) (0.056) (0.018)
totimpt−7 0.175 0.024 −0.017 0.020 −0.022
(0.151) (0.031) (0.027) (0.032) (0.020)
totimpt−8 0.150 0.035 −0.077 0.088 0.065
(0.085) (0.053) (0.046) (0.097) (0.039)
totimpt−9 0.117 0.035 0.061 −0.067∗ −0.073
(0.085) (0.051) (0.080) (0.028) (0.052)
totimpt−10 0.125 0.014 0.004 −0.006 0.050
(0.065) (0.060) (0.030) (0.048) (0.057)
totimpt−11 0.075 0.084 −0.068∗ 0.110 −0.021
(0.052) (0.048) (0.027) (0.154) (0.020)
Observations 22471 18933 8191 9167 12639
R2 0.050 0.042 0.046 0.171 0.054
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is consumer
prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors
in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included but not reported.
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Table 5.9: Impact of disasters on inflation, balanced panel regression coef-
ficients
Headline Food Housing & energy CPIxFHE
totimp 0.009 0.037 −0.008 −0.046
(0.036) (0.099) (0.059) (0.079)
totimpt−1 0.048 0.192 −0.113 −0.077
(0.052) (0.101) (0.070) (0.049)
totimpt−2 −0.062 −0.005 −0.070 −0.109∗
(0.049) (0.129) (0.057) (0.053)
totimpt−3 −0.133∗ −0.209∗ 0.021 −0.087
(0.056) (0.093) (0.061) (0.088)
totimpt−4 0.007 −0.087 0.085 0.066
(0.031) (0.091) (0.069) (0.060)
totimpt−5 −0.040 0.018 −0.072 −0.103∗∗
(0.031) (0.070) (0.068) (0.037)
totimpt−6 −0.132∗∗∗ −0.158∗ −0.122∗ −0.126∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.065) (0.059) (0.033)
totimpt−7 −0.062 −0.133∗∗ 0.036 −0.019
(0.032) (0.045) (0.088) (0.032)
totimpt−8 −0.031 −0.113∗ −0.046 0.046
(0.034) (0.056) (0.057) (0.045)
totimpt−9 −0.054 0.051 −0.096 −0.152∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.102) (0.087) (0.040)
totimpt−10 −0.069 −0.035 −0.029 −0.103
(0.037) (0.067) (0.052) (0.053)
totimpt−11 −0.091∗∗ −0.115∗∗ −0.160∗∗ −0.032
(0.027) (0.041) (0.059) (0.031)
Observations 5226 5226 5226 5226
R2 0.077 0.086 0.131 0.039
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is consumer
prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors
in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included but not reported.
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Table 5.10: Impact of disasters by type: earthquake coefficients
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
eqimp 0.239 0.249 −0.033 −0.301 −0.096
(0.124) (0.126) (0.121) (0.417) (0.054)
eqimpt−1 0.050 −0.088 0.191∗ 0.822∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.133) (0.084) (0.278) (0.047)
eqimpt−2 −0.021 −0.102 −0.084 −0.044 −0.175∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.106) (0.100) (0.233) (0.047)
eqimpt−3 −0.005 −0.071 −0.119∗ −0.452 −0.141∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.058) (0.051) (0.346) (0.039)
eqimpt−4 0.140 0.098 0.059 −0.131 −0.147∗∗
(0.130) (0.100) (0.080) (0.339) (0.044)
eqimpt−5 0.109 0.061 0.033 0.787 −0.107∗
(0.115) (0.100) (0.083) (0.539) (0.043)
eqimpt−6 0.095 0.118 −0.042 0.646 −0.099
(0.127) (0.194) (0.057) (0.616) (0.058)
eqimpt−7 0.037 0.009 −0.023 0.719 −0.119∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.127) (0.064) (0.933) (0.033)
eqimpt−8 0.001 0.043 −0.131 −0.469 −0.119
(0.155) (0.087) (0.134) (0.453) (0.064)
eqimpt−9 0.091 0.002 −0.007 −0.424 −0.133∗∗
(0.139) (0.109) (0.066) (0.247) (0.045)
eqimpt−10 0.052 0.151 −0.118 −0.525∗∗ −0.077
(0.157) (0.110) (0.094) (0.158) (0.046)
eqimpt−11 0.086 0.220 −0.018 0.648 −0.044
(0.157) (0.184) (0.085) (1.210) (0.063)
Observations 22471 18933 8191 9167 12639
R2 0.055 0.045 0.050 0.174 0.060
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is consumer
prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors
in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included but not reported.
Coefficients in tables 5.10 through 5.14 estimated jointly.
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Table 5.11: Impact of disasters by type: storm coefficients
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
stimp 0.076 0.117∗ −0.064 −0.394 0.016
(0.053) (0.053) (0.060) (0.418) (0.048)
stimpt−1 0.042 0.163∗∗ −0.029 −0.240 −0.074
(0.053) (0.059) (0.080) (0.188) (0.058)
stimpt−2 −0.062∗ −0.125∗ −0.097∗ −0.221 0.019
(0.030) (0.050) (0.042) (0.135) (0.060)
stimpt−3 −0.056 −0.126∗ −0.099∗∗ 0.223 −0.066∗
(0.046) (0.051) (0.032) (0.189) (0.029)
stimpt−4 −0.034 −0.017 −0.132∗∗ 0.116 −0.027
(0.024) (0.029) (0.041) (0.080) (0.021)
stimpt−5 −0.040 −0.026 −0.138∗∗∗ −0.050 −0.051
(0.031) (0.050) (0.022) (0.101) (0.034)
stimpt−6 0.021 0.063 −0.135∗∗∗ −0.122 −0.000
(0.052) (0.063) (0.028) (0.078) (0.034)
stimpt−7 −0.040 −0.026 −0.079∗∗∗ 0.112 −0.006
(0.037) (0.044) (0.022) (0.080) (0.047)
stimpt−8 −0.009 0.006 −0.096∗ 0.094 0.117
(0.052) (0.097) (0.038) (0.080) (0.067)
stimpt−9 −0.024 0.089 −0.017 −0.131 −0.080
(0.023) (0.085) (0.064) (0.122) (0.114)
stimpt−10 −0.029 −0.065 −0.061 0.108 0.116
(0.020) (0.044) (0.035) (0.155) (0.107)
stimpt−11 0.011 0.014 −0.117∗∗ 0.051 −0.001
(0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.111) (0.041)
Observations 22471 18933 8191 9167 12639
R2 0.055 0.045 0.050 0.174 0.060
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is consumer
prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors
in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included but not reported.
Coefficients in tables 5.10 through 5.14 estimated jointly.
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Table 5.12: Impact of disasters by type: flood coefficients
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
flimp 0.433∗ 0.165 −0.091 −0.277 −0.166
(0.170) (0.105) (0.090) (0.211) (0.108)
flimpt−1 0.194 0.081 −0.079 −0.374 −0.182∗∗
(0.193) (0.108) (0.083) (0.516) (0.064)
flimpt−2 0.190 −0.219 0.012 −0.322 −0.012
(0.278) (0.186) (0.061) (0.258) (0.069)
flimpt−3 0.232 0.032 −0.017 0.040 −0.020
(0.189) (0.159) (0.091) (0.300) (0.079)
flimpt−4 0.166 0.012 −0.059 0.165 0.051
(0.216) (0.111) (0.077) (0.198) (0.065)
flimpt−5 0.395 −0.145 −0.081 0.492∗ −0.110∗
(0.413) (0.088) (0.075) (0.206) (0.046)
flimpt−6 0.858 −0.033 −0.177 0.554∗∗ −0.022
(0.654) (0.105) (0.091) (0.196) (0.056)
flimpt−7 0.471 0.132 −0.060 0.171 0.011
(0.282) (0.112) (0.114) (0.221) (0.059)
flimpt−8 1.169 0.194 −0.105 −0.415 0.314∗
(0.677) (0.103) (0.089) (0.259) (0.155)
flimpt−9 0.237 −0.100 0.100 0.182 −0.056
(0.322) (0.084) (0.179) (0.225) (0.108)
flimpt−10 0.134 0.056 0.010 0.170 −0.064
(0.227) (0.142) (0.119) (0.359) (0.049)
flimpt−11 0.136 0.141 −0.139 0.004 −0.143∗∗
(0.132) (0.131) (0.077) (0.161) (0.043)
Observations 22471 18933 8191 9167 12639
R2 0.055 0.045 0.050 0.174 0.060
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is consumer
prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors
in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included but not reported.
Coefficients in tables 5.10 through 5.14 estimated jointly.
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Table 5.13: Impact of disasters by type: drought coefficients
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
drimp 0.235∗ 0.093 −0.020 0.039 0.024
(0.109) (0.054) (0.077) (0.050) (0.035)
drimpt−1 0.224∗ 0.069 −0.051 −0.042 −0.029
(0.102) (0.081) (0.038) (0.107) (0.030)
drimpt−2 0.199 −0.026 −0.057∗ −0.098 −0.072∗∗
(0.129) (0.104) (0.026) (0.087) (0.024)
drimpt−3 0.142 0.011 −0.061∗∗ 0.002 −0.039
(0.081) (0.055) (0.023) (0.073) (0.025)
drimpt−4 0.251 0.028 −0.077∗ −0.047 0.021
(0.210) (0.046) (0.033) (0.086) (0.041)
drimpt−5 0.307 −0.071 −0.023 −0.026 −0.016
(0.250) (0.053) (0.027) (0.065) (0.029)
drimpt−6 0.257 0.008 −0.035 −0.028 −0.016
(0.184) (0.073) (0.029) (0.047) (0.025)
drimpt−7 0.404 0.057 0.015 −0.025 −0.024
(0.306) (0.085) (0.020) (0.041) (0.016)
drimpt−8 0.210 0.063 −0.022 0.142 −0.005
(0.112) (0.046) (0.029) (0.129) (0.030)
drimpt−9 0.270 0.019 −0.003 −0.033 −0.040
(0.152) (0.077) (0.049) (0.036) (0.023)
drimpt−10 0.284∗∗ 0.094 −0.014 −0.056 0.031
(0.107) (0.112) (0.027) (0.068) (0.033)
drimpt−11 0.136 0.124 −0.026 0.149 −0.008
(0.103) (0.108) (0.026) (0.223) (0.021)
Observations 22471 18933 8191 9167 12639
R2 0.055 0.045 0.050 0.174 0.060
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is consumer
prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors
in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included but not reported.
Coefficients in tables 5.10 through 5.14 estimated jointly.
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Table 5.14: Impact of disasters by type: other disaster coefficients
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
otimp −0.205 −0.153 −0.034 0.072 0.085
(0.192) (0.205) (0.079) (0.254) (0.161)
otimpt−1 −0.252 −0.001 0.016 −0.021 0.096
(0.200) (0.187) (0.056) (0.146) (0.175)
otimpt−2 −0.009 0.415 −0.133 −0.082 −0.202
(0.134) (0.242) (0.078) (0.082) (0.113)
otimpt−3 −0.217 −0.116 −0.054 −0.032 0.131
(0.260) (0.136) (0.052) (0.182) (0.378)
otimpt−4 −0.269 −0.369 −0.014 0.248 0.317
(0.190) (0.220) (0.106) (0.282) (0.236)
otimpt−5 −0.238 −0.023 0.115 0.273 −0.457
(0.159) (0.054) (0.141) (0.308) (0.460)
otimpt−6 −0.295 −0.148 −0.169 0.288 −0.031
(0.168) (0.121) (0.171) (0.146) (0.035)
otimpt−7 −0.110 0.079 −0.051 0.015 −0.063
(0.208) (0.145) (0.101) (0.157) (0.067)
otimpt−8 −0.258∗ −0.291∗∗∗ −0.301 0.064 −0.015
(0.122) (0.049) (0.277) (0.185) (0.040)
otimpt−9 −0.302 −0.121 0.600 −0.316∗ −0.240
(0.171) (0.304) (0.640) (0.124) (0.160)
otimpt−10 −0.087 0.010 0.176 0.053 −0.086
(0.128) (0.227) (0.263) (0.145) (0.115)
otimpt−11 0.043 0.255 −0.177 −0.154 −0.034
(0.248) (0.225) (0.128) (0.171) (0.091)
Observations 22471 18933 8191 9167 12639
R2 0.055 0.045 0.050 0.174 0.060
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is consumer
prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors
in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included but not reported.
Coefficients in tables 5.10 through 5.14 estimated jointly.
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Table 5.15: Impact of disasters in advanced countries – regression coeffi-
cients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
totimp 0.005 0.049 −0.116 −0.046 −0.007
(0.034) (0.043) (0.066) (0.068) (0.023)
totimpt−1 −0.016 0.089∗ −0.016 −0.132 −0.032
(0.021) (0.041) (0.070) (0.084) (0.024)
totimpt−2 −0.038 −0.096 0.014 −0.152 −0.032
(0.024) (0.059) (0.042) (0.172) (0.033)
totimpt−3 −0.032 0.028 −0.088∗∗ 0.096 −0.013
(0.034) (0.081) (0.028) (0.067) (0.031)
totimpt−4 0.003 0.019 −0.109∗ −0.101 −0.021
(0.036) (0.050) (0.042) (0.095) (0.030)
totimpt−5 −0.039 −0.127 −0.092 −0.179∗∗ 0.016
(0.026) (0.073) (0.072) (0.054) (0.037)
totimpt−6 0.018 −0.042 −0.010 0.197 −0.023
(0.036) (0.040) (0.039) (0.107) (0.029)
totimpt−7 −0.033 0.000 −0.020 −0.120∗ 0.013
(0.033) (0.062) (0.032) (0.048) (0.035)
totimpt−8 0.018 0.033 0.135 −0.010 −0.031
(0.034) (0.056) (0.171) (0.035) (0.024)
totimpt−9 0.044∗ −0.011 0.169 0.034 0.041
(0.021) (0.059) (0.190) (0.064) (0.043)
totimpt−10 0.009 0.036 −0.110 0.032 0.007
(0.038) (0.033) (0.114) (0.067) (0.048)
totimpt−11 0.042 0.053 0.018 0.076 0.044
(0.035) (0.064) (0.082) (0.073) (0.024)
Observations 2783 2741 2167 2715 2591
R2 0.302 0.247 0.172 0.507 0.361
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is consumer
prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors
in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included but not reported.
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Table 5.16: Impact of disasters in other high income countries – regression
coefficients
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
totimp 1.139 0.144 −0.014 −2.621∗∗ 0.048
(1.006) (0.121) (0.033) (0.850) (0.089)
totimpt−1 1.222 0.317 0.064 −0.561∗ −0.187
(1.038) (0.161) (0.099) (0.248) (0.107)
totimpt−2 0.368∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.147 0.059 −0.182∗
(0.147) (0.103) (0.078) (0.182) (0.077)
totimpt−3 0.439 0.102 −0.111 0.954∗∗∗ 0.102
(0.253) (0.115) (0.152) (0.280) (0.119)
totimpt−4 0.400∗ 0.340∗ 0.026 0.233 −0.104
(0.186) (0.141) (0.050) (0.140) (0.056)
totimpt−5 0.161 −0.062 0.035 0.148 −0.145
(0.116) (0.126) (0.053) (0.167) (0.114)
totimpt−6 0.187∗ 0.270∗ −0.010 −0.249 0.044
(0.082) (0.132) (0.048) (0.259) (0.136)
totimpt−7 0.266 0.430∗∗∗ 0.039 0.104 −0.004
(0.153) (0.090) (0.054) (0.163) (0.062)
totimpt−8 0.273 0.087 0.089 −0.152 0.044
(0.197) (0.112) (0.101) (0.384) (0.046)
totimpt−9 0.075 −0.228 0.005 −0.096 0.051
(0.080) (0.122) (0.065) (0.159) (0.081)
totimpt−10 0.172∗ 0.196 0.054 0.514 −0.062
(0.067) (0.121) (0.043) (0.335) (0.094)
totimpt−11 0.217∗ 0.019 −0.064 −0.447∗ 0.075
(0.101) (0.130) (0.080) (0.178) (0.106)
Observations 4887 4106 2486 2465 2852
R2 0.093 0.134 0.116 0.295 0.139
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is consumer
prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors
in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included but not reported.
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Table 5.17: Impact of disasters in high income countries, by type of disaster
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
Earthquakes
Quarter 0 0.237 −0.493 −0.156 −1.055∗ −0.247
Quarter 1 0.511 0.803 0.486∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗ −0.327
Quarters 2-3 0.170 0.940 −0.162 −0.732∗∗ −0.852∗∗
Year 1 0.917 1.250 0.167 −1.109 −1.427∗∗
Year 2 0.131 0.647 −0.134 −0.814 −1.621∗∗∗
Year 3 0.847 1.688 −0.071 −4.991∗∗∗ −1.614∗∗∗
Storms
Quarter 0 1.622 0.269 −0.034 −3.414∗∗∗ 0.160
Quarter 1 1.736 0.297 −0.052 −0.931∗∗∗ −0.139
Quarters 2-3 1.232∗ 0.396 0.002 1.683∗∗∗ 0.135
Year 1 4.590 0.963∗∗ −0.084 −2.661∗∗∗ 0.156
Year 2 1.497∗ 1.266∗∗∗ −0.026 0.544 0.128
Year 3 0.958∗ −0.079 −0.122 −0.013 0.327
Floods
Quarter 0 −0.191 −0.080 0.017 0.405 −0.548∗∗
Quarter 1 0.039 0.320 0.066 0.264 −0.282
Quarters 2-3 −0.656 −0.873∗ 0.129 −2.785 −0.732
Year 1 −0.807 −0.633 0.212 −2.117 −1.561∗
Year 2 −1.687 −1.170 0.217 −0.302 −0.926
Year 3 −1.903 −1.022 0.353 0.279 −0.286
Observations 7670 6847 4653 5180 5443
R2 0.086 0.143 0.106 0.353 0.164
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is consumer
prices excluding food, housing and energy. Underlying regression estimates available on request.
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Table 5.18: Impact of disasters in middle and low income countries – re-
gression coefficients
Headline Food Housing & Energy CPIxFHE
totimp 0.158∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.033 0.013
(0.058) (0.036) (0.030) (0.037)
totimpt−1 0.104∗ 0.094∗ −0.025 −0.047
(0.051) (0.042) (0.032) (0.029)
totimpt−2 0.073 −0.070 −0.004 −0.033
(0.074) (0.046) (0.027) (0.032)
totimpt−3 0.032 −0.066 0.035 −0.051
(0.055) (0.038) (0.028) (0.043)
totimpt−4 0.101 −0.012 0.002 0.019
(0.102) (0.030) (0.035) (0.029)
totimpt−5 0.135 −0.051 0.033 −0.059
(0.121) (0.038) (0.028) (0.041)
totimpt−6 0.173 0.025 −0.021 −0.020
(0.102) (0.047) (0.027) (0.018)
totimpt−7 0.185 0.025 −0.014 −0.011
(0.156) (0.031) (0.028) (0.020)
totimpt−8 0.155 0.041 0.066 0.066
(0.088) (0.053) (0.051) (0.040)
totimpt−9 0.124 0.036 −0.053 −0.065
(0.087) (0.052) (0.033) (0.049)
totimpt−10 0.131 0.014 −0.042∗ 0.049
(0.068) (0.063) (0.020) (0.057)
totimpt−11 0.080 0.091 −0.018 −0.018
(0.053) (0.050) (0.040) (0.020)
Observations 14801 12086 7301 7196
R2 0.057 0.042 0.064 0.057
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is consumer
prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors
in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included but not reported.
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Table 5.19: Impact of disasters in middle and low income countries, by
type
Headline Food Housing & Energy CPIxFHE
Earthquakes
Quarter 0 0.230 0.253∗ 0.073 −0.083
Quarter 1 0.028 −0.125 −0.022 −0.205∗∗∗
Quarters 2-3 0.005 −0.224 −0.210∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗
Year 1 0.262 −0.096 −0.159 −0.530∗∗∗
Year 2 0.413 0.221 0.017 −0.348∗∗
Year 3 0.264 0.321 −0.327∗ −0.267
Storms
Quarter 0 0.044 0.181∗ 0.032 0.023
Quarter 1 −0.017 0.220∗ −0.067 −0.076
Quarters 2-3 −0.216∗ −0.378∗∗∗ 0.095 −0.123
Year 1 −0.189 0.023 0.060 −0.176
Year 2 −0.186 −0.046 −0.054 −0.140
Year 3 −0.118 0.065 −0.061 0.245
Floods
Quarter 0 0.404∗∗ 0.155 −0.007 −0.141
Quarter 1 0.192 0.084 −0.006 −0.157∗∗
Quarters 2-3 0.381 −0.159 0.002 −0.007
Year 1 0.978 0.080 −0.012 −0.305
Year 2 1.790 0.018 −0.015 −0.025
Year 3 1.552 0.276 −0.387 0.041
Droughts
Quarter 0 1.453∗ 0.517 0.297 0.149
Quarter 1 1.376∗ 0.391 −0.103 −0.098
Quarters 2-3 2.165 0.058 −0.067 −0.590∗
Year 1 4.994∗ 0.966 0.128 −0.540
Year 2 7.359 0.292 0.246 −0.028
Year 3 5.374∗ 1.856 −0.109 −0.099
Observations 14680 12031 7262 7157
R2 0.063 0.045 0.068 0.065
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE
is consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Underlying regression
estimates available on request.
5.B. APPENDIX – REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 179
Table 5.20: Impact of severe disasters in high income countries – major
disaster coefficients
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
totimp −0.060 0.041 0.778∗ 0.047 −0.106
(0.196) (0.344) (0.374) (0.261) (0.487)
totimpt−1 0.218 1.305∗ 1.219∗ −0.168 0.776
(0.301) (0.613) (0.486) (0.298) (0.502)
totimpt−2 0.097 −0.176 1.273∗ −0.010 0.114
(0.238) (0.375) (0.601) (0.317) (0.627)
totimpt−3 0.014 0.628 0.263 0.713 0.198
(0.213) (0.355) (0.593) (0.496) (0.337)
totimpt−4 0.156 0.383 −1.154 −0.207 −0.244
(0.132) (0.437) (0.729) (0.226) (0.374)
totimpt−5 0.039 −0.152 −0.960∗ −0.205 −0.017
(0.114) (0.382) (0.446) (0.188) (0.286)
totimpt−6 0.092 −0.375 −0.728 −0.030 −0.330
(0.151) (0.436) (0.370) (0.740) (0.330)
totimpt−7 −0.167 −0.350 −0.389 0.291 −0.019
(0.188) (0.335) (0.348) (0.440) (0.199)
totimpt−8 0.012 0.584 −0.541 0.092 0.096
(0.171) (0.440) (0.409) (0.215) (0.284)
totimpt−9 −0.101 0.851∗ −0.474 −0.171 0.443
(0.241) (0.339) (0.478) (0.379) (0.271)
totimpt−10 −0.127 −0.343 −0.330 −0.073 0.217
(0.127) (0.281) (0.385) (0.297) (0.292)
totimpt−11 −0.257 −0.304 −0.245∗ −0.557 −0.010
(0.141) (0.206) (0.107) (0.481) (0.090)
Observations 7670 6847 4653 5180 5443
R2 0.077 0.136 0.103 0.340 0.160
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is
consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
standard errors in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included
but not reported. Coefficients in tables 5.20 and 5.21 estimated jointly.
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Table 5.21: Impact of severe disasters in high income countries – severe
disaster coefficients
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
totsevimp 0.483 0.006 −0.904∗ −1.007 0.133
(0.385) (0.352) (0.383) (0.946) (0.504)
totsevimpt−1 0.286 −1.181 −1.252∗ 0.072 −0.902
(0.519) (0.611) (0.488) (0.338) (0.503)
totsevimpt−2 −0.104 0.219 −1.290∗ −0.226 −0.205
(0.312) (0.394) (0.605) (0.367) (0.653)
totsevimpt−3 0.095 −0.698 −0.377 −0.326 −0.165
(0.241) (0.366) (0.583) (0.603) (0.351)
totsevimpt−4 −0.048 −0.229 1.133 0.208 0.197
(0.165) (0.444) (0.749) (0.286) (0.374)
totsevimpt−5 −0.055 −0.026 0.886 0.131 −0.078
(0.134) (0.379) (0.454) (0.238) (0.288)
totsevimpt−6 −0.038 0.428 0.677 0.035 0.322
(0.167) (0.462) (0.375) (0.758) (0.330)
totsevimpt−7 0.249 0.506 0.340 −0.383 −0.001
(0.198) (0.373) (0.349) (0.448) (0.196)
totsevimpt−8 0.017 −0.643 0.632 −0.087 −0.144
(0.190) (0.447) (0.404) (0.342) (0.307)
totsevimpt−9 0.012 −1.128∗∗ 0.524 0.084 −0.476
(0.255) (0.345) (0.477) (0.405) (0.279)
totsevimpt−10 0.203 0.509 0.254 0.386 −0.253
(0.134) (0.297) (0.406) (0.448) (0.341)
totsevimpt−11 0.345∗ 0.282 0.241 0.292 0.080
(0.137) (0.202) (0.151) (0.519) (0.121)
Observations 7670 6847 4653 5180 5443
R2 0.077 0.136 0.103 0.340 0.160
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is
consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
standard errors in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included
but not reported. Coefficients in tables 5.20 and 5.21 estimated jointly.
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Table 5.22: Impact of severe disasters in middle and low income countries
– major disaster coefficients
Headline Food Housing & energy CPIxFHE
totimp 0.886 0.069 −0.257 0.072
(0.823) (0.165) (0.153) (0.130)
totimpt−1 0.376 0.308 −0.156 0.019
(0.243) (0.195) (0.207) (0.142)
totimpt−2 −0.152 −0.634∗∗ −0.202 −0.143
(0.191) (0.188) (0.125) (0.090)
totimpt−3 −0.002 −0.305 0.109 −0.213
(0.198) (0.173) (0.151) (0.108)
totimpt−4 −0.129 0.041 −0.055 0.030
(0.230) (0.155) (0.132) (0.118)
totimpt−5 0.161 0.070 0.063 0.096
(0.176) (0.209) (0.107) (0.148)
totimpt−6 −0.017 −0.143 −0.036 −0.171
(0.183) (0.233) (0.138) (0.189)
totimpt−7 −0.208 −0.142 −0.018 −0.152
(0.193) (0.131) (0.176) (0.092)
totimpt−8 −0.073 −0.198 −0.173 −0.058
(0.215) (0.152) (0.092) (0.185)
totimpt−9 −0.066 −0.039 −0.294∗ −0.200
(0.227) (0.201) (0.118) (0.116)
totimpt−10 −0.035 −0.267 −0.169∗ −0.143
(0.206) (0.215) (0.079) (0.088)
totimpt−11 −0.177 −0.469∗ −0.312∗∗∗ −0.045
(0.154) (0.181) (0.074) (0.083)
Observations 14801 12086 7301 7196
R2 0.058 0.044 0.066 0.059
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is
consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
standard errors in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included
but not reported. Coefficients in tables 5.22 and 5.23 estimated jointly.
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Table 5.23: Impact of severe disasters in middle and low income countries
– severe disaster coefficients
Headline Food Housing & energy CPIxFHE
totsevimp −0.765 0.038 0.314∗ −0.065
(0.836) (0.170) (0.157) (0.127)
totsevimpt−1 −0.285 −0.228 0.136 −0.071
(0.257) (0.192) (0.210) (0.151)
totsevimpt−2 0.240 0.597∗∗ 0.210 0.115
(0.202) (0.199) (0.129) (0.101)
totsevimpt−3 0.036 0.250 −0.080 0.173
(0.195) (0.169) (0.152) (0.130)
totsevimpt−4 0.240 −0.059 0.059 −0.012
(0.227) (0.166) (0.132) (0.119)
totsevimpt−5 −0.027 −0.128 −0.031 −0.165
(0.169) (0.213) (0.109) (0.161)
totsevimpt−6 0.199 0.176 0.016 0.158
(0.177) (0.228) (0.147) (0.195)
totsevimpt−7 0.410∗ 0.172 −0.000 0.150
(0.206) (0.133) (0.167) (0.097)
totsevimpt−8 0.236 0.247 0.251∗ 0.129
(0.204) (0.167) (0.109) (0.184)
totsevimpt−9 0.197 0.074 0.249∗ 0.140
(0.204) (0.219) (0.106) (0.137)
totsevimpt−10 0.172 0.291 0.132 0.202
(0.219) (0.256) (0.079) (0.103)
totsevimpt−11 0.265 0.580∗∗ 0.308∗∗ 0.026
(0.167) (0.205) (0.096) (0.088)
Observations 14801 12086 7301 7196
R2 0.058 0.044 0.066 0.059
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is
consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
standard errors in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included
but not reported. Coefficients in tables 5.22 and 5.23 estimated jointly.
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Table 5.24: Impact of severe disasters in middle and low income countries,
by type of disaster
Headline Food Housing & energy CPIxFHE
Earthquakes
Quarter 0 0.529 0.643∗ 0.177 −0.184
Quarter 1 −0.165 −0.300 −0.136 −0.493∗∗
Quarters 2-3 0.005 −0.627 −0.492∗ −0.631∗∗
Year 1 0.369 −0.284 −0.451 −1.308∗∗∗
Year 2 1.296 0.243 0.015 −0.955∗∗
Year 3 1.069 0.848 −0.744 −0.682
Storms
Quarter 0 0.104 0.655∗ 0.091 0.041
Quarter 1 −0.064 0.741∗ −0.250 −0.276
Quarters 2-3 −0.709 −1.299∗∗∗ 0.380 −0.442
Year 1 −0.669 0.098 0.221 −0.676
Year 2 −0.563 −0.139 −0.218 −0.473
Year 3 −0.370 0.306 −0.197 0.898
Floods
Quarter 0 1.141∗∗ 0.343 0.223 −0.416
Quarter 1 0.662 0.317 0.118 −0.414∗
Quarters 2-3 1.339 −0.108 −0.070 0.200
Year 1 3.143 0.552 0.271 −0.630
Year 2 5.160 0.122 −0.008 0.024
Year 3 4.130 0.690 −0.834 0.210
Droughts
Quarter 0 1.957∗ 1.141 0.949∗ 0.108
Quarter 1 2.396 0.264 −0.068 −0.250
Quarters 2-3 4.309 0.972 −0.088 −1.020∗
Year 1 8.662∗ 2.378 0.793 −1.162
Year 2 15.317 0.567 0.456 −0.098
Year 3 11.454∗∗ 4.589 0.476 0.027
Observations 14801 12086 7301 7196
R2 0.066 0.052 0.075 0.069
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE
is consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Underlying regression
estimates available on request.
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Table 5.25: Impact of disasters, damage to GDP – regression coefficients
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
totdam 0.012 0.024∗∗∗ −0.039 0.186 −0.001
(0.009) (0.007) (0.025) (0.138) (0.004)
totdamt−1 0.004 0.012 0.025 0.169 −0.011
(0.006) (0.007) (0.023) (0.100) (0.007)
totdamt−2 −0.003 −0.018∗∗ −0.003 −0.136 0.000
(0.009) (0.006) (0.035) (0.090) (0.008)
totdamt−3 −0.003 −0.015 −0.007 −0.012 −0.008
(0.007) (0.008) (0.035) (0.055) (0.005)
totdamt−4 0.008 0.004 −0.074 0.263 −0.005
(0.012) (0.007) (0.045) (0.158) (0.003)
totdamt−5 0.011 −0.002 −0.032 −0.005 −0.006
(0.013) (0.009) (0.023) (0.068) (0.005)
totdamt−6 0.009 −0.001 0.013 0.141 0.002
(0.011) (0.008) (0.030) (0.107) (0.004)
totdamt−7 0.013 −0.002 0.003 0.254 −0.005
(0.015) (0.005) (0.019) (0.165) (0.005)
totdamt−8 0.020 0.018∗∗ −0.085∗∗ 0.001 0.017
(0.011) (0.006) (0.032) (0.109) (0.012)
totdamt−9 0.024∗ 0.033∗ 0.020 −0.061 −0.004
(0.010) (0.015) (0.036) (0.100) (0.020)
totdamt−10 0.005 −0.003 0.034 −0.060 0.016
(0.005) (0.012) (0.028) (0.069) (0.016)
totdamt−11 0.004 −0.001 −0.008∗ −0.018 −0.002
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004)
Observations 22471 18933 8191 9167 12639
R2 0.047 0.042 0.044 0.172 0.053
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is
consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
standard errors in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included
but not reported.
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Table 5.26: Impact of disasters by number in high income countries – re-
gression coefficients
Headline Food Housing Energy CPIxFHE
totnum 0.477 0.277 0.109 −0.804∗ −0.076
(0.315) (0.215) (0.157) (0.387) (0.137)
totnumt−1 0.815∗ 0.595∗ 0.400 −0.329 0.151
(0.361) (0.263) (0.225) (0.565) (0.193)
totnumt−2 0.363 −0.003 0.244 −0.329 −0.081
(0.278) (0.157) (0.177) (0.564) (0.142)
totnumt−3 0.279 0.054 0.068 0.909∗ 0.040
(0.172) (0.171) (0.271) (0.402) (0.115)
totnumt−4 0.126 0.245 −0.092 −0.126 −0.192
(0.143) (0.235) (0.229) (0.288) (0.136)
totnumt−5 −0.081 −0.101 −0.289 −0.192 −0.053
(0.168) (0.244) (0.175) (0.268) (0.157)
totnumt−6 0.008 0.060 −0.202 −0.548 0.126
(0.125) (0.197) (0.139) (0.454) (0.167)
totnumt−7 0.033 −0.009 −0.026 0.147 0.005
(0.160) (0.190) (0.160) (0.350) (0.131)
totnumt−8 −0.024 0.126 0.062 0.118 −0.084
(0.191) (0.173) (0.216) (0.305) (0.131)
totnumt−9 0.066 0.242 0.019 −0.034 0.213
(0.225) (0.249) (0.183) (0.398) (0.153)
totnumt−10 0.010 0.047 −0.038 0.005 0.145
(0.146) (0.197) (0.195) (0.303) (0.161)
totnumt−11 −0.046 −0.193 −0.230 −0.257 0.112
(0.192) (0.203) (0.231) (0.325) (0.125)
Observations 7670 6847 4653 5180 5443
R2 0.076 0.134 0.099 0.336 0.159
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is
consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
standard errors in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included
but not reported.
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Table 5.27: Impact of disasters by number in middle and low income coun-
tries – regression coefficients
Headline Food Housing & energy CPIxFHE
totnum 0.578∗ 0.319∗∗ −0.229 −0.024
(0.227) (0.120) (0.136) (0.093)
totnumt−1 0.212 0.051 −0.128 −0.126
(0.233) (0.131) (0.104) (0.073)
totnumt−2 −0.204 −0.612∗∗∗ −0.156 −0.107
(0.214) (0.179) (0.109) (0.084)
totnumt−3 0.029 −0.068 −0.103 −0.200∗∗
(0.216) (0.171) (0.075) (0.073)
totnumt−4 0.171 0.109 −0.159 0.086
(0.254) (0.090) (0.090) (0.112)
totnumt−5 0.236 −0.277∗ 0.040 −0.050
(0.289) (0.128) (0.073) (0.082)
totnumt−6 0.412 −0.118 0.080 −0.131
(0.274) (0.127) (0.097) (0.075)
totnumt−7 0.564 0.109 −0.043 −0.034
(0.369) (0.091) (0.099) (0.069)
totnumt−8 0.622 0.213 −0.078 0.084
(0.365) (0.132) (0.068) (0.189)
totnumt−9 0.326 −0.045 −0.240∗ −0.296∗∗∗
(0.289) (0.130) (0.111) (0.081)
totnumt−10 0.343 −0.150 −0.125 −0.118
(0.252) (0.121) (0.116) (0.108)
totnumt−11 0.410∗ 0.129 −0.317∗∗∗ −0.082
(0.200) (0.121) (0.090) (0.062)
Observations 14801 12086 7301 7196
R2 0.056 0.043 0.065 0.057
Notes: *, **,*** significant at 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level respectively. CPIxFHE is
consumer prices excluding food, housing and energy. Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
standard errors in parentheses. Country and quarterly time fixed effects included
but not reported.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and areas for future
research
This thesis investigates four areas of incomplete knowledge surrounding
inflation dynamics that are of interest to monetary policy makers. To in-
vestigate these areas, four questions are asked: Why are prices sticky? How
do exporters set their prices? What is the role of global inflation factors in driving
domestic inflation? How do disasters affect inflation? The answers to those
questions are summarised below, together with ideas for future research
based on these findings.
6.1 Why are prices sticky?
The extent of price stickiness in the economy has bearing on inflation dy-
namics and the ability of monetary policy to affect real activity. There are a
number of theories on the causes of this stickiness, but differentiating be-
tween them is not straightforward, even with data on firms’ prices. A large
survey of New Zealand firms provides insight into the pricing behaviour
of firms, and the reasons for which they may choose to not change prices.
The responses to the survey point to a wide heterogeneity in pricing
behaviour by New Zealand firms. There is a notable divergence between
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sectors, but also within sectors, with many sectors having both firms that
reset prices on a daily basis and those that reset prices less frequently than
annually. The median number of times a New Zealand firms reviews its
prices is twice per year, but the median number of changes is one.
In terms of the underlying causes of price stickiness, the rigidity that
firms were most likely to cite as being ‘very important’ for not changing
prices is explicit contracts. Implicit contracts, where the firm wishes to
maintain an ongoing relationship and does not wish to antagonise its cus-
tomers, was the second most recognised reason. There is little support
in the responses for two popular theoretical justifications for stickiness –
menu costs and sticky information.
One interesting finding from this research is that there is a greater de-
gree of price stickiness in firm-to-firm relationships than firm to consumer.
This suggests that stickiness is more prevalent in producer than in con-
sumer prices. According to the literature, monetary policy should tar-
get the sector with relatively stickier prices (see, e.g. Aoki, 2001; Benigno,
2004). This raises the question whether inflation targets should be set in
terms of producer rather than consumer prices. An avenue for further re-
search would be to explicitly model these stylised facts for New Zealand
in a DSGE model that explicitly accounts for the two sectors and relative
stickiness to investigate the implications for monetary policy.
6.2 How do exporters set their prices?
The literature on how exchange rate movements affect domestic prices is
vast. That there is a disconnect between the domestic price of internation-
ally traded goods and exchange rate movements is a widespread empirical
observation. The causes of that disconnect are less certain, and a number
of theories have been advanced. A survey of export pricing behaviour is
used to examine the pricing behaviour of firms along two dimensions: the
choice over currency of invoice and the choice of whether to differentiate
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prices across markets.
Contrary to the common assumption in the literature, primary sector
firms do differentiate their prices across markets, even when other firm
characteristics such as size and productivity are taken into account. Pri-
mary sector firms are also more likely to invoice in third-party, or vehicle,
currencies. This finding accords with previous research.
The advantage of using a survey is that it also allows consideration
of service sector firms, which have been largely ignored in the literature.
Trade in services is a sizeable and growing share of exports for advanced
economies. Service sector firms appear to differentiate prices in a similar
fashion to manufacturers.
As noted in chapter 3, one of the problems associated with surveys is
whether respondents act in the way that they report. One avenue for fu-
ture research would be to take these survey responses and match them to
firms within Statistics New Zealand’s micro data laboratory. That would
enable the matching of survey responses (complete with behavioural drivers
unobservable in the price data) with the relevant price data.
6.3 What is the role of global inflation factors in
driving domestic inflation?
With many goods traded on international markets, it is unsurprising that
there is some influence of international prices on domestic prices. Recent
research on advanced economies has suggested that these global inflation
factors can explain a large share of national inflation variance – perhaps as
high as 70 percent. The weakness of the global inflation literature to date
is that it has been concentrated on a relatively small number of rich coun-
tries. This thesis has widened the scope of the analysis by constructing a
consumer price database for 223 countries and territories, using national
and international sources.
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The wider sample of countries provides contrasting results. That global
factors can explain a large share of inflation variance in advanced coun-
tries is confirmed, but the result does not generalise for less developed
countries. Only a small share of inflation variance in low income coun-
tries can be explained by global factors. More generally, higher income
per capita, greater financial development and greater central bank trans-
parency are associated with a greater explanatory role for global factors.
In terms of sub-components, global factors account for a large share of the
variance of food and energy prices, but a smaller share of the variance of
other sub-components.
There are a number of avenues for future research that are made pos-
sible by the data collected and presented in chapter 4. The persistence of
inflation has important implications for the conduct of monetary policy,
and the costs of disinflation (see Fuhrer and Moore, 1995). The literature
focuses on headline inflation, but the data here provide the ability to ex-
tend the literature by determining whether persistence is driven by partic-
ular sub-indices. There is also a debate whether persistence has changed
(e.g. Cogley and Sargent, 2002; Pivetta and Reis, 2007; Stock and Watson,
2007; Ho et al., 2009). It may be possible to determine structural breaks in
headline inflation more accurately using the information contained across
sub-indices.
6.4 What is the impact of disasters on inflation?
Disasters caused by natural hazards have the potential to cause massive
economic disruption. To date, little is known about the impact of these
disasters on prices and the analysis here is the first systematic assessment
of the impact of disasters on inflation. How prices change following a
disaster is clearly of relevance for policymakers when considering how to
react in the immediate aftermath, but is also important for ex ante plan-
ning.
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Two databases are combined in the analysis here to determine the im-
pact of disasters on inflation. The findings point to a wide degree of het-
erogeneity of impact. The impact of disasters on inflation in advanced
countries is almost exclusively negligible and insignificant. In developing
countries, disasters have the potential to cause lingering periods of infla-
tion several years after the event. There are also differences in impact by
type of disaster and by the sub-index. With greater certainty around the
impact on prices, it will be possible in future research to consider how
monetary policy should react to disasters, one of the main remaining gaps
in the literature on disasters.
As noted in chapter 5, the implications of disasters for monetary pol-
icy is one of the main lacunae in the literature. The research presented
here provides a the first step in understanding those implications. To pro-
vide more concrete guidance for monetary policy makers faced with large
disasters, future research could construct a general equilibrium model to
consider optimal responses, using the results found here.
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